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Abstract 
The aim of this doctoral research project is to examine the impact of financialisation on 
income inequality and on business cycles. More precisely, the present study seeks to answer 
three core research questions: (i) Were the business cycles of the USA and the UK driven 
endogenously by the private debt aggregates since the late 19th century as suggested by Hyman 
Minsky’s behavioural theory of economic fluctuations? (ii) Did the private debt aggregates 
and real share prices contribute to declines in labour share growth in France, Sweden, and the 
USA since the late 19th century? (iii) Which financial variables are linked to the rise of the top 
one per cent income share in the neoliberal era in the USA, Germany, and Sweden?  
Chapter 1 provides strong econometric evidence for corporate debt-driven cycles a la 
Minsky in the US economy since it is found that the corporate debt ratio has been procyclical, 
and GDP and investment growth have been corporate debt-burdened in the full sample period. 
There is also weak evidence for Minskyan mortgage debt-driven cycles in the USA. Regarding 
the UK, there is evidence that its corporate leverage ratio has been procyclical. Chapter 2 
shows that there is robust evidence that the mortgage debt accumulation has led to decreases 
in the labour shares of France, Sweden, and the USA since the late 19th century. For Sweden, 
real share prices and stock market capitalisation also exhibit negative effects on its labour 
share in historical context.  However, the econometric findings suggest that the effects of 
power resources variables like union density and government spending are stronger than those 
of the financial variables. Chapter 3 estimates econometrically the determinants of the top one 
per cent income share in the neoliberal era. The results of the estimations suggest that real 
share prices increase the top percentiles of the USA and Sweden, dominating the other 
explanatory variables in terms of magnitude. In the neo-mercantilist, export-oriented economy 
of Germany it is the positive effect of trade globalisation that prevails over the rest explanatory 
variables, with finance playing a limited role. Unlike functional income inequality, the effects 
of financial variables prevail over those of power resources variables on the top one per cent.  
The findings of this research project show that the financialisation of different sectors 
of the economy have different effects on the macroeconomy. Therefore, the concept of 
financialisation should be perceived as a dynamic, transforming process which has been 
historically integral to capitalism and should be studied in a comparative perspective by 
considering cross-country and cross-period discrepancies. 
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Introduction 
 
The great financial crisis of 2007-08 has been the biggest financial crisis since the great crash 
of 1929. Unlike the 1929 crisis, the 2007-08 collapse did not result in a great depression in 
most advanced economies. Exceptions are some southern European countries who did 
experience relatively long recession periods. However, even if the contractionary effects of 
the 2007-08 financial crisis have not been long-lasting, this historical event has raised the 
interest in the potentially destabilising role of finance. Thus, scholarship on the impact of 
finance on the economy and society has gained more prominence in social sciences during the 
last ten years (van der Zwan, 2014). This phenomenon has been characterised as the 
financialisation of the economy, which according to Epstein (2005, p. 3) refers to “…the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions”. The vast majority of the studies within this field come from the heterodox 
political economy tradition, i.e. Post-Keynesian economics (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; 
Orhangazi, 2008; Palley, 2013; Hein, 2015), classical Marxist Political Economy (Lapavitsas, 
2011; Fine, 2013), Monopoly Capitalism/Monthly Review school (Foster, 2007), and French 
Regulation School (Aglietta, 2000; Boyer, 2000). In addition, scholars within the disciplines 
of International Political Economy, Cultural Political Economy, and Sociology (e.g. Froud et 
al., 2002; Krippner, 2005; Aalbers, 2008; Montgomerie, 2006, 2009; Wood, 2018a, 2018b) 
also discuss aspects of the impact of the increased dominance of the finance sector over the 
real economy. More recently, quantitative macroeconomic historians have explored questions 
related to the effects of finance on the macroeconomy since the mid-19th century (Schularick 
and Taylor, 2012; Jordá et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al., 2013). The rising interest of 
scholars with diverse academic backgrounds in this field of scholarship pinpoints that this 
phenomenon is indeed of great importance. 
To understand what the term financialisation means, first, we have to define it. Several 
broad definitions of financialisation have appeared through the years, but so far there is no 
canonical definition. This fact is not surprising in the sense that there is no unifying framework 
for the analysis of financialisation and its effects on the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
level. Different theoretical approaches have focused on different aspects of its impact, but so 
far, all aspects have not been integrated into a grand theory of financialisation. In general, we 
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can define financialisation as the phenomenon of the increased dominance of the financial 
sector over the real economy which triggers behavioural changes in the micro level that 
ultimately result in macroeconomic instability, greater imbalances, and rising income 
inequality. There are two broad areas of financialisation scholarship: (a) the impact of finance 
on growth; and (b) the effects of financialisation on the balance of power between different 
social classes which determines the distribution of income. The first area, i.e. the effects of 
finance on growth, has been historically dominated by Post-Keynesian scholars who build on 
the seminal works of Hyman Minsky (1975, 1986, 1992), with some more recent empirical 
contributions from macroeconomic historians. The second area has been more open as social 
scientists from different disciplines have examined how the dependence of different social 
groups on finance affects their bargaining position, thus income distribution. More broadly, 
Sawyer (2013) distinguishes two perceptions in the financialisation literature: financialisation 
as an integral part of the capitalist economy which has ups and downs throughout the decades, 
and financialisation as a distinct stage of capitalism. Most of the financialisation literature 
implicitly or explicitly falls under the second category (Lapavitsas, 2011; van der Zwan, 
2014). Scholars within this approach even go as far as to use the term financialisation as 
synonymous to neoliberalism (Ioannou and Wójcik, 2019). Unlike those studies, the present 
doctoral research project examines the impact of financialisation on growth and income 
inequality by considering finance as historically integral to the capitalist system, i.e. rejects 
that neoliberalism and financialisation are synonymous terms. In this respect, it is essential to 
analyse how the financialisation of different sectors of the economy affect the behaviour of 
labour, capital, and rentiers and how this influence triggers changes at the macroeconomic 
level.  
The first dimension of the dominance of finance over the economy is the 
financialisation of non-financial corporations in the form of rising business debt accumulation. 
The dependence of non-financial firms on private financial institutions has implications both 
in terms of macroeconomic instability and in terms of shifting the balance of power towards 
capital owners. Regarding macroeconomic instability, Hyman Minsky has been the first 
economist to provide an analytical framework for the analysis of corporate debt-driven 
endogenous business cycles. According to his approach, in periods of economic stability in 
which demand grows, firms tend to become more optimistic, thus they want to invest more. 
As their desired investment rate rises faster than retained profits, they decide to become riskier 
and increase their debt ratios in order to cover this funding gap. The additional sources of 
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investment funding do increase investment in the short-run leading to a boom period. However, 
the accumulation of corporate debt increases debt service commitments, hence firms save a 
gradually rising portion of their retained profits in order to repay their debt which eventually 
decreases their investment expenditure in the medium/long-run. In addition, eventually private 
banks realise that this debt-driven growth model is unsustainable, therefore their uncertainty 
rises which leads them to increase the price of borrowing deteriorating further the financial 
position of firms. The subsequent decrease in investment expenditure, due to the deteriorating 
financial position of firms and banks, and prospects for sustainable economic growth leads to 
a slowdown in accumulation which results in rising unemployment. The decrease in demand 
for labour increases the competition in the labour market, creating downward pressures on 
wages which eventually harms effective demand further. Beyond inducing endogenous crises, 
the accumulation of business debt by non-financial firms can also have an effect on the balance 
of power between capital and labour. As suggested by scholars within the Kaleckian tradition 
(Hein, 2007; Argitis and Dafermos, 2013) it is likely that, if firms are relatively more powerful 
relative to labour in the first place, firm managers will attempt to counterbalance the 
deterioration in firms’ financial position due to debt accumulation by squeezing real wages. In 
this respect, given a pro-capital environment, firms have the power to incorporate their debt 
service commitments into their price mark-ups, i.e. shift functional income distribution 
towards capital. In the majority of advanced political economies, this decrease in the wage 
shares can indeed harm growth, given the results of empirical growth regime studies which 
show that demand is wage-led. That means that the magnitude of the decrease in consumption 
expenditure due to the falling wage share is larger than the magnitude of the relevant positive 
effect on investment (since wages are part of production cost), therefore a decrease in the wage 
share will induce a recession. Summarising, the harmful macroeconomic effects of corporate 
debt accumulation are dual as it can either directly decrease investment in the medium/long-
run in the Minskyan sense or create contractionary effects due to the decrease in the wage share 
in wage-led economies as in Kalecki (1954). 
The second dimension of the dominance of finance over the economy is the 
financialisation of non-financial corporations in terms of the impact of the growth of stock 
markets on corporate governance. The first contributions to analyse the impact of the influence 
of the stock market for the macroeconomy appeared during the 1980s with the papers of Beja 
and Goldman (1980) and Taylor and O’Connell (1985). According to the influential model of 
Beja and Goldman (1980), stock markets are constituted of fundamentalist and chartist 
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investors. The former tend to be more reluctant and invest with a long-term scope, while the 
latter act speculatively inducing higher share prices in the short-term. The coexistence of these 
stabilising and destabilising dynamics created by the two groups of investors can generate 
speculative asset prices cycles. But how that relates to the distribution of income? While 
normally the goal of firm managers is to efficiently choose long-term, secure investments that 
will yield profits, the growth of stock markets creates a new social group of influence: the 
shareholders. The income of shareholders is directly linked to the value of the company shares 
they hold; thus, it is of their interest to keep the share prices to the highest possible level in 
order to maximise dividend payments. In this regard, they exhibit pressure on firm managers 
to act accordingly. In the absence of enough private demand for shares, the straightforward 
way to retain high stock prices is to buy back shares of the company in order to internally 
increase the demand. To achieve that consistently substantial funding resources are needed. 
Hence, firm managers are likely to increase firms’ corporate debt ratios in order to buy back 
shares and pursue the maximisation of shareholder value, i.e. dividend payments. According 
to Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000), this process is characterised as the rise of short-termism in 
corporate governance. The core difference between the two forms of corporate financialisation 
is the initial incentive to increase corporate indebtedness: here it is the rise and the influence 
of shareholder class that induces firms to take on more debt, rather than firms’ optimism and 
desire to invest more and more. As discussed earlier, if firms have power over labour, they will 
attempt to incorporate those debt service commitments into their price mark-ups, i.e. squeeze 
real wages in order to improve their financial position. As this wage share reduction decreases 
consumption, a recession is likely to occur, especially in an economy where demand is wage-
led. Another possibility that arises in the scenario of the shareholder value oriented form of 
financialisation is that the growth of stock markets may benefit part of the working class, 
instead of squeezing its income. Upper-middle class workers may have access to buy shares, 
thus the increase in shareholder value can provide them with an additional non-wage source of 
income which depends positively on financialisation. Accordingly, rising share prices can 
indeed increase the bargaining power of the upper working class, given that a substantial part 
of shares is owned by them.  
The third main dimension of financialisation is the financialisation of households in 
terms of household and mortgage debt accumulation by them. While Minsky’s original thesis 
on private indebtedness’s destabilising impact is focused on corporate debt, the issue of rapidly 
rising household indebtedness has become particularly popular after the 2007-08 housing-
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driven crisis in the USA. A substantial part of the social sciences literature has focused on the 
connection among the accumulation of household debt, workers’ loss of bargaining power, and 
higher inequality during neoliberalism. The argument that inequality may be exacerbated due 
to rising household indebtedness first appeared within the Foucauldian cultural political 
economy literature (Froud et al. 2002; Langley, 2007). According to cultural political 
economists, financialisation has transformed investor identities, inducing working class’ self-
discipline and loss aversion behaviour due to its dependence on finance. Rising debt 
commitments make workers more insecure about defaulting on their debt, therefore they avoid 
endangering their employment by negotiating more aggressively for higher wages. Of course, 
this linkage depends on country-specific institutional complementarities. According to 
Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) in statist-developmentalist economies, like Sweden, the 
disciplinary effects of mortgage debt accumulation are likely to be modest as indebted 
homeowners are more protected by the state since housing is perceived a social right.  By the 
same token, Argitis and Dafermos (2013) also discuss the potential negative wage impact of 
household debt accumulation arguing that its disciplinary effect depends on labour power 
resources. In an economy with wide bargaining coverage workers are protected, thus they are 
able to act more aggressively against employers and demand higher wages to improve their 
worsening financial position. In economies with weaker labour power resources, the 
disciplinary effect of household indebtedness will be stronger, inducing income inequality. 
Wood (2017) also makes a similar claim from a Foucauldian perspective arguing that the 
disciplinary wage share effects of household debt are expected to be weaker in statist-
developmentalist economies like the Scandinavian countries and provides relevant empirical 
evidence for Sweden and Norway. Examining the potential role of households for economic 
fluctuations, Kim et al. (2017) present a formal post-Keynesian endogenous business cycle 
model in which workers become more optimistic during the boom period, thus they decide to 
increase their debt ratios either for consumption reasons or as residential investment in 
housing. Subsequently, the rising household debt commitments increase workers’ cost of job 
loss, hence rising household indebtedness can lead to increases in functional income inequality. 
In a wage-led economy where higher functional income inequality has an overall negative 
effect on total private demand, this process will trigger a slowdown in accumulation, therefore 
it will lead to a recession. 
All things considered, the analysis above outlines three main types/forms of 
financialisation: Corporatist debt-driven financialisation; Shareholder value oriented 
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financialisation; and household debt-driven financialisation. This categorisation pinpoints that 
the widely used term ‘financialisation’ is too broad and simplistic to describe the dominance 
of the financial sector over the real economy, which can take different forms across space and 
time. Most studies within the current financialisation literature describe financialisation as a 
combination of shareholder value orientation and rising mortgage indebtedness, which are 
indeed the two main elements of the neoliberal financialisation period. However, is that a 
historical stylised fact for the finance-dominated eras and does that hold unanimously in all 
different varieties of capitalism? The main argument of this doctoral thesis is that finance is 
integral to the capitalist system and can take different forms across space and time. Although 
one dimension of financialisation may prevail over others in a certain period or country, that 
does not necessarily mean that the macroeconomic impact of the rest will be negligible. This 
doctoral thesis scrutinises the macroeconomic impact of different channels of financialisation 
in historical context using time series analysis in order to account explicitly for cross-country 
discrepancies. Its focus is centred on the nexus between financialisation and two of the 
fundamental problems of political economy: economic fluctuations and the distribution of 
income. Therefore, this doctoral research project contributes to the empirical literature on the 
impact of financialisation on the macroeconomy, seeking to answer three core research 
questions: 
(i) Were the business cycles of the liberal market economies of the USA and the UK 
driven endogenously by corporate or mortgage debt since the mid-19th century? 
 
(ii) Has financialisation been inducing higher functional income inequality in France, 
Sweden, and the USA since the mid-19th century? 
 
(iii) Has financialisation been contributing to the rise of the top one per cent income 
share in the USA, Germany, and Sweden during the post-Fordist, neoliberal 
accumulation regime? 
 
To answer these empirical questions, I rely mainly on econometric estimations and descriptive 
statistical analysis. As financialisation can take different forms in different countries and under 
different epochs, I follow a time series-based econometric analysis, rather than panel data 
methodologies, in order to examine each case study separately and highlight any discrepancies 
and their qualitative implications. The choice of case studies for each chapter is based on data 
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availability (especially for the first two chapters) and on providing a comparison of different 
varieties of capitalism with diverse characteristics regarding domestic institutional structures. 
Considering finance as historically integral to advanced political economies at least since the 
19th century, the present study uses annual historical macroeconomic data to scrutinise the first 
two research questions. Regarding the third main research question, the focus is shifted to the 
neoliberal era for two reasons: First, the population that constitutes the top percentile has 
changed dramatically in that particular period, including both top managers and rentiers, rather 
than exclusively rentiers (Piketty, 2014). Second, an existing empirical panel data study has 
examined the impact of finance on the top one per cent using historical macroeconomic data 
(Roine et al., 2009). Therefore, this doctoral research thesis is constituted of three main 
chapters. 
In the first chapter titled ‘Minsky Debt-driven Cycles in Historical Perspective: The 
cases of USA (1890-2015) and UK (1882-2010)’, I test econometrically the behavioural debt-
driven business cycle theory of Minsky in historical perspective for the liberal market 
economies of the USA and the UK. Existing Minskyan empirical literature on the impact of 
private debt on economic fluctuations either focus exclusively on the negative effect of private 
indebtedness on GDP and investment or examine cycles in terms of oscillations due to standard 
deviation shocks of private debt (Palley, 1994; Kim, 2013, 2016). Regarding the quantitative 
macroeconomic history on financial cycles, their approach is mostly exploratory as the 
common practice is to test econometrically the effects of financial variables on the probability 
of financial crises (e.g. Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordá et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman 
et al., 2013). There are two fundamental problems with these approaches. First, the former 
studies examine only one aspect of Minsky’s theory: debt-burdened growth. Second, either the 
standard deviation shock analysis or the estimation of probabilistic econometric models are 
methodologically closer to exogenous business cycle models, where an external shock 
destabilises the system. In this chapter, I test a minimalistic two-equation endogenous Minsky 
debt cycle model where the leverage ratio is procyclical, and GDP and investment growth are 
debt-burdened, i.e. I focus explicitly on both aspects of Minsky’s endogenous theory. Since 
the equations are quite minimalistic, corresponding exactly to a simple 2D difference equations 
system of private debt and growth, estimating the model through ordinary least squares would 
result in serially correlated errors. To avoid such statistical issues, a straightforward statistical 
solution is applied: allow the error terms to follow moving average error processes of order 
one (MA(1)), i.e. use the Autoregressive MA(1) model (ARMA(1, 1)). Such a solution has 
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been proposed as one of the most effective ways to overcome serial correlation in minimalistic 
econometric specifications (Koreisha and Pukkila, 1990; Koreisha and Fang, 2001; Dufour and 
Pelletier, 2011). The econometric model is estimated for the full sample period, the pre-WWII 
era, and the post-WWII period. Regarding the private debt variables, I test both for the effects 
of corporate debt and the role of mortgage indebtedness. The full sample results provide strong 
evidence that the business cycle of the USA has been corporate debt-driven since the late 19th 
century. Either on an equation-by-equation basis or in the context of a system (Vector 
Autoregressive MA(1) model) the econometric findings show that the corporate leverage ratio 
has been procyclical, while simultaneously GDP growth and investment growth have been 
business debt-burdened. Therefore, it is confirmed that the US business cycle has been 
endogenously driven by corporate debt as in Minsky in historical perspective. For the USA, I 
also find weak evidence for a Minskyan mortgage debt-driven cycle, below the standard levels 
of statistical significance. Regarding the UK, there is econometric evidence that its corporate 
leverage ratio is procyclical over the full period, but the effects of business debt on growth are 
insignificant, hence only one aspect of Minsky’s theory is confirmed. Similar weak evidence 
for corporate debt-driven cycles is also obtained for the post-WWII period. According to the 
estimations, the mortgage debt-growth system does not exhibit cycles for the UK. That may 
seem in contrast with the findings of the quantitative macroeconomic history literature which 
suggest that mortgage debt increases the probability of financial crises, but this is not 
necessarily the case. Mortgage debt accumulation may lead to deeper crises and recessions, 
but the results of this chapter show that it is actually corporate debt that drives endogenously 
the business cycle since the late 19th century, at least in the liberal economy of the USA. 
In the second chapter titled ‘The Comparative Political Economy of Financialisation 
and the Labour Share in the long-run: Evidence from France, Sweden, and the USA’, I explore 
econometrically whether mortgage indebtedness, corporate indebtedness, real share prices, and 
stock market capitalisation have been decreasing the labour shares of France (1911-2010), 
Sweden (1891-2000), and the USA (1929-2015). The estimations utilise the unrestricted error-
correction model which is a commonly used model in the social sciences distribution literature 
that corrects for serial correlation (e.g. Kristal, 2010; Volscho and Kelly, 2012; Bengtsson, 
2014a; Godechot, 2016). I also control for the effects of trade openness, union density, and 
government spending. As discussed earlier, different forms of financialisation can indeed 
benefit capital at the expense of labour under certain conditions. A constantly growing body 
of empirical literature on the determinants of functional income inequality provides evidence 
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that financialisation has been contributing to the decline of the labour shares in the neoliberal 
era (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Alvarez, 2015; Stockhammer, 2017; Wood, 2017; 
Guschanski and Onaran, 2018; Köhler et al., 2018). The vast majority of those studies show 
that either financial globalisation or shareholder value orientation have been the main drivers 
of the labour share, while only Wood (2017) and Guschanski and Onaran (2018) find some 
evidence for negative effects of household debt on the labour shares of certain liberal market 
economies. Given that this project perceives financialisation as integral to capitalism, this 
chapter seeks to answer which dimensions of financialisation have been linked to the 
distributional conflict between capital and labour since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
As the effects of financialisation may also depend on other dimensions of the economy such 
as the state of the labour market (Argitis and Dafermos, 2013) or domestic governments’ policy 
stance on housing finance (Schwarz and Seabrooke, 2008), I choose three case studies with 
diverse characteristics: France as a sector coordinated Dirigiste economy with weak labour 
power resources; Sweden as statist-developmentalist, nation coordinated economy with strong 
labour power resources; and the USA as the archetypal liberal, asset-based market economy. 
For France, the econometric findings show that the mortgage debt ratio has contributed to 
reductions in its labour share since the early 20th century. Also, it is found that government 
spending exhibits a positive effect on labour’s income share in historical context. This result 
is consistent with the argument of Dutton (2002) that a universal social security system has 
been established in France since the pre-WWII period under the pressure of social groups like 
the feminists. For Sweden, the estimations show that mortgage debt, real share prices, and 
stock market capitalisation have been decreasing its labour share over the period 1891-2000. 
In addition, there is robust evidence that indeed strong labour power resources benefited labour 
in Sweden during the last century, as the positive effect of union density is statistically 
significant in the vast majority of specifications. For the USA, the results on the effects of 
financialisation are mixed, since mortgage debt exhibits a negative sign on its labour share, but 
business debt increases it since 1929. Regarding the rest explanatory variables, the positive 
effect of government spending is robust, showing that historically government intervention has 
benefited labour in the USA. As a final step into the analysis of this chapter, I calculate the 
standardised coefficients for the baseline specification for the three countries. This allows us 
to evaluate whether power resources or financialisation variables prevail in terms of the 
distributional conflict between capital and labour. Moreover, making the coefficients 
comparable in the case of the USA allows to clarify the overall impact of financialisation, i.e. 
compare the negative effect of mortgage debt with the positive impact of corporate debt. The 
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main findings of standardising the long-run coefficients suggest that the magnitude of 
traditional power resources variables, like government spending in France and the USA, and 
union density in Sweden, are stronger than the impact of financial indicators. Finally, in the 
USA the negative effect of mortgage debt prevails over the positive effect of business debt, 
hence the overall impact of financialisation is indeed negative. Overall, the main novelty of 
this chapter is that it is the first econometric study on the impact of financialisation on 
functional income inequality that uses historical macroeconomic data. The findings provide 
support to the view that finance has been integral to capitalism at least since the late 19th 
century (see Jordá et al. 2017) by reporting econometric evidence that financial variables have 
been crucial not only for the business cycle (see Chapter 1; Jordá et al. 2013, 2015, 2016) but 
also for the distributional conflict between capital and labour. 
In the third chapter titled ‘Financialisation and the Top 1% in the Neoliberal era: A 
Comparative Political Economy perspective’ I shift my focus from the historical dimension of 
financialisation and explore a research question related to the neoliberal era: Did 
financialisation contribute to the rise of the top percentile income share during neoliberalism? 
While functional income distribution refers to the distributional conflict between the factors of 
production, i.e. two well-established social groups historically, this is not the case for the top 
one per cent. According to Piketty (2014, pp. 276-278), at the beginning of the 20th century in 
advanced political economies, the top one per cent represented the rentier class, i.e. it was 
constituted primarily by income from capital. During neoliberalism, a substantial qualitative 
structural change has occurred as labour income prevails over capital income in the top one 
per cent.  In this respect, the top percentile has become the income share of capital owners and 
the top managerial class, i.e. the working super-rich. This major structural change suggests that 
the analysis of the determinants of the top percentile requires a time-specific study, i.e. focus 
on its evolution under certain regimes of accumulation where its demographics have not 
changed substantially. Accordingly, this chapter centres on the post-Fordist, neoliberal 
accumulation regime. So far, studies on the impact of financialisation on the top one per cent 
have used widely panel data analysis or focused exclusively on the USA. The present study 
contributes to the literature by examining the effects of financialisation on the top percentile 
income share of three different varieties of capitalism through a comparative political economy 
analysis: the liberal economy of the USA (1974-2011); the export-oriented, sector coordinated 
economy of Germany (1972-2010); and the Nordic nation coordinated market of Sweden 
(1981-2012). As in the second chapter, I test for the effects of household debt, business debt, 
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real share prices, and stock market capitalisation using the unrestricted error-correction model. 
I also control for the effects of union density, government spending, trade globalisation, and 
corporate taxation. In the USA, the econometric findings show that real share prices have a 
robust positive impact on its top one per cent, while unionisation exhibits a negative sign, with 
the magnitude of the former being larger. In Germany, the positive impact of trade 
globalisation prevails over the rest statistically significant effects, which is consistent with its 
classification as export-oriented (Stockhammer et al. 2016). Regarding the rest robust long-
run coefficients union density and government spending exhibit the expected negative effects, 
whilst real share prices have a negative impact on the top percentile which, as discussed earlier, 
may have to do with workers owning company part of the shares. In Sweden, household debt, 
business debt, and real share prices are the only robust long-run effects. Business debt and real 
share prices are found to induce an increase in the top percentile. Household debt decreases 
the top one per cent, which is consistent with the argument of Argitis and Dafermos (2013) 
that in countries with strong labour power resources indebted workers have the power to 
demand higher wages to improve their financial position, thus inequality decreases. In total, 
the econometric results of this chapter show that the drivers of the rise of the top one per cent 
vary significantly in different varieties of capitalism. In the USA, this phenomenon has been 
driven mainly by asset price inflation, i.e. shareholder value orientation. In Sweden, all 
financialisation variables play a key role but corporate financialisation seems to be more 
influential, as the positive effects of business indebtedness and real share prices prevail. In 
Germany, there is no evidence that the rise of its top percentile in the neoliberal era has been a 
financialisation-driven phenomenon, as the statistically significant long-run effects are that of 
trade openness, unionisation, and government expenditures. Last but not least, it is worth 
pointing out that unlike functional income distribution, the magnitudes of the financialisation 
variables are found to be larger than those of labour power resources variables for the top one 
per cent. 
The main results reported in this doctoral thesis are non-trivial as they enhance our 
understanding of the role of financialisation for macroeconomic stability and income 
inequality. Recapitulating, macroeconomic instability in terms of investment slowdowns is 
found to be driven endogenously by corporate rather than household debt. However, household 
debt seems to play a key role for functional income inequality, having strong negative effects 
which suggest that the engagement of household in finance decreases their bargaining power, 
as cultural political economists have argued. Unlike functional income distribution, top income 
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shares are driven mainly by share prices rather than private debt aggregates. This implies that 
the rise of personal income inequality requires a different analytical framework which should 
emphasise which social group is represented by each inequality indicator. As personal income 
inequality indicators can represent different social groups under different epochs -e.g. see 
Piketty (2014) for the top one per cent income share- it is fundamental to take into account 
such structural changes. Finally, it is worth noting that power resources variables, like union 
density and government spending, are found to exhibit stronger effects than the financialisation 
variables on the labour share. The opposite holds for the top percentile which underlines that -
at least in the neoliberal era- its rise is a phenomenon driven by the contemporary variant of 
financialisation. 
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Chapter 1 
Minsky Debt-driven Cycles in Historical Perspective:  
The cases of USA (1890-2015) and UK (1882-2010) 
 
1. Introduction 
The interest in financial cycles research has grown significantly since the 2007-8 crisis, which 
has pinpointed the destabilising role of the liberalised financial sector. Recent neoclassical-
oriented theoretical studies (see Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Farmer, 2013; Bhattacharya 
et al. 2015) have attempted to explain financial instability by enriching the existing New 
Keynesian-style macro models with several insights from the pioneering works of Hyman 
Minsky (1975, 1986, 1992). In addition, there is also a currently growing stream of the 
literature that explores empirically the issues of financial cycles and finance-driven business 
cycles, either by descriptive analysis (see e.g. Drehmann et al. 2012; Borio, 2014) or by 
econometric estimations (see e.g. Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011; Claessens et al. 2011, 2012; 
Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordá et al. 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al. 2015; Bezemer et 
al. 2015; Mian et al. 2016). Most of these empirical studies evaluate financial and business 
cycles’ synchronisation through Logit and/or Probit models, but only a few of them utilise 
recently developed historical macroeconomic datasets (e.g. Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordá 
et al. 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al. 2013). 
While Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is relatively new for the neoclassical 
economic thought, his ideas have been a pillar for a wide variety of Post-Keynesian (PK) 
endogenous business cycle theoretical models, emphasizing the interactions between the 
financial sector and the real economy, and underlining the inherently destabilizing role of the 
financial sector (see e.g. Foley, 1987; Jarsulic, 1989; Skott, 1994; Asada, 2001; Lima and 
Meirelles, 2007; Charles, 2008; Fazzari et al. 2008; Nishi, 2012). Despite the theoretical PK 
Minsky cycles’ literature keeps expanding, the empirical work is very limited and, until now, 
has centred mainly on consumer and household debt. The three relevant studies by Palley 
(1994) and Kim (2013, 2016) attempt to evaluate endogenous debt-riven cycles mainly through 
impulse response functions analysis of multivariate Vector Autoregressive models with various 
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lag structures, and/or long-run cointegration analysis. The authors argue that the endogeneity 
of debt-driven oscillations is rooted in the positive short-run feedback from debt to growth, 
which, eventually, becomes negative in the long-run. Such an approach is simple and 
interesting, but it does not fully reflect the endogenous nature of Minsky’s business cycle 
theory. The PK Minsky models involve oscillations generated by the continuous endogenous 
contradiction between negative interest payments’ growth effects and investors’ risky 
borrowing decisions during the boom, which, if one follows this approach, remains obscure. 
On top of that, strictly speaking, Minsky’s original works are mainly concerned with the 
destabilising effects of business debt accumulation, and not household debt. Regarding the time 
dimension of these estimations, these studies focus only on the last three to four decades at 
best. 
The aim of the present chapter is to contribute to the growing empirical literature on 
financial and finance-driven business cycles, by evaluating econometrically the endogeneity of 
debt-driven cycles, using historical macroeconomic data. First, responding to Schularick’s and 
Taylor’s (2012) call for new identification strategies, a new specification based on simple 2-
dimensional endogenous business cycle models of difference equations is used. The necessary 
conditions for endogenous, interaction-driven oscillations in such dynamic systems is that the 
product of the off-diagonal elements must be negative. In terms of Minsky’s original works 
that means that the leverage ratio must be procyclical and growth must be debt-burdened, which 
I evaluate by estimating a pair of a growth equation and a debt ratio equation, simultaneously. 
Second, I assess econometrically Minsky’s business cycle theory by utilizing a historical time 
series macroeconomic dataset of annual observations, that extends approximately from the 
mid-19th century to date (see Appendix 1), focusing on the UK and the US. It is the first time 
that any empirical PK Minsky business cycles’ study covers such a long historical period and 
examines case studies other than the US. Even within the historical macroeconomic data 
empirical literature, econometric estimations based on time series analysis are absent. 
Given our minimalistic econometric specification, misspecification issues arise. To 
address those, I estimate our equations incorporating either moving-average error terms of 
order one (MA(1)), in order to avoid serial correlation issues. To assess potential regime shifts, 
I estimate our equations for three different periods: the full-sample period; the pre-WWII era 
(only for the UK where the length of the series allows it); and the post-WWII period. The main 
finding of our study is that the US economy has experienced corporate debt-driven Minsky 
business cycles over the full period. The full-sample estimations robust evidence for a business 
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debt-driven business cycle, according to the main results and the robustness checks. Also, there 
is weak evidence for a mortgage debt-driven business cycle over the same period, but below 
the usual standards of statistical significance. In the post-WWII period, there is no evidence for 
mortgage cycles, which may seem in contrast with the results of Jordá et al. (2016). Regarding 
the UK economy, its corporate and mortgage leverage ratios are procyclical in all periods, but 
the necessary conditions are not met since there is little evidence for the negative effects of 
private debt on growth. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the distinguishing 
characteristics of the main PK Minsky models, building closely on the approach of Nikolaidi 
and Stockhammer (2017), in order to derive the two fundamental assumptions that govern a 
Minsky debt cycle: debt-burdened growth and procyclical leverage ratios. Section 3 reviews 
the existing empirical literature on financial and debt-driven business cycles, highlighting their 
methodological differences and their shortcomings. Section 4 presents our historical data 
sources and our econometric modelling approach, underlining its theoretical relevance. Section 
5 discusses thoroughly and interprets the results of our estimations, contrasting them with 
comparable findings of the existing studies. Finally, the concluding section recapitulates our 
contribution and the main findings. 
 
2. Endogenous Business Cycles and Financial Instability 
During his long academic career, Minsky published numerous academic papers and several 
books, whose theoretical origins can be traced in the Post-Keynesian thought, but also in the 
old Institutionalist tradition. Despite his most influential publications on financial instability 
(see Minsky 1975, 1986, 1991) offer insightful perspectives on finance-dominated capitalism’s 
dynamics, none of his writings provides us with a distinct benchmark theoretical model that 
summarizes his views. As a matter of fact, Minsky’s successors have been attempting to 
incorporate elements of his analysis into the existing formal Post-Keynesian models, such as 
the Kaleckian or the Kaldorian. This fact has brought confusion, since the post-Minsky 
business cycles models use various different initial assumptions regarding the operation of the 
goods market, the financial variables of interest, and, thus, on the inherent (in)stability of the 
financial sector. The first attempt to classify the Minsky cycles models has been recently made 
by Nikolaidi and Stockhammer (2017) who develop simple two-dimension differential 
equations’ systems which represent the various assumptions about the interactions between 
financial and real variables, in each case. According to this survey, there are two elements that 
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characterize the discrepancies between the existing Minsky cycles models: (i) The residual 
source of firms’ finance which is either business debt or equities; and (ii) The state of the goods 
market, which is either Kaleckian, i.e. stable, or Kaldorian, i.e. unstable. Hence, we may 
distinguish three main families of Minsky models: the debt (and interest rate) cycles models, 
in which the only residual financing source is debt, and the speculative models, in which the 
investment gap is also covered by equities. It is also worth mentioning that the existing Minsky 
models are based on a simplified closed economy framework. This implies that pure financial 
effects may be less evident in small open economies, which are more susceptible to 
international shocks. The rest of this section summarizes the differences between the main 
families of these models in order to derive the testable hypotheses that I estimate subsequently. 
 
2.1 Minsky Debt Cycles 
Minsky’s (1975, 1986, 1991) analysis is rooted in the PK and Old Institutionalist traditions. 
His writings offer rich insights on financial dynamics, but no canonical business cycle model. 
Minsky’s successors have thus incorporated different elements of his analysis into formal 
business cycle models.  
The distinguishing characteristic of the Minsky corporate debt-driven cycles models is 
that the hypothesized residual source of finance is business debt (Skott 1994; Asada 2001; 
Lima and Meirelles 2007; Charles 2008; Fazzari et al. 2008). The theoretical rationale behind 
these assumptions is that during the euphoria of the boom, the desired investment rate rises 
rapidly, exceeding retained profits’ growth rate. This implies that this gap between desired 
investment and actual internal funding resources will be covered by corporate debt, hence the 
debt-to-capital ratio will rise accordingly. As the debt ratio keeps increasing, the relevant 
interest payments rise as well and a rising share of retained profits must be devoted to debt 
service. This makes the position of the firm gradually more and more fragile, which eventually 
leads to a crisis and debt deflation. A typical Minsky corporate debt-driven cycle model can be 
expressed in the following Jacobian matrix representation: 
[
gt
dt
] = [
± −
+ ±
] [
gt−1
dt−1
] (1) 
where g is the growth rate, and d is the business debt-to-capital ratio. The necessary conditions 
for oscillations in a Minsky debt cycle model is that growth must be debt-burdened (J12 < 0) 
and the leverage ratio pro-cyclical (J21 > 0). An important simplifying assumption of the 
Minsky debt cycles models is that they omit equity markets. 
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While Minsky’s original emphasis on business debt-driven cycles, several authors 
attempt to formalise consumer debt and real estate prices in the context of Minskyan debt-
driven cycle models. Palley (1994) presents a Minsky model that includes procyclical 
consumer debt accumulation. Modifying a multiplier-accelerator cycle model, Palley shows 
that, initially, debt flows increase aggregate demand through consumption, thus output, but 
eventually rising debt accumulation decreases aggregate demand. Ryoo (2016) develops a real 
estate price Minsky model, in which momentum trader expect further price increases when 
house prices grow. Ultimately, households’ demand for houses will slowdown, curbing house 
prices, thus the housing cycle. Here, the key variable is the expected capital gains which are 
non-observable. Based on Palley (1994) and Ryoo (2016), I propose a Minsky mortgage debt-
driven models similar to a 2D corporate debt-driven model, where the leverage ratio is 
procyclical, i.e. households’ confidence during the boom period makes them increase their debt 
ratio in order to purchase a house. Eventually,  increasing debt payments decrease growth hence 
endogenous fluctuations are generated. Such a Minsky household debt model can be depicted 
in the following Jacobian matrix form: 
[
g𝑡
mt
] = [
± −
+ ±
] [
gt−1
mt−1
] (2) 
where g is the growth rate, and m is the mortgage or household debt-to-capital ratio. As in the 
Minsky corporate debt-driven model, the impact of mortgage debt ratio on growth must be 
negative (J12 < 0), whereas, since debt accumulation is driven by households’ optimism, the 
effect of growth on the mortgage debt ratio must be positive (J21 > 0).  
Models of finance-driven business cycles also appear in the New Keynesian tradition, 
in the form of financial accelerator models (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999). 
In those models, asset price inflation induces borrowing, while the rise in leverage ratios 
reduces aggregate demand, as in Minsky, which leads to asset price deflation and thus, to 
instability. Despite those models do not strictly correspond to Minsky’s PK framework, they 
do produce comparable results. 
 
2.2 Interest Rate Cycles 
Another sub-family of financially-driven business cycle models are the interest rate cycles 
models, which within the PK Minskyan tradition are represented by Foley’s (1987) and 
Jarsulic’s (1989) models. Compared to the demand-determined debt ratio of the Minsky debt 
cycles models, these models centre explicitly on endogenous credit supply as well, focusing on 
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commercial banks’ interest rate determination. Therefore, endogenous credit supply by the 
commercial banks depends on (a) the supply of reserves by the central bank; (b) the desired 
interest rate; (c) the risk involved in making loans; and (d) the legal/institutional constraints 
regarding the use of reserves. Their supply-side rationale suggests that when the interest rate 
level is low enough, borrowing becomes cheaper, henceforth investment starts rising. As the 
increasing demand for loanable funds rises, it presses the interest rate level upwards, which 
eventually discourages new investment, and so on. What distinguishes these models from the 
debt cycles models is that a crisis may also occur because of a supply decision by the central 
bank or due to legislation change about the use of reserves1, and not necessarily by business 
debt accumulation itself alone. Jarsulic (1989) provides an intuitive 2D Jacobian matrix 
representation of such a model, as follows: 
[
gt
rt
] = [
± −
+ ±
] [
gt−1
rt−1
] (3) 
where g is the growth rate of capital stock, and r is the real short-term interest rate. Growth is 
burdened by rising interest payments, and since the higher r becomes, the higher the interest 
payments become, i.e. J12 must be negative. Furthermore, as described right above the interest 
rate level is procyclical, thus J21 must be positive. Since the product of the off-diagonal 
elements of this Jacobian matrix is indeed negative, we do get the minimum necessary 
conditions for an interaction cycle between output and the interest rate. Obviously, a similar 
trivial investment-interest rate relationship could exist in a New Keynesian IS-LM framework 
(see Mankiw 2016, Ch. 17). This implies that even if one finds empirical evidence for interest 
rate-driven cycles2, it is not possible to argue convincingly that the underlying mechanism is 
Minskyan and not New Keynesian and vice versa. 
 
2.3 Other Minsky Cycles Models 
The tradition of Minsky-inspired business cycles models also includes Keen’s (1995) 
Goodwin-inspired model, in which oscillations occur due to the effect of debt on functional 
income distribution, leading to growth cycles in a profit-led framework. In this regard, the 
oscillations in Keen’s model are distribution-led, i.e. they are not generated purely by real-
                                                 
1 Minsky (1986, p. 86) himself argues that such a crisis is plausible theoretically, and also highlights two events 
in the post-War US economy, in which inflation targeting-oriented monetary policy led to a recession (ibid., pp. 
73, 102). 
2 Estimating interest rate cycles for all case studies, following our econometric modelling approach (see Section 
4), yields evidence for interest-driven cycles only for France (see Appendix 5). 
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financial interactions, hence they are not financial cycles in the strict sense. Also, to be precise, 
Keen’s model does incorporate some Minskyan elements in a Goodwin (1967) profit squeeze 
cycle mechanism, but his Say’s Law assumption makes his model not strictly Keynesian.  
As mentioned above, Minsky debt cycles models put aside the role of asset price 
inflation. Very few models have included such dynamics, namely the models of Taylor and 
O’Connor (1985), and Ryoo (2010, 2013). Focusing on Ryoo’s PK Minsky models, his 
benchmark model is constituted of three variables: output, the desired debt ratio, and the 
expected return on equities. The oscillations in this model occur from the interaction between 
the desired debt ratio and the expected return on equities, dragging along the GDP growth rate. 
This rationale is -more or less- similar to the model of Beja and Goldman (1980), in which the 
interaction between the stabilising ‘long terminism’ of fundamentalists and the destabilising 
‘short-terminism’ of chartists speculators trigger the oscillations in stock prices. Contrary to 
the other two types of models, where all variables were observable, here two out of the three 
variables are unobservable, which makes its empirical assessment through estimations 
impossible. 
 
3. Financial Cycles: A Review of the Empirical Literature 
3.1 Empirical PK Minsky cycles literature  
As shown above, the theoretical PK Minsky cycles literature has been growing since the mid-
1980’s and includes some quite sophisticated models which incorporate complex cycle 
mechanisms. On the contrary, the empirical literature on PK Minsky cycles is quite limited and 
has started growing only very recently. The approach followed in those studies is to estimate 
growth equations that include both debt flows (i.e. changes) and debt accumulation (i.e. levels), 
capturing an endogenous cycle created by the transition from a debt-led to a debt-burdened 
regime. The rationale for such a specification choice is that (short-run) changes in debt offer 
alternative investment financing resources, thus boost growth, while its accumulation (i.e. debt 
burden or levels) should affect negatively growth subsequently, creating endogenous 
oscillations. As argued in the previous section, this is not the case for a typical Minsky debt 
cycle model, since it is the ongoing boom that gives rise to optimism and therefore to positive 
changes in debt. That is the procyclical leverage ratio. 
Palley (1994) is the first PK scholar that estimates Minsky cycles, centring on the 
effects of consumer debt change and real consumer debt burden on the real GNP per capita of 
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the US (1975Q2 – 1991Q1). Assessing those relationships, Palley estimates a GNP equation 
using a single-equation distributed lag approach and a 3-dimensional vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model which includes all three variables. Consumer debt is proxied by the real per 
capita consumer installment credit and consumer debt burden is the same indicator multiplied 
by the real prime interest rate; both from the CITIBASE. Regarding the single-equation 
distributed lag model, Palley’s findings show that an increase in debt increases real GNP, whilst 
a rise in real debt burden affects it negatively. This specification also includes controls for 
interest rate and inflation consumer burden. His impulse response function analysis, through 
the VAR model, indicates that a standard deviation shock in consumer debt change produces a 
strong short-run positive effect on per capita GNP, whereas a debt burden shock generates a 
strong negative initial response by the per capita GNP. Interestingly, despite the simulated 
oscillations gradually dampen, the cycles do not die out, even after 100 periods.  
Almost two decades later, Kim (2013) follows Palley’s single-equation autoregressive 
distributed lags (ARDL) approach, using quarterly US data from BEA, BLS, and FED, and 
enriches his analysis with structural break unit root tests. The three baseline specifications of 
this study estimate the effect of household debt level and changes in household debt on real 
GDP, for the full period (1951Q1 – 2009Q1), and also control for consumer debt, household 
net worth and investment in levels and changes. All three estimations, based on the ARDL 
model, allow only for one lag for each variable (including the dependent) and no 
contemporaneous effects. The results suggest that a positive change in household debt boosts 
output, but the level of debt (i.e. debt accumulation) does have a negative impact on output, 
implying an underlying cyclical mechanism. At a later stage, after confirming the existence of 
structural breaks in the last quarter of 1982 or the first of 1983, i.e. around the period that 
financialisation rose, though the Chow breakpoint test, sub-sample models are estimated. More 
specifically, following the same specification as before, Kim estimates several models, two for 
the period 1951Q4 to 1982Q4, and six for the post-1983 era. Compared to the full-sample 
estimations, now the only explanatory variables are levels and changes of the dependent, 
household debt, net worth and investment. The results of the first pre-1983 estimation (which 
does not include any control for investment, either change or level) shows that a positive change 
in household debt (debt flow in terms of Kim’s assumptions) affects positively growth, with 
the relevant coefficient being robust. Contrariwise, household debt’s level, in the same 
equation, has a positive (but statistically insignificant) sign, i.e. an increase in debt 
accumulation seems to boost growth, which contradicts Minsky’s debt-burdened growth 
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hypothesis, as interpreted by Kim. Introducing investment levels and changes fixes some serial 
correlation issues that existed before, but most relevant coefficients remain not statistically 
significant. Moving on to the post-1983 estimations, in three out of the six equations estimated, 
a rise in household debt’s level affects negatively growth, whilst positive household debt 
changes seem to boost growth, as expected by the author, with the coefficients being robust. 
The third PK Minskyan study on business cycles is Kim’s (2016) system-based 
econometric approach, using the same quarterly dataset for the US. This time, the analysis 
starts with the estimation of three-variable VAR models of GDP, net worth, and either 
household, mortgage, or consumer debt (each household debt variable included at a time), 
supplemented by Johansen cointegration tests. The findings seem to be quite sensitive to lag 
length selection since only the consumer debt system with specific lag lengths (either one or 
three) appears to provide evidence of cointegration. Then, proceeding to the short-run VAR-
based generalised impulse response analysis, the Monte-Carlo simulations’ results suggest a 
bidirectional positive feedback loop between each of the three debt variables and GDP (in first 
differences). This implies that indeed the leverage ratio is procyclical, but also growth is debt-
led, which according to Palley’s and Kim’s rationale makes sense in the short-run. As a last 
step, Kim reassesses potential cointegrating relationships via the Johansen test, based on the 
vector error correction model (VECM), and adds a consumption variable into the three-variable 
systems that were tested previously. This choice is based on the assumption that consumption 
is the main channel through which net worth and household debt affect growth. Indeed, the 
obtained coefficients suggest that the debt variables separately affect negatively output in the 
long run, whilst the multiple cointegration tests also provide evidence for similar long-run 
relationships. Lag lengths choices and differencing in all specifications were made relying upon 
the standard information criteria and unit root tests, rather than on theoretical arguments.  
Besides the very few empirical business cycles’ studies, PK Minskyan scholars have 
explored other dimensions of Minsky’s analysis, such as investment effects at the firm level3 
(see Ndikumana 1999; Arza and Espanol 2008), and monetary and macroprudential shocks’ 
impact on financial fragility (see Greenwood-Nimmo and Tarassow 2016). Ndikumana’s 
(1999) study estimates a Tobin’s Q model, in which the dependent variable is the investment-
to-capital stock (at the beginning of the period) and the explanatory variables are the cash flow, 
interest expense, sales’ growth, the percentage change in the cost of capital, (the average of) 
                                                 
3 Non-financial sectors’ financial fragility is also examined in few studies (see Isenberg, 1989; Wolfson, 1990; 
Mulligan, 2013; Nishi, 2018). 
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Tobin’s Q, and long-term and total debt ratios. The dataset used is a firm-level one, including 
only the manufacturing sector over the period 1977 to 1991 (source: Compustat database). 
Based on fixed-firm effects and two-stage least squares specifications (using 4 lags for each 
independent variable), the econometric findings reported, establish that increases in cash flows 
and debt service do decrease the investment-to-capital ratio. This microeconomic-level finding 
indeed provides support to Minsky’s argument about debt-burdened growth. A similar model 
for investment is estimated by Arza and Espanol (2008), who explore total sales’, total debt’s, 
cash flows’ effects on the investment-to-capital ratio, for the Argentinian economy, utilising 
an unbalanced non-financial firm-level panel dataset (74 firms, 1991Q1 – 2001Q4), derived 
from the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange database. Their estimations also include control 
variables for hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance regimes, classified by the spread between 
cash flows and short-term debt plus the nominal lending interest rate. The fixed-effects and 
instrumental variable fixed-effects models estimated, show that increases in the squared value 
of debt lead to falls in the investment ratio, as expected. Greenwood-Nimmo and Tarassow 
(2016) focus on a different, more policy-oriented aspect of Minsky’s insights, centring on 
monetary and macroprudential shocks effects on aggregate financial fragility (measured as the 
credit-to-GDP and the corporate credit-to-internal funds ratios), using quarterly data (1960-
2007) for the US economy. Following a sign-restricted VAR econometric approach, they study 
the impact of a contractionary monetary shock, a credit-constrained macroprudential shock 
(defined as a shock which does not result in real credit or asset price boom, but has only short-
run effects), and combined shocks, via impulse response functions analysis. Their main 
findings suggest that a contractionary monetary shock has a positive impact on financial 
fragility since it induces the rise of the credit-to-GDP ratio and the corporate credit ratio. 
Contrariwise, a credit-constraining macroprudential shock does reduce the total credit ratio but 
does not have a similarly significant effect on the corporate financial ratio. In terms of our 
contribution, these studies do show that rising indebtedness harms investment and leads to 
crises and that regulating credit growth reduces financial fragility to some extent -as in Minsky-
, but they are not strictly relevant, because they do not examine explicitly the underlying 
endogenous oscillations mechanism, i.e. if firms’ debt ratios increase during the booms.  
 
3.2 Financial cycles during the Post-WII period 
In recent years, apart from the strictly defined PK Minskyan studies, the wider financial cycles’ 
and finance-driven business cycles’ literature has been growing rapidly. Drehman et al. (2012) 
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and Borio (2014) apply various descriptive analysis techniques, such as Band-bass (see 
Christiano and Fitzgerald 1999) and Hodrick-Prescott filtering (see Whittaker 1922; Hodrick 
and Prescott 1997) and turning-point analysis (see Burns and Mitchell 1946). Drehman et al. 
(2012) focus on Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, UK, and the USA from 1960 to 
2011, using quarterly data for several indicators such as assets prices, the credit-to-GDP ratio, 
and credit to the non-financial private sector. The frequency-based analysis shows that the 
financial cycles should not be analysed as regular short-term business cycles, but as medium-
term cycles (i.e. 16 years or longer), while their amplitude and length appear to become 
significantly prolonged after the 1980’s. On top of that, their turning point analysis highlights 
that the peaks of the financial cycles are very often related to deep economic downturns, as 
Minsky argued. Borio (2014) reviews the financial cycles’ literature -based mainly on the 
aforementioned contribution- and draws similar conclusions about the relevant stylised facts, 
but also pinpoints the policy challenges and the absence of endogenous finance-driven business 
cycles models within the literature. As showed in the previous section this comment is more 
relevant to the neoclassical literature, rather than the PK Minskyan modelling tradition. 
A similar empirical strategy has also been followed by Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) 
who examine the evolution of house prices from 1970 to 2007 in 18 industrialised economies, 
through a turning point and frequency analysis, but also through panel cointegration tests on 
house prices’ growth and multinomial Probit models as well. As a first step, they obtain housing 
prices gaps through HP filtering (calculated as real house prices’ deviations from the HP trend), 
in order to identify the boom and bust periods in each country. Their cointegration analysis is 
conducted for the full sample, and the upturn and downturns periods separately, highlighting 
that domestic credit, interest rates, and global liquidity seem to induce housing cycles. The 
Probit estimations outcomes underline that banking crises (dependent variable) are associated 
with house prices fluctuations, during booms and busts. In addition, according to the findings, 
financial deregulation plays a key role for domestic liquidity, thusly for house prices booms. 
The studies of Claessens et al. (2011, 2012) shift the focus to the determinants of the 
duration of recessions and recoveries, and their amplitude, based on quarterly datasets (1960Q1 
– late 2000’s) of 21 and 44 countries, respectively. The descriptive part of the studies (i.e. 
turning point analysis) confirms that financial cycles tend to have lower frequencies and be 
deeper than regular business cycles like most relevant studies contend. Moreover, equity and 
housing cycles’ amplitudes appear to be longer than credit cycles’, but the degree of 
synchronisation among them increases over time. Moving on to the panel estimations of 
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financial downturns’ determinants (dependent variables: either credit, or house prices, or equity 
prices), controlling for trade and financial globalisation in the post-1980’s era shows that 
financial cycles indeed amplified during that period. The last finding of Claessens et al. (2011, 
2012) panel regressions is that recessions become deeper and longer when the downturns in 
credit and asset prices become synchronised.  
Another study that examines financial variables’ per capita GDP’s growth effects in the 
post-WWII era is that of Bezemer et al. (2015), whose empirical strategy emphasizes on the 
distinction between credit stocks and flows, like Kim (2013). The estimations use a 46-country 
panel (1990-2011), containing controls for government spending, trade, inflation, and 
education. The results of the first round of panel estimations, based on the FE and system-
GMM approaches, signify that either total credit stocks’, or total credit flows’ coefficients are 
hardly statistically significant in any of the cases. Distinguishing between non-financial and 
asset market credit yields more interesting results, following the same estimating approach. 
More precisely, most specifications indicate that either credit stocks or flows affect negatively 
growth, with the coefficients being statistically significant. This holds for the estimations 
within the non-financial credit and the asset market credit context. Similar findings are reported 
for estimations based on a similar industry-level dataset and, also, for the interaction between 
stocks and flows (calculated as credit stock multiplied by credit flow) using the initial macro 
dataset. In those cases, the results hold for total credit, as well as for its aggregates. 
Furthermore, Mian et al. (2016) explore empirically household debt’s impact on growth 
(30 countries, 1960-2012) -among other things- arguing that a large-scale reduction in the 
household debt-to-GDP ratio is related to future increases in growth. Their strategy includes 
an interesting attempt to capture longer cycles by applying longer differences, focusing on the 
change over 3 periods. Furthermore, their distributed lags specification is of some interest as 
well, since its benchmark form incorporates 3 lags forward for the dependent (real GDP 
growth) and 1 lag for the independent variables, i.e. changes in household and non-financial 
firms’ debt-to-GDP ratios. The vast majority of those estimations prove that the household debt 
ratio seems to consistently influence negatively growth, using mainly the country FE approach, 
but also the Arellano-Bond GMM methodology in one case. Those results do not appear only 
in the full sample period, but also in the post-1980’s, pre-1990’s, pre-2000’s eras and even 
when examining developed and emerging economies separately. The last step of their growth 
effects analysis is to focus on the global level, by taking the sample averages of the variables 
and estimating the model based on a time series approach, using the same specification. 
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Similarly to what reported previously, in all specifications the coefficients for the 3-period 
change in the household debt-to-GDP ratio are systematically negative and robust. 
  
3.3 Quantitative macroeconomic history literature 
The remaining part of the literature comes from the field of quantitative macroeconomic 
history, which utilise historical macroeconomic data (~1870-2013) as the present study does. 
Schularick’s and Taylor’s (2012) paper is one of the seminal contributions within this field. 
Using a 14-country dataset which roughly covers the period from 1870 to 2008 (collected from 
various sources by the authors4), they focus on several financial indicators such as total credit, 
(broad and narrow) money, bank assets, and a binary variable for financial crises. For their 
estimations, based on variations of Logit and Probit panel models, they use the financial crises 
binary variable as the dependent and include five lags for a single independent variable which 
is the change in the logarithm of either total credit, total loans/GDP, or broad money. The 
findings underline that either the level of total credit or the real total loans-to-GDP ratio do 
matter since their coefficients have the expected signs and are strongly robust in most cases. 
These results are true for several specifications including country and time fixed effects (or 
both) and for the pre- and post-WII eras. The authors also highlight that while it seems that 
total credit is strongly correlated with financial crises, the same is not true for the money 
variables which appear to be much less important, especially after WWII. As a robustness 
check, few more specifications are estimated, now including changes in the logarithm of 
nominal stock prices (again, 5 lags included), besides total credit, and combinations of the two 
(i.e. multiplying the ratios) in order to study stocks effects in the context of financial 
development, based on 5-year moving average Logit approach. The main outcomes of those 
estimations are that once again is confirmed that credit growth is associated with financial 
crises, whereas asset prices matter as well -given an already developed, large financial sector.  
Jordá et al. (2013) use the same historical macroeconomic dataset as Schularick and 
Taylor (2012), focusing also on credit’s impact on the change in the logarithm of real GDP per 
capita, rather than only on financial crises events. Their first set of -unconditional path- log real 
GDP per capita estimations use only two binary variables as explanatory, one for real and one 
for financial recessions, and examine their cumulative effects -separately- over a five-year 
horizon. The findings show that in Year 1 the effects are quite close and robust, but that changes 
                                                 
4 See http://www.macrohistory.net/data/  
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over time since it seems that financial recessions’ negative growth effects last longer 
throughout time. A novel element of this study is that it also controls for excess credit, which 
is defined as the percentage change of the loans-to-output ratio compared to the last expansion 
period. This measure is used as a proxy for the ‘speed’ of an economy’s leverage ratio’s 
increase over time, i.e. the degree of financialisation. Testing this factor, the authors expand 
their previous specification by incorporating two more interaction explanatory terms: excess 
credit multiplied by the financial and real recessions, respectively. Indeed, the statistically 
significant results of those regressions confirm that the combination of a financial crisis during 
an excess credit period, i.e. a ‘financialised’ era, leads to deeper recessions and lasting negative 
growth effects. The final robustness test for the findings is made by introducing several controls 
in both specifications mentioned above, such as the inflation rate, short- and long-term interest 
rates, the investment-to-GDP ratio, the growth rate of real loans per capita, and the current 
account-to-GDP ratio. Overall, the results of these conditional regressions, in terms of the main 
variables of interest, remain similar qualitatively and as regards their statistical significance. 
Despite finding some worth-mentioning results that confirm credit’s harmful impact on growth, 
as the authors admit, their econometric approach does not impose a ‘tight theoretical frame a 
priori’ on their estimating strategy (see Jordá et al. 2013, p. 25).  
Centring on the effects of house and equity price bubbles, Jordá et al. (2015) estimate 
equations for the full sample and the post-WWII era, using Logit and Probit panel models for 
the same historical macroeconomic dataset, expanded for house prices. The first round of 
estimations uses a financial crises binary variable as the dependent and housing bubbles, equity 
bubbles, or both bubbles multiplied by the credit level as independents, in order to test for the 
interaction among them. The robust findings show confirm once again that credit is strongly 
correlated with financial crises, whilst the variables for housing bubbles and both bubbles 
combined also seem to be associated with financial crashes as well. Those results remain 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar in the full sample and post-WWII periods. Shifting the 
focus on the cumulative change on the logarithm of real GDP per capita, like in Jordá et al. 
(2013), over a five-year horizon, the findings indicate that both housing and equity bubbles 
harm growth, especially in eras of high credit. The regression results provided demonstrate that 
they hold even if one includes macroeconomic controls. On the whole, quantitatively, housing 
bubbles’ impact appears to be the most harmful for growth, particularly when such a bubble is 
fueled by credit. 
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Aikman et al. (2015), besides estimating Logit and Probit models, similar to those of 
the aforementioned studies, also utilise Band-bass filtering and spectral density analysis, using 
the same dataset used by the previous studies. Their conclusions on cycles’ frequencies are 
similar to those of Drehman et al. (2012) and Borio (2014) for the post-WWII period, i.e. credit 
cycles tend to be substantially longer (roughly four times, as they report) compared to the 
regular business cycles. Regarding their estimating strategy, the follow the same specification 
and estimating technique as Schularick and Taylor (2012). Their Logistic estimations (full 
sample and sub-sample, excluding war years) suggest that credit cycles are associated with 
financial crises, while money seems to play a minor role. The final part of their empirical 
investigation includes cross-country correlation analysis through Cumulative Distribution 
Functions (CDF) for the post-WWII periods, comparing the 1945-79 and the 1980-2008 eras. 
While synchronisation among countries has been increased during the financialisation period, 
the outcomes of the relevant tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum and Jenrich’s tests) point out that, still, 
there is no absolute convergence, by any means. 
Lastly, the most recent paper by Jordá et al. (2016) gives prominence to credit 
disaggregation and specifically to mortgage credit, excluding the two highly volatile world war 
periods. Once again, the same historical macroeconomic dataset is used, now including three 
additional countries (Belgium, Finland, and Portugal). The full sample, pre-WWII, and post-
WWII Logit panel estimations (no controls included) verify that, generally, both mortgage and 
non-mortgage debt is robustly correlated with financial crises. However, interestingly, in the 
post-WWII estimations, the coefficients of non-mortgage debt are not statistically significant, 
implying that real estate lending becomes relatively more important after 1945. Moving on to 
the robustness check estimations, the authors disaggregate mortgage debt further, by separating 
commercial and residential mortgages, and include a global factor (the share of PPP adjusted 
GDP of countries that are in a financial crisis). The global factor appears to be robust in almost 
all specifications, but it seems that only residential, and not commercial, mortgages are now 
statistically significant. It is also worth mentioning that if one includes only the global factor 
control into the specification that includes only total mortgage and non-mortgage loans as 
explanatory terms, non-mortgage debt’s coefficient becomes robust. The last round of 
estimations of this paper follows the usual approach in quantitative macroeconomic history 
studies and shifts its focus on the effects of financialisation on real per capita GDP. Like in 
Jordá et al. (2013), the cumulative change in the log of real GDP per capita is studied over a 
five-year horizon, based on a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) approach using inverse 
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weighting-score weighting (see Jordá 2005) and controlling for the same factors as Jordá et al. 
(2013). Including only two binary explanatory variables, one for real and one for financial 
recessions, reconfirm the usual findings of financial crises impact on growth. Expanding the 
specification for either total private credit, or both its aggregates (mortgage and non-mortgage 
debt) for the full sample and the pre- and post-WWII periods, the main conclusion remain the 
same with the aforementioned empirical studies, i.e. overall total credit and its aggregates do 
play an important role for growth declines, and mortgage debt’ importance became relatively 
more important during the second half of the 20th century. Five-year cumulated responses 
analysis for real per capita GDP, real investment per capita and real lending per capita -building 
on the distinction between mortgage and non-mortgage debt shocks- underlines that when a 
crisis is associated with a credit boom, recessions tend to be longer and recoveries slower. In 
particular, after WWII mortgage booms led to deeper depression projections. 
 
3.4 Discussion of the existing empirical debt-driven cycles literature 
As demonstrated in Section 2, the two fundamental Minskyan relationships that govern an 
endogenous debt-driven cycle is the procyclicality of the leverage ratio and debt-burdened 
growth. Attempting to classify the existing empirical literature on debt-driven cycles and relate 
it with our discussion of the Minsky debt cycles models and our contribution, we may 
distinguish several different methodological approaches and shortcomings. First, the PK 
Minsky cycles studies (Palley 1994; Kim 2013, 2016) use both single-equation and system-
based (VAR) estimating strategies, centring on household debt measures impact on growth, 
even in the context of the systems. The growth equations estimated for the post-WWII US 
economy are modified versions of the Minsky models’ growth equation, that include debt both 
in level and in first differences, in order to contrast the short- and long-run effects. Apparently, 
the cyclical mechanism tested in those studies is quite different from Minsky’s original 
assumptions, since the authors hypothesize that cycles are generated by the shift from a debt-
led to a debt-burdened growth regime, overlooking leverage ratio’s procyclicality5. Second, 
another part of the existing literature focuses on estimating debt’s growth effects, through panel 
data estimations, using datasets for the post-WWII period (e.g. Bezemer et al. 2015; Mian et 
al. 2016). Indeed, their findings do provide supporting evidence for the debt-burdened growth 
hypothesis, either in the context of household or business debt. Yet, ignoring leverage ratio’s 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Kim (2016) finds a procyclical leverage ratio and mentions that this result is in line with Minsky’s 
assumption, but does not stress its importance for endogenous oscillations. 
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procyclicality, no safe conclusion can be drawn about the endogeneity of the oscillation 
mechanism, which is a fundamental element in Minsky’s writings and in the Minsky modelling 
literature. Third, several studies examine debt-driven (and asset-driven) cycles’ 
synchronisation with growth cycles through probabilistic and logistic panel data regressions, 
mainly using historical macroeconomic data (e.g. Schularick and Taylor 2012; Jordá et al. 
2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al. 2015), as the present study does. Estimating the impact of 
financial crises on GDP growth and the effects of private credit on the probability of a financial 
crisis, their econometric results highlight that a strong correlation between credit and growth 
fluctuations does exist, avoiding using any specific, restrictive theoretical assumptions. 
Notwithstanding that this implies an underlying relationship between the two variables, 
synchronisation itself does not give us enough information about the causality, which is of 
great significance for any endogenous mechanism.  
The aim of our study is to address most of those shortcomings. To begin with, as 
discussed more thoroughly in the next section, I evaluate endogenous debt-driven cycles by 
estimating pairs of equations, based strictly on the differential equation systems of the existing 
Minsky models. Thereby, besides testing the burdened-growth assumption, I explicitly 
examine leverage ratio’s procyclicality as well, which allows us to derive more accurate 
conclusions about the endogeneity and the causality of the underlying debt-driven cycle 
mechanism. Also, in terms of the narrow PK empirical literature, it is the first time that a 
business cycle study uses historical macroeconomic data. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, 
the present econometric study is the first one among the finance-driven cycles literature that 
utilises time series analysis using historical time series, enabling us to examine country-specific 
information, which in a panel data context is omitted. Table 1 below summarises the different 
methodological approaches, the historical periods covered, and the main findings of the 
existing empirical literature. 
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Table 1: Overview of related empirical studies 
Authors 
Dependent 
variables 
Financial variables Data 
Palley (1994), Kim 
(2013, 2016) 
GDP, per capita 
GDP  
Consumer, Household, 
Mortgage debt 
USA, quarterly 
(1975-1991, 1951- 
2009) 
Greenwood-Nimmo and 
Tarassow (2016) 
Financial fragility 
Monetary and 
Macroprudential shocks 
USA, quarterly 
(1960- 2007) 
Claessens et al. (2011, 
2012) 
Recessions’ and 
Recoveries’ 
Durations 
Credit, Asset prices 
Panel, quarterly (21 
countries, 1960-2007; 
44 countries, 1960-
2007)  
Bezemer et al. (2015) Per capita GDP Credit stocks and flows 
Panel (46 countries, 
1990-2011) 
Mian et al. (2016) GDP 
Corporate and Household 
debt 
Panel (30 countries, 
1960-2012) 
Schularick and Taylor 
(2012), Jordá et al. 
(2013), Aikman et al. 
(2015)  
Financial crises 
(binary), per 
capita GDP 
Total credit, money, bank 
assets, stock prices, 
Financial crises (binary) 
Panel (14 countries, 
1870-2008) 
Jordá et al. (2015) 
Financial crises 
(binary) 
Total credit, House and 
equity prices 
Panel (14 countries, 
1870-2008) 
Jordá et al. (2016) 
Financial crises 
(binary), per 
capita GDP 
Mortgage and Corporate 
(non-mortgage) credit 
Panel (17 countries, 
1870-2012) 
 
4. Data and Econometric Modelling Approach 
The historical time series macroeconomic dataset of the present study approximately covers 
the period from the mid- or late-19th century to date and includes two main case studies: UK 
and USΑ6. Since we follow a multiple-country times series approach, data are obtained from 
various sources, in order to estimate our system. The four main variables of interest are the real 
GDP, real investment, the business debt-to-income ratio, and the mortgage debt-to-income 
ratio. Since business debt is not directly available for the US before 1960, I approximate it by 
subtracting mortgage debt from total private credit to the non-financial private sector. The 
series for the UK come from Thomas and Dimsdale (2016), and Jordà et al. (2017), whereas 
the US data were derived from US national accounts, Shiller (2005), and Jordà et al. (2017). A 
more precise summary of individual variables’ definitions, periods covered, and data sources 
                                                 
6 I would like to thank Erik Bengtsson for providing us big part of the historical time series dataset I use for the 
UK and the USA, but also for several other countries (see Appendix 1). 
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can be found in Appendix 1, whilst Appendix 3 summarizes the results of the augmented 
Dicky-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests. Summary statistics about the relevant indicators can be 
found in Table 2 right below, where BDEBT is the business (non-mortgage) debt-to-GDP ratio, 
MDEBT is the mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio, I is real investment (in billion pounds, 2013), and 
GDP is real gross domestic product (in billion dollars, 2009). 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
USA UK 
BDEBT Δ(GDP)  Δ(I) MDEBT BDEBT Δ(GDP)  Δ(I) MDEBT 
Mean  0.205  0.030 0.007  0.214  0.183  0.019 0.022  0.160 
Median  0.205 0.032  0.048  0.187  0.191  0.022  0.032  0.101 
Max  0.320  0.158  0.591  0.432  0.354  0.101  0.604  0.718 
Min  0.059  -0.147  -2.053  0.061  0.063  -0.112  -0.454  0.013 
First ob. 1889 1930 1889 1889 1880 1851 1851 1880 
Last ob. 2013 2015 2015 2013 2009 2015 2015 2009 
# obs.  125  86 126  125  130  165 165  130 
 
As outlined in Section 2, an endogenous debt-driven business cycle model can be 
reduced into a simple pair of behavioural difference equations, which give us the necessary 
conditions for interaction-driven oscillations, following the relevant Jacobian matrix (see (1)):  
𝑔𝑡  =  (𝐴1 + 1)𝑔𝑡−1  +  𝐴2𝑑𝑡−1  (4) 
𝑑𝑡  =  𝛣1𝑔𝑡−1 + (𝛣2 + 1)𝑑𝑡−1  (5) 
where g denotes the growth rate, and d is debt. Equations (3) and (4) are the econometric 
equations I estimate, hence the necessary conditions7 for Minsky interaction cycles are that 
coefficient 𝐴2 must be negative (debt-burdened growth) and, simultaneously, that coefficient 
𝐵1 must be positive (procyclical leverage ratio).  
Since the selected lag structure is quite minimalistic, corresponding exactly to the 
relevant difference equations’ system, our reduced form equations are technically misspecified. 
Estimating the two equations through ordinary least squares (OLS) will obtain results with 
serially correlated error terms. To overcome this problem, I apply two solutions: (i) estimate 
                                                 
7 Apparently, the sufficient conditions for instability in such a dynamic system depends on the discriminant of the 
Jacobian matrix, which must be negative (see Appendix 2). So, when the necessary conditions are met, we also 
calculate the discriminant in order to evaluate the sufficient conditions as well. 
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our equations through maximum likelihood (ML) allowing the error terms to follow 
autoregressive processes of order one (AR(1)); (ii) estimate our equations through Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS), allowing the error terms follow moving average processes of order one 
(MA(1)), i.e. use the ARMA model. Regarding the first solution, statistical identification is a 
potential issue, i.e. there might not be enough information in the reduced form equations to 
yield unbiased point estimates of the relevant structural form coefficients (Brooks, 2014, p. 
309). Therefore, as first step to this approach I estimate pairs of AR(2) models for each system 
and examine whether we can proceed to allow the error terms to follow AR(1) processes in the 
reduced form based on the statistical significance of the first lagged values of the variables, i.e. 
the elements of the implied 2D Jacobian matrix. Accordingly, as shown in Appendix 4, 
allowing AR(1) error processes is applicable only for the USA, where all first lagged values 
are statistically significant. With respect to the ARMA model, recent research suggests that it 
avoids identification issues, i.e. it can effectively yield unbiased estimates from reduced form 
equations (see Dufour and Pelletier, 2011). Such a model can be estimated either by ML or 
GLS, but the results of simulation exercises (Koreisha and Pukkila, 1990; Koreisha and Fang, 
2001) suggest that the GLS approach is less sensitive to the initial values than the ML approach 
for small sample sizes (50-200 observations). Thus, our second solution to serial correlation is 
to follow the ARMA-GLS approach. A crucial condition in such a model is the invertibility of 
the MA process, which means that it must be possible to convert it into an AR process of 
infinite order, i.e. the absolute value of the roots of the characteristic equation of the MA model 
must lie within the unit circle (Brooks, 2014, pp. 267-81). In practice, the roots are identical to 
the absolute value of the estimated coefficient of the moving average term, in our case the 
MA(1) operator, which accordingly must be less than one. I choose to estimate our models on 
an equation-by-equation basis, instead of using a systems approach (e.g. a VAR model) in order 
to avoid misspecification of one equation to affect the other. This allows assessing efficiently 
whether even one of the two conditions for Minsky debt-driven oscillations holds in a particular 
economy. 
To summarise, the baseline model of our estimations is the ARMA approach, estimated 
through GLS, which according to the relevant literature is the most appropriate solution for 
serially correlated disturbance in small-size macroeconomic samples, avoiding identification 
problems. Alternatively, when identification issues are absent, I also estimate our pair of 
equations allowing AR(1) error terms, rather than MA(1), as a further demonstration of the 
consistency of our findings. Following the usual practice within the historical macroeconomic 
33 
 
data econometric studies, I estimate the model for the full-sample and sub-sample periods as 
well, evaluating potential regime shifts after World War II. 
 
5. Specifications and Econometric Results 
Following the methodology analysis of the previous section, I evaluate the existence of an 
endogenous debt-driven cycle through the following equations: 
Δlog(GDP)t = α0 + α1Δlog(GDP)t-1 + α2ΔDEBTt-1 + εGDPt (6) 
ΔDEBTt = β0 + β1ΔDEBTt-1 + β2Δlog(GDP)t-1 + εDEBTt (7) 
where GDP is real output, DEBT is either the business debt-to-income ratio (BDEBT) or the 
mortgage debt-to-income ratio (MDEBT) and εt the error terms. In both equations, I do apply 
first differences on both variables, to ensure stationarity (see Appendix 3). Also, regarding 
GDP, this is also consistent with the assumption of the Minsky models which refer to capital 
stock’s growth rate rather than to its level. Additionally, I take the logarithm of real GDP to 
linearise the exponential trend of the series, accordingly equation (5) is in log-level form, and 
equation (6) is in level-log form. Here, the crucial coefficients are α2 and β2, which represent 
the off-diagonal elements of the relevant Jacobian matrix (see (1)). As pinpointed in Section 3, 
the existing PK Minskyan studies examine almost exclusively a modified version of equation 
(5) and do not stress the importance of equation (6) for the endogeneity of the business cycle 
mechanism. An additional logical step to our business debt estimations is to replace GDP with 
Investment, expecting similar effects, i.e. that rising indebtedness decrease investment growth, 
and that increases in the growth rate of investment will lead to riskier decisions by firms, thus 
to higher debt ratios. This choice is also consistent with Minsky’s original story and the Minsky 
debt cycle models, which centre on the destabilising role of firms’ behaviour, i.e. their 
borrowing decisions during the boom, and their investment expenditure decisions when debt 
ratios become unsustainable. Accordingly, I also estimate pairs of investment and business debt 
ratio equations of the following form: 
Δlog(I)t = γ0 + γ1Δlog(I)t-1 + γ2ΔBDEBTt-1 + εGDPt (8) 
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ΔBDEBTt = δ0 + δ1ΔBDEBTt-1 + δ2Δlog(I)t-1 + εDEBTt (9) 
where I is real investment, BDEBT is the business debt-to-income ratio, and εt the error terms. 
Again, both variables are in first differences, in order to avoid non-stationarity, while 
investment is in logarithm form -like I do for GDP in (5) and (6). Analogously, our focus now 
is centred on the off-diagonal elements γ1 which must be negative, and δ2 which must be 
positive. In total, with respect to business debt estimations, I expect that a strong indication of 
endogenous debt-driven oscillations would be that either with GDP or investment, the relevant 
coefficients should have comparable statistically significant signs in both cases. 
The rest of this section presents the econometric findings for corporate debt-driven 
cycles in the US and the UK, distinguishing among the full-sample, the pre-WWII, and the 
post-WWII eras. As a further step, I also explore the possibility of endogenous mortgage debt-
driven cycles, following the same specification. This second part is inspired by the results of 
Jordá et al. (2016) who report that rising mortgage indebtedness increases the probability of 
financial crises, especially after 1945, but do not consider explicitly the possibility of 
endogenous oscillations. 
 
5.1.1 Business debt-driven cycles - Full-sample results 
Starting with the scrutiny of endogenous debt-driven cycles in the full-sample period for the 
US economy, I report econometric results for two different pairs of equations (Table 3). Both 
systems include dummy variables to control for the world war years. Pair (1) and (3) is the 
system of GDP and the corporate debt-to-income ratio, where I correct serial correlation by 
allowing MA(1) error processes. This system does yield evidence for endogenous cycles since 
both relevant coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. More specifically, in specification (1) I find debt-burdened growth of -0.528, and in 
specification (3) a procyclical leverage ratio of 0.112. This implies that indeed US firms do 
increase borrowing during the booms, and simultaneously a one unit increase in the corporate 
debt-to-income ratio’s change leads to a -52.8 per cent decrease in growth. Hence, there is 
robust supporting evidence for the necessary conditions for endogenous Minsky corporate 
debt-driven cycles between 1929 and 2015. Since at this stage I centre on corporate debt and 
firms’ behaviour, growth cycles should be primarily driven by investment expenditure. 
Accordingly, to confirm the strength of the findings, I replace GDP with Investment (I) and re-
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estimate the system allowing again MA(1) error terms (specifications (2) and (4)). This change 
also allows us to cover a quite longer period since the Investment series for the USA begin in 
1890. In terms of statistical significance and signs of the relevant coefficients, the results 
remain similar. Here, the negative effect of the business debt ratio on the Investment rate 
becomes much stronger (-3.989), compared to the GDP estimations. Moreover, the leverage 
ratio remains procyclical, with its magnitude remain become smaller compared to the GDP 
estimations. i.e. 0.023. Regarding post-estimation diagnostics, the main priority is to confirm 
the absence of serial correlation, which is the main issue I intend to solve by allowing MA(1) 
error terms. In all four equations, according to the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation tests, the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. The White test indicates 
heteroskedasticity issues in all four equations. Regarding invertibility, in all four specifications 
applied the inverted MA roots, i.e. the absolute values of the estimated coefficients of the 
MA(1) terms, are below 1, therefore the MA processes are indeed stable. Overall, our 
estimations strongly suggest the existence of endogenous corporate debt-driven cycles in the 
US economy, either in the context of GDP-Corporate debt or in the context Investment-
Corporate debt systems, for the full sample period, i.e. from the late 19th / early 20th century to 
date. Comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients of the two systems, the findings point out 
that the corporate debt ratio is more sensitive to increases in Investment than it is to changes in 
growth, whilst rising business debt accumulation decreases Investment growth substantially 
more than total demand growth. Calculating the length of the interaction cycle I find that it is 
16 years for the GDP growth-corporate debt system and 11.3 years for the investment growth-
corporate debt system.8 In addition, the Jacobian discriminant is negative in both models, thus 
the sufficient condition for oscillations is met. 
Moving on to our econometric estimates for endogenous business debt-driven cycles in 
the UK economy, over the period 1882 to 2010, as in the case of the USA I report two different 
systems of specifications (Table 4), both based on the ARMA model, since again allowing 
AR(1) errors is not applicable due to identification issues (see Appendix 3). Specifications (1) 
and (3) are the GDP-Corporate debt system of equations, while specifications (2) and (4) are 
the Investment growth-corporate debt system.  According to specification (3), UK’s leverage 
ratio is procyclical (0.100) and statistically significant at the 5% level, which implies that the 
euphoria of the boom did give rise to business indebtedness, between 1882 and 2010. The 
coefficient is slightly smaller in magnitude compared to the relevant coefficient for the USA, 
                                                 
8 The interaction cycle length of the 2D system is calculated following Stockhammer et al. (2018, p. 6). 
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which means that debt accumulation seems to increase less rapidly during the boom period. 
Also, I find that the subsequent rise in debt does have negative effects on GDP growth, but the 
relevant coefficient is statistically insignificant. The sign of this coefficient indicates that a one 
unit increase in business debt-to-income ratio’s change results in a -11.4% decrease in growth, 
which is consistent with Minsky’s assumption of debt-burdened growth. Replacing GDP with 
investment in the system (2) - (4) makes little difference since both relevant coefficients remain 
similar in terms of statistical significance and signs. Investment growth exhibits a positive 
effect on the business debt-to-income ratio (0.023) and is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The effect of a change in business debt on investment growth remains negative (-0.397), 
but as in the GDP-business debt system, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. These 
results provide strong evidence that, historically, the corporate leverage ratio of the UK has 
been procyclical. Contrariwise, the effect of business debt on investment growth is found to be 
negative but statistically insignificant, which constitute weak evidence for debt-burdened 
growth. Calculating the discriminant is found to be positive for both systems, hence the 
sufficient condition for cycles are not met for the UK. Also, it is worth noting that allowing 
MA(1) error terms in specifications (1), (2), (3) did not resolve the serial correlation issues, as 
in the case of the USA. Introducing MA(2) errors along with MA(1) resolves the serial 
correlation issues, but still the effects of business debt on growth remain statistically 
insignificant and the Jacobian discriminant keeps its positive sign. In total, for the UK there is 
only econometric evidence for the procyclicality of the business leverage ratio, i.e. only for one 
of Minsky’s endogenous debt-driven cycles hypothesis.
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Table 3: USA – Corporate debt estimations (Full-sample) 
USA - Corporate debt-driven cycles (Full Sample: 1890/1929 – 2015) 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent: Δlog(GDP) Δlog(I) Dependent: Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
0.624*** 
(6.272) 
 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
0.548*** 
(3.908) 
0.446*** 
(3.092) 
Δlog(I)t-1 
 
 
0.523*** 
(3.648) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
 
0.112*** 
(3.694) 
 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
 
-0.528*** 
(-2.893) 
-3.989*** 
(-3.719) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.023*** 
(4.406) 
MA(1) 
 
-0.533*** 
(-3.397) 
-0.521*** 
(-2.966) 
MA(1) 
 
-0.104 
(-0.5518) 
-0.113 
(-0.631) 
R-squared 0.562 0.343 R-squared 0.432 0.416 
B-G LM test 0.235 0.673 B-G LM test 0.510 0.165 
White test 0.000 0.001 White Test 0.000 0.000 
Period 1929-2015 1890-2015  Period 1929-2015 1890-2015 
Jacobian Matrices’ Discriminants for each system: (1), (3): -0.233; (2), (4): -0.361 
Cycle length: (1), (3): 16.086; (2), (4): 11.318 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values for specification tests are p-values 
corresponding to nR2. B-G LM test at first lag only. Constant terms and dummy variables for the World War years are included but not 
reported. 
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Table 4: UK – Corporate debt estimations (Full-sample) 
UK - Corporate debt-driven cycles (Full-sample: 1882-2010) 
 (1) (2) 
 
 (3) (4) 
Dependent:  Δlog(GDP) Δlog(I) Dependent:  Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
0.734*** 
(9.406) 
 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
-0.431*** 
(-2.758) 
-0.593*** 
(-4.659) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.836*** 
(32.862) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
 
0.100** 
(2.076) 
 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
-0.114 
(-1.098) 
-0.397 
(-1.362) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.023* 
(1.912) 
MA(1) 
-0.811*** 
(-8.859) 
-1.000 
(-0.002) 
MA(1) 
 
0.611*** 
(3.969) 
0.706*** 
(5.496) 
R-squared 0.327 0.572 R-squared 0.344 0.10 
B-G LM test 0.016 0.001 B-G LM test 0.005 0.12 
White test 0.002 0.000 White Test 0.004 0.74 
Jacobian Matrices’ Discriminants for each system: (1), (3): 1.311; (2), (4): 2.005 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values for 
specification tests are p-values corresponding to nR2. B-G LM test at first lag only.  Constant terms and dummy 
variables for the World War years are included but not reported. 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Robustness checks for the US Business debt-driven cycle – Full sample 
To evaluate the robustness of our findings in the case of the USA I estimate the model in the 
context of a system, i.e. as a VARMA model using the Kalman filtering methodology. The 
VARMA estimations do confirm the robustness of the findings, as the off-diagonal elements keep 
the expected signs and remain statistically significant, as in the main results. Table 5 reports the 
results of the VARMA(1,1) maximum likelihood specifications using the Kalman filter 
methodology. Overall, the results remain similar to the main results even in the context of a system, 
confirming the robustness of the findings. The estimations suggest that increases in the corporate 
debt ratio decrease GDP growth by -71.8% and investment growth by -384.1%. Both coefficients 
are statistically significant at the 5 levels. Simultaneously, either GDP growth or investment 
growth induces increases in the corporate debt-to-income ratio, 0.058 and 0.022, respectively. 
Again, both coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 and 1% levels, respectively. Thus, 
these robustness estimations provide further econometric evidence that the leverage ratio of the 
USA has indeed been procyclical, as expected. Moreover, calculating the discriminants of the 
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relevant Jacobian matrices for each VARMA system, they still remain negative, therefore once 
again the sufficient conditions for oscillation are met. Finally, the cycle length for the GDP-
business debt system is found to be 15.6 years, while the cycle length of the Investment-business 
debt system is 10.7 years. Unsurprisingly, both cycle lengths calculated for the maximum 
likelihood VARMA systems are very close to those of the equation-by-equation ARMA 
estimations using GLS. 
Table 5: USA (1889-2010), Corporate debt cycles – VARMA(1,1) 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent:  Δlog(GDP) Δlog(I) Dependent:  Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
 
0.481*** 
(7.791) 
 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 0.475** 
(2.261) 
0.419*** 
(3.556) 
Δlog(I)t-1  0.409** 
(2.311) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
 
0.058* 
(1.837) 
 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 -0.718** 
(-2.405) 
-3.841** 
(-2.333) 
Δlog(I)t-1 
 
 0.022*** 
(4.690) 
MA(1) 0.062 
(1.000) 
-0.344 
(1.000) 
MA(1) 
 
0.024 
(1.000) 
0.232 
(1.000) 
R-squared 0.335 0.078 R-squared 0.265 0.232 
White test 0.000 0.000  White test 0.000 0.000 
VARMA system (1)-(3)  VARMA system (2)-(4) 
Discriminant: -0.167   Discriminant: -0.306  
Cycle length: 15.573   Cycle Length: 10.665  
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values 
corresponding to specification tests are p-values.  The R2 values are computed from the one-step-ahead predictions 
of the state space model, so differ slightly from those presented in tables 3 and 5. 
 
 
Furthermore, as an additional test for the robustness of the main findings, I calculate and 
plot the recursive coefficients for the GDP growth-corporate debt (Figure 1) and the investment 
growth-corporate debt (Figure 2) systems for the USA to evaluate parameter stability. Due to the 
use of historical macroeconomic data, this step is essential in order to assess whether the results 
are driven by a sub-period. Regarding initial conditions for the recursive regressions, the anchor 
date is set to 1950 and the step size is set to one. Both figures suggest that all elements of the 
Jacobians of systems (1)-(3) and (2)-(4) (see Table 3) are indeed stable with the recursive plots 
40 
 
remaining within the 5% confidence intervals. Thus, our estimates are indeed stable across time 
and not driven by a sub-period. 
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Figure 1: Recursive coefficients for the GDP growth system 
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Figure 2: Recursive coefficients for the investment growth system
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5.2 Business debt-driven cycles - Pre-World War II period 
Moving on to the sub-sample estimations, the examination starts by exploring the late 19th – early 
20th-century financialisation phase. USA is not included in the pre-WWII debt cycles estimations, 
because its real GDP series start at 1929, limiting the sample too much for a yearly data time series 
estimating framework. Therefore, I evaluate the existence of endogenous corporate debt-driven 
cycles only for the UK, during the pre-1939 period (see Table 6). As in the full sample estimations, 
only the ARMA estimations are applicable, so I estimate two pairs of equations one for the GDP-
Business debt system, and the second pair of Investment and business debt. The findings change 
compared to the full-sample estimations. The effects of the change in the business debt ratio on 
GDP growth is found to be positive (0.382) and statistically insignificant. On the contrary, its effect 
on investment growth is negative (-0.294), but again it is not statistically significant. Hence, it is 
unclear whether growth in the UK  has been debt-burdened or debt-led during the pre-WWII 
period. Estimating the impact of GDP growth on the business debt ratio we obtain a negative sign, 
i.e. GDP growth decreases firms’ indebtedness. However, the coefficient is again insignificant. 
Regarding the effect of investment growth on the business debt ratio, it is found to be positive, as 
expected, but once again it is not statistically significant. More specifically, a one per cent increase 
in the growth rate seems to lead to an 11% increase in the business debt ratio. That implies that, as 
in the full period, UK firms do increase their indebtedness as they become more optimistic during 
the boom phase of the business cycle. Overall, the investment growth-business debt system 
confirms both hypotheses for a Minsky debt-driven cycle, but below the standards of statistical 
significance. Unlike the full sample estimations for the UK, the econometric findings for the pre-
WWII period seem to be quite sensitive to the real variable used. While the full-sample results 
suggest clearly that the UK’s leverage ratio is procyclical, the results for the pre-WWII period are 
more obscure. This implies that in the case of the UK important variables which have been crucial 
growth drivers are omitted.  
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Table 6: UK – Corporate debt estimations (Pre-WWII) 
UK - Corporate debt-driven cycles (1880-1939) 
 (1) (2) 
 
 (3) (4) 
Dependent:  Δlog(GDP) Δlog(I) Dependent:  Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
-0.438* 
(-1.710) 
 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
0.788*** 
(-11.274) 
-0.668*** 
(-5.688) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.699*** 
(4.210) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
 
-0.062 
(-1.495) 
 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
0.382 
(1.135) 
-0.294 
(-0.430) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.032 
(1.563) 
MA(1) 
0.801*** 
(4.350) 
-0.503** 
(-2.243) 
MA(1) 
1.000** 
(0.000) 
0.695*** 
(4.607) 
R-squared 0.204 0.476 
 
R-squared 0.510 0.501 
B-G LM test 0.040 0.154 B-G LM test 0.323 0.268 
White test 0.000 0.080 White Test 0.003 0.940 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values for 
specification tests are p-values corresponding to nR2. B-G LM test at first lag only.  Constant terms and dummy 
variables for the World War years are included but not reported. 
 
5.3 Business debt-driven cycles - Post-World War II period 
Following the usual practice in the financial cycles’ empirical literature that utilises historical 
macroeconomic data, the last set of our estimations focuses on the post-WWII years (see Table 7). 
Again, the estimations are based on the baseline ARMA-GLS methodology. The results of these 
estimations provide weak evidence for a post-WWII endogenous GDP-business debt cycle for the 
UK. More precisely, it seems that UK firms’ desired investment rate grows faster than retained 
profits during the boom, leading to debt accumulation, since the effect of GDP growth on the 
change in the business debt ratio is found to be positive (0.154), i.e. an one unit increase in the 
growth rate triggers a 15.4% rise in the debt ratio (spec. (5)). This coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. At the same time, the effect of the change in business debt ratio on 
GDP growth has the expected negative sign (-0.251) and is statistically significant at the 10% level 
(spec. (1)). The coexistence of rising indebtedness during the euphoria of the boom and the 
negative effects of the subsequent debt payments creates the necessary conditions for endogenous 
debt-driven oscillations. Nevertheless, while the necessary condition is met, the discriminant of 
the implied Jacobian of this system is positive, thus the sufficient condition is not met. In 
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specifications (2) and (6), which is the system where I replace GDP growth with investment 
growth, the off-diagonal coefficients keep their expected signs, i.e. changes in the business debt 
ratio decrease investment growth and investment growth exhibits a positive effect on the change 
of the business debt ratio. In addition, the discriminant of the Jacobian of the system (2)-(6) is 
negative, which suggest that the sufficient condition is met. However, both coefficients of the off-
diagonal elements are not statistically significant. Overall, these findings constitute weak evidence 
for the existence of a post-WWII business debt-driven cycle in the UK.  
Regarding the USA, the effect of GDP growth on the business debt ratio keeps the expected 
positive sign (0.004), but becomes substantially weaker compared to the full sample result and it 
is not statistically significant (spec. (7)). Similarly, the impact of the change in the business debt 
ratio on GDP growth is statistically insignificant as well (spec. (3)), despite it does keep its negative 
sign (-0.126), as in the full sample results. The discriminant of the Jacobian matrix of the system 
(3)-(7) is negative, which provides evidence that the sufficient condition is met. Nonetheless, as 
both off-diagonal elements are statistically significant, the evidence for cycles is considered as 
weak. After replacing GDP growth with investment growth, s notable change is observed, since 
the effect of the change in the business debt ratio on investment growth becomes positive (spec. 
(4)). The impact of investment growth on the change in the business debt ratio remains positive at 
0.015 (spec. (8)). As in the GDP-business debt system, the coefficients of both off-diagonal 
elements of the implied Jacobian are statistically insignificant, thus there is no evidence for 
endogenous cycles. 
In a nutshell, the post-WWII estimations suggest that there is some weak evidence for 
Minskyan debt-driven business cycles in the UK over the period 1945 to 2015. Unlike the full 
sample period, for the USA there is no evidence for business cycles endogenously driven by 
interactions between the corporate debt ratio and either GDP growth or investment growth.
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Table 7: USA and UK – Corporate debt estimations (Post-WWII) 
USA and UK - Corporate debt-driven cycles (1945-2015) 
 
(1) 
UK 
(2) 
UK 
(3) 
USA 
(4) 
USA 
 
 
(5) 
UK 
(6) 
UK 
(7) 
USA 
(8) 
USA 
Dependent:  Δlog(GDP) Δlog(I) Δlog(GDP) Δlog(I) Dependent:  Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) Δ(BDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
0.648*** 
(5.572) 
 
0.110 
(0.034) 
 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
-0.029 
(-0.088) 
0.132 
(0.396) 
0.125 
(0.368) 
0.194 
(0.656) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.096 
(0.318) 
 
0.670*** 
(8.054) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
 
0.154* 
(1.680) 
 
0.004 
(0.102) 
 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 
-0.251* 
(-1.895) 
-0.405 
(-0.397) 
-0.126 
(-0.329) 
0.032 
(0.061) 
Δlog(I)t-1  
0.017 
(1.079) 
 
0.015 
(1.604) 
MA(1) 
-0.464** 
(-2.591) 
0.204 
(0.662) 
0.280 
(0.832) 
1.000 
(-0.001) 
MA(1) 
0.361 
(1.190) 
0.218 
(0.656) 
0.245 
(0.735) 
0.038 
(0.114) 
R-squared 0.286 0.073 0.079 0.319 R-squared 0.156 0.10 0.122 0.151 
B-G LM test 0.010 0.790 0.638 0.450 B-G LM test 0.034 0.331 0.443 0.692 
White test 0.673 0.000 0.000 0.000 White Test 0.011 0.853 0.000 0.004 
Jacobian Matrices’ Discriminants for each system : (1), (5): 0.304; (2), (6): -0.026; (3), (7): -0.002; (4), (8): 0.228 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values for specification tests are p-values corresponding to 
nR2. B-G LM test at first lag only.  Constant terms are included but not reported. 
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5.4 Minskyan mortgage debt – growth cycles 
In one of their recent papers, Jordà et al. (2016) argue that, during the Post-WWII period, 
business cycle fluctuations appear to be more closely correlated with mortgage debt, rather 
with non-mortgage loans, based on evidence from logistic and probabilistic panel data 
regressions. Our findings for the same period, reported in the previous sub-section, also 
highlight that corporate debt-demand endogenous interactions do not create the conditions for 
endogenous oscillations. Inspired by the results of Jordà et al. (2016), I shift our focus on 
scrutinizing the possibility of endogenous mortgage debt-driven cycles in the post-1945 era.  
As the first stage of our evaluation, I follow the Logit estimation strategy of Jordá et al. 
(2016), but in a time series context, focusing on our two case studies, UK and USA in the post-
WWII period. I estimate three specifications, exactly as the aforementioned study does: (1) 
where the single explanatory variable is the mortgage debt-to-income ratio; (2) where the single 
explanatory variable is the corporate debt-to-income ratio; and (3) where I use both ratios. As 
reported in the table below (specifications (1) and (3)), the effects of rising mortgage ratios on 
the probability of a financial crisis (FIN_CRISIS) vary in terms of signs and robustness. While 
in most cases its effect is positive, as expected, but not statistically significant, in the case of 
specification (3) for the UK the sign is negative and robust, suggesting that rising mortgage 
indebtedness decreases the probability of a crisis. On the contrary, the signs of the corporate 
debt ratio’s coefficients are consistently positive for both countries, as expected. More 
precisely, in the case of the UK business debt ratio’s coefficients vary from 16.73 to 91.309 
and both are statistically significant, which indicates that the probability of a financial crisis 
increases remarkably, as corporate debt accumulation escalates. Comparing the magnitude of 
the coefficients of the two debt ratios, again business debt’s impact seems to be quite larger, 
either in the single explanatory variable estimations ((1) and (2)) or when both explanatory 
variables included. One possible explanation for the important discrepancies between my 
results and the findings of Jordá et al. (2016) is that I use time series analysis rather than panel 
regressions. A potential issue with our estimations, which might explain the differences, is the 
use of time series analysis with a dependent variable with such little variation (since its value 
becomes 1 only on the year of the occurrence of a crisis) could yield biased estimates, given 
that Logit models are estimated through ML, which are quite sensitive to sample size. 
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Table 8: UK and USA – Financial crises Logit estimations (1945-2013)  
Dependent: FIN_CRISIS 
 
UK 
 
USA 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
MDEBT 
4.171 
(1.373) 
 
-29.262** 
(-2.131) 
17.536 
(1.403) 
 
26.562 
(1.294) 
BDEBT  
16.730** 
(2.103) 
91.309** 
(2.341) 
 
19.884 
(0.802) 
37.974 
(0.876) 
R-squared 0.08 0.20 0.48 0.14 0.04 0.19 
LR statistic 0.163 0.025 0.002 0.102 0.373 0.167 
Notes: Constant terms not reported. 
 
To evaluate the possibility of endogenous mortgage-driven cycles, I estimate growth-
mortgage debt ratio pairs of equations, following the baseline equation-by-equation ARMA-
GLS specification that I previously used for the endogenous corporate debt-driven cycles 
(Table 9). Starting with the UK (specifications (2) and (4)), the effect of mortgage debt on GDP 
growth -contrary to the expected- is positive (0.185), but statistically insignificant. In addition, 
the effect of the change in the mortgage debt on growth is -relatively weakly- negative (-0.052) 
and the coefficient again is not statistically significant. Such results could indicate an anti-
Minsky endogenous oscillations mechanism of debt-led growth and a countercyclical leverage 
ratio, but since both coefficients are not insignificant, no safe conclusion can be drawn. As 
reported in the previous sub-section, there is weak econometric evidence for a UK corporate 
debt-driven cycle over the same period. In this regard, it seems that business debt has been a 
more influential driver of the UK business cycle in the post-WWII era, according to our 
estimating methodology. Moving on to the estimations for the USA, I obtain strongly mortgage 
debt-led growth of 0.996 and a procyclical mortgage leverage ratio of 0.050. Only the 
coefficient of the former is statistically significant. This finding suggests that a one unit 
increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio results in a 99.6% increase in GDP growth, which is 
in contrast with the assumption of debt-burdened growth. Since I applied first differences to 
ensure stationarity, our robust mortgage debt-led growth finding for the US, despite anti-
Minsky as argued in Section 3, is comparable to the similar results of Kim (2013). In general, 
our results show that in both case studies there is no evidence for endogenous mortgage debt-
driven oscillations mechanism in the post-1945 era.  
 
 
49 
 
Table 9: USA and UK – Mortgage debt estimations (Post-WWII) 
USA and UK - Mortgage debt-driven cycles (Post-1945) 
 
(1) 
USA 
(2) 
UK 
 
 
(3) 
USA 
(4) 
UK 
Dependent: Δlog(GDP) Dependent: Δ(MDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
-0.111 
(-0.454) 
0.416** 
(2.186) 
Δ(MDEBT)t-1 
0.511*** 
(3.293) 
0.888*** 
(10.231) 
Δ(MDEBT)t-1 
0.996** 
(2.622) 
0.185 
(0.820) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
0.050 
(1.128) 
-0.052 
(-1.361) 
MA(1) 
0.470* 
(1.900) 
0.053 
(0.228) 
MA(1) 
 
0.315* 
(1.728) 
-0.060 
(-0.374) 
R-squared 0.165 0.239 R-squared 0.477 0.666 
B-G LM test 0.299 0. 054 B-G LM test 0.963 0.285 
White test 0.000 0.387 White Test 0.353 0.289 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values for 
specification tests are p-values corresponding to nR2. B-G LM test at first lag only.  Constant terms are included 
but not reported. 
 
In addition, to evaluate the possibility of endogenous oscillations driven by mortgage 
debt over the full sample period. I estimate the system of real GDP growth and the change in 
the mortgage debt-income ratio using the baseline ARMA-GLS approach. Table 10 reports the 
results. For the USA, Ι find that the mortgage leverage ratio is procyclical as expected (0.100), 
and statistically significant at the 1% level (spec. (3)). I also find that increases in the mortgage 
debt ratio decrease growth (-0.134), but the coefficient is not statistically significant (spec. (1)). 
Moreover, I find that the discriminant is negative, thus necessary and sufficient conditions for 
cycles are met. The cycle length for this system is found to be 40.2 years. Thus, for the USA 
there is weak evidence for endogenous mortgage-driven cycles, below the standards of 
statistical significance. For the UK, I find that the partial effect of real GDP growth on the 
mortgage debt ratio is negative and not statistically significant. With respect to the effects of 
real GDP growth on the mortgage debt ratio, I find a positive sign, i.e. mortgage debt-led 
growth, and the coefficient is again not statistically significant. Overall, I do not find any 
evidence for Minskyan household debt-driven oscillations for the UK. 
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Overall, the mortgage cycle results suggest that there is some weak evidence for a US 
mortgage debt-driven business cycle in the full sample period. Regarding the UK and the post-
1945 estimations for the USA, there is no evidence for endogenous cycles. These results do not 
necessarily contradict the findings of Jordá et al. (2016) that mortgage debt increases the 
probability of financial crises in the post-WWI era. The main reason is that their results indicate 
that major financial crises are strongly correlated with mortgage debt accumulation after 1945 
and that recessions become deeper when they coincide with financial crashes, which is not a 
priori relevant for endogeneity. Since the financial crises binary variable takes into account 
only the year of a crisis’ occurrence, its ‘cycle’ frequency is very low, which implies that it is 
more strongly correlated with the debt aggregate that exhibits longer cycles. On the contrary, 
since I focus on the interaction with GDP, whose cycle frequency is substantially higher, it is 
likely that regular business cycles are more strongly correlated with the debt aggregate that has 
a relatively higher frequency. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Recapitulating, the growing empirical literature on financial and finance-driven business cycles 
follows three main methodological approaches: (i) Comparison of financial and real business 
Table 10: USA and UK – Mortgage debt estimations (Full sample) 
USA and UK - Mortgage debt-driven cycles (Full sample) 
 
(1) 
USA 
(2) 
UK 
 
 
(3) 
USA 
(4) 
UK 
Dependent: Δlog(GDP) Dependent: Δ(MDEBT) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
0.606*** 
(5.990) 
0.359* 
(1.674) 
Δ(MDEBT)t-1 
0.444*** 
(3.108) 
0.906*** 
(16.126) 
Δ(MDEBT)t-1 
-0.134 
(-0.868) 
0.270 
(0.344) 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 
0.100** 
(2.424) 
-0.011 
(-0.671) 
MA(1) 
-0.604*** 
(-4.254) 
-0.051 
(-0.215) 
MA(1) 
 
0.618*** 
(5.009) 
-0.065 
(-0.570) 
R-squared 0.515 0.275 R-squared 0.562 0.764 
B-G LM test 0.020 0.413 B-G LM test 0.413 0.392 
White test 0.000 0.000 White Test 0.000 0.096 
Jacobian Matrices’ Discriminants for each system: (1), (3): -0.027; (2), (4): 0.333 
Cycle length: (1), (3): 40.215  
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Values for 
specification tests are p-values corresponding to nR2. B-G LM test at first lag only.  Constant terms and dummy 
variables for the World War years are included but not reported. 
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cycles’ duration, through frequency analysis, i.e. Band-bass filtering, Turning point analysis, 
or Spectral density analysis (e.g. Claessens et al. 2011, 2012; Drehman et al. 2012; Borio 2014; 
Aikman et al. 2015); (ii) Evaluation of financial and real business cycles synchronisation 
through Logistic and Probabilistic regressions, based on binary variables for financial crises 
(either as dependent or independent variable), mainly using historical macroeconomic data 
(e.g. Schularick and Taylor 2012; Jordá et al. 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al. 2015); and (iii) 
Estimation of growth equations which include debt effects (e.g. Palley 1994; Kim 2013, 2016; 
Bezemer et al. 2015; Mian et al. 2016). Despite a growing number of studies among the 
literature uses historical macroeconomic data (e.g. Schularick and Taylor 2012; Jordá et al. 
2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al. 2015), the existing PK studies by Palley (1994) and Kim 
(2013, 2016) cover only parts of the post-WWII period and examine only the US economy. As 
argued in Sections 3, another critical issue with their econometric specification is that it is not 
theoretically accurate with respect to the endogenous business cycle mechanism of Minsky, as 
it is formalised in the macroeconomic modelling literature (see Section 2), based on insights 
from his original writings (see Minsky 1975, 1986, 1992). While in Minsky the endogeneity of 
crises is rooted in the procyclicality of the leverage ratio and in debt-burdened growth, these 
studies estimate only growth equations expecting a business cycle generated by a medium-term 
regime shift from debt-led to debt-burdened growth. Also, it is worth mentioning that Minsky 
originally focused on corporate debt’s impact on the business cycle fluctuations, rather than on 
household debt. The only empirical studies that incorporate business (or non-mortgage) debt 
effects are the papers of Jordá et al. (2016) and Mian et al. (2016), reporting supporting 
evidence strong correlation with the probability of a financial crisis and negative growth 
effects, respectively. Besides that, another important shortcoming of the existing literature is 
the weak theoretical background of their specifications, as it has been admitted by authors like 
Jordá et al. (2013). On the one hand, frequency analysis and Logistic/Probabilistic regressions 
do give us indications about cycle synchronisation but fail to provide us with more precise 
information about the causality among the variables, which is of great importance for the 
endogeneity of the cycle. On the other hand, estimating only growth equations and proving that 
rising indebtedness decreases growth rates is only half the endogenous oscillation mechanism.  
Building on our critique of the empirical debt-driven cycles literature, I attempted to 
address the lack of theoretical coherence by estimating simultaneously pairs of growth and debt 
ratio equations, derived directly from the 2-dimensional differential equation systems of the 
relevant PK Minsky models (see Sections 3 and 4). That means that I explicitly focused on 
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both necessary conditions for the endogeneity of the cyclical mechanism, i.e. on debt’s negative 
growth effects and leverage ratio’s procyclicality as well, as Minsky does. This approach is 
fundamentally different from the existing PK Minsky cycles studies’ methodology which 
implies that the boom phase occurs due to debt-led growth, which eventually becomes debt-
burdened as the debt ratios rise. Indeed, such an endogenous oscillation mechanism makes 
sense, from a logical perspective, but neither it is consistent with Minsky’s original 
assumptions, nor it gives us enough information about why and how the debt ratios increase 
during the boom. Furthermore, I utilised a historical macroeconomic dataset that includes the 
UK and the US, covering approximately the period from 1880 to 2015. This is the longest time 
horizon examined in any PK business cycle study yet, and the only time series-based 
econometric study within the empirical debt-driven cycles literature that uses historical data. 
An econometric issue that arises due to our minimalistic specification is misspecification, 
which results in potential serial correlation issues. In order to prevent such statistical problems, 
I chose to allow the error terms of our equations to follow either AR(1) or MA(1) processes, 
following the propositions of the relevant econometric literature (see Section 4). The confirm 
the consistency of our findings in the case of corporate debt, I estimate our pairs of equations 
using two different real variables, either GDP or Investment. Moreover, following the usual 
practice in the quantitative macroeconomic history literature, I estimate the models for the full 
period and for sub-periods, finding some worth-mentioning discrepancies. 
In the case of the US economy, the full-sample estimations provide robust evidence for 
endogenous business debt-driven oscillations. In the first round of estimations, I estimate two 
pairs of equations based on GDP-business debt and Investment-business debt systems, using 
the ARMA-GLS model. The results confirm Minsky’s hypotheses, i.e. firms increase their debt 
ratios in the boom period of the cycle, while the subsequent rise in indebtedness has strong 
negative effects on growth which eventually lead to endogenous crises. To test the robustness 
of our findings, I re-estimate the two pairs of equations as a system, i.e. a VARMA model using 
the Kalman filtering methodology. In spite of some minor variation in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients, the robustness check estimations yield equivalent results in terms of statistical 
significance and signs. Both in the main results and the robustness checks, we confirm both the 
necessary and the sufficient condition for endogenous cycles. Such results highlight that in the 
US economy the firms tend to take riskier decisions, i.e. rapidly increase their debt ratios, 
benefiting the rise of an unsustainable debt-driven growth model which eventually leads to 
systemic crises, like the 1929 and 2007 financial breakdowns. Although, our post-1945 
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corporate debt estimations for the USA yield statistically insignificant coefficients, both for the 
effect of the debt ratio on growth and for the impact of growth on indebtedness, whilst the 
magnitude of the coefficients shrinks, compared to the full period regressions. These results 
may not be that unexpected if we consider the findings of Kim (2013, 2016) who show that in 
the USA household, mortgage, and consumer credit’s influence rose especially after the early 
1980s, contributing to the current secular stagnation phase. Jordá et al. (2016) come up with 
similar conclusions about mortgage debt’s post-WWII dynamics but in a panel context. To 
evaluate the possibility of endogenous mortgage-driven cycles, which is beyond the scope of 
the studies mentioned above, I estimated GDP-mortgage debt pairs of equations for the full and 
the post-1945 periods, based on the baseline ARMA-GLS specification used for the corporate 
debt estimations. The econometric findings provide weak evidence for the existence of an 
endogenous mortgage debt-driven cycle in the USA over the full period. It is also worth noting 
that the cycle length of the US mortgage cycle is substantially longer than the corporate cycle. 
However, unlike the aforementioned studies, I find no evidence for a post-WWII mortgage 
debt-driven cycle in the USA. This finding may appear to contradict Jordá et al. (2016), but 
this is not necessarily the case. Mortgage debt may lead to a higher probability of major crises 
or lead to deeper recessions, but corporate debt seems to be more influential for endogenous 
cycles. 
Moving on to our second case study, the UK economy, our estimates provide little 
supporting evidence for endogenous debt-driven cycles. Regarding the endogenous business 
debt-driven business cycles estimations over the post-WWII era, the necessary conditions for 
cycles are met, i.e. debt decrease GDP growth and GDP growth increases indebtedness, with 
both effects being statistically significant. This result does not hold for the pre-WWII and the 
post-WWII periods, where the coefficients keep their signs, but the effects of business debt on 
GDP growth are insignificant. We may conclude that UK firms tend to take riskier investment 
decisions and increase their indebtedness at a fast rate over different historical periods. 
Nonetheless, when I replace GDP with investment, the magnitudes of the effects decrease 
significantly, and the coefficients become insignificant. Since UK’s cycle is not corporate-
driven in the post-1945 era, like in the case of the USA, I evaluate the possibility of a mortgage 
debt-driven cycles by re-estimating the system of equations through the baseline ARMA-GLS 
model. The effect of mortgage debt on growth is positive, but statistically insignificant, which 
again implies the absence of a strong direct linkage. The effect of GDP growth on the change 
in the mortgage debt ratio is positive and statistically significant, indicating that higher growth 
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rates lead to higher household indebtedness in the UK over the post-WWII period. The results 
remain identical in terms of statistical significance and signs in the full period as well. To sum 
up, the econometric estimations suggest that both UK firms and households increase their 
indebtedness during the euphoria of the boom phase of the cycle. Yet, there is little or no 
evidence that corporate or mortgage debt accumulation leads to slowdowns in growth, hence 
there is no evidence for endogenous cycles. Given the weak findings for the UK economy, it 
seems that neither corporate nor household debt has not been the major driver of its business 
cycle, but some other variable that is omitted in our regressions. In the case of an endogenous 
cycle, that could be a distribution-driven cycle à la Goodwin (1967) or a multiplier accelerator 
cycle. 
Recapitulating and attempting to contrast our contribution with the existing literature 
both in terms of methodology and findings, it is useful to focus separately on its relationship 
with the PK studies and the quantitative macroeconomic history literature. With respect to the 
PK studies, the contribution of this chapter is threefold since: (a) our methodology on 
evaluating cycles’ endogeneity is based explicitly the two fundamental Minskyan relationships, 
i.e. procyclical leverage ratios and debt-burdened growth, rather than assuming a cycle due to 
a growth regime shift process; (b) following Minsky’s original narrative, I focus mainly on the 
interactions between GDP or investment growth and the corporate debt ratio; (c) in terms of 
data and case studies, I scrutinise case studies other than the US and I extend our analysis to a 
much longer time horizon, due to the use of historical time series. From the perspective of the 
quantitative macroeconomic history literature, I confirm that debt aggregates can also be 
important for endogenous cycles, rather than only make financial crashes more likely or 
recessions deeper. Also, our approach highlights that the choice of time series analysis has an 
impact on results since the existing historical studies yield quite different results based on panel 
estimations. Compared to this part of the literature, our approach is much more theory-driven, 
rather than exploratory, suggesting that mortgage debt might worsen recessions or induce 
financial crises, but corporate debt is more important for endogenous oscillations, at least in 
the case of the US economy. Therefore, there are two important implications of our results with 
respect to the economic history literature: (i) focusing on individual countries matters, since I 
observe important discrepancies; and (ii) strong correlation between certain debt aggregates 
(i.e. mortgages) and financial crises’ probability does not necessarily imply the existence of an 
underlying endogenous oscillation mechanism. In this regard, imposing a tighter theoretical 
framework for estimations is crucial, since it gives us much more specific information about 
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the causes and consequences of financial deregulation. In total, our methodology and findings 
not only examine the harmful consequences of credit accumulation but also unveils the 
underlying causes of its expansion. 
Undoubtedly, the approach of this chapter, despite giving a more precise picture for the 
endogeneity of a debt-driven cycle mechanism compared to the existing empirical literature, 
has certain shortcomings. The most notable is that I examine endogenous financial instability 
solely in terms of the debt ratios, rather than incorporate the role of asset price inflation. The 
main reason behind that choice is that the existing theoretical modelling literature that models 
endogenous financial cycles including both debt and asset prices (e.g. Ryoo, 2010, 2013) is 
based on abstract behavioural variables, such as the desired debt ratio and the expected rate of 
return on equities, which apparently cannot be estimated directly. Thus, developing such a 
formal model based on observable variables for debt and asset prices is beyond the scope of 
this empirical study.  
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Appendix 
 
A1: Historical Macroeconomic Data sources 
Table A1: Data Sources 
Country Variable Period Source 
UK 
GDP (real) 1850-2015 Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) 
Business Debt (nominal) 1880-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Mortgage Debt (nominal) 1880-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
GDP (nominal) 1870-2013 Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) 
Exports (real) 1850-2015 Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) 
Short-term Interest Rate (nominal) 1850-2009 Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) 
Consumer Price Index 1850-2009 Thomas and Dimsdale (2016) 
USA 
GDP (real) 1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
Investment (real) 
1889-1929 Kuznets and Jenks (1961) 
1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
Total Credit (nominal) 1889-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Mortgage Credit (nominal) 1889-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
GDP (nominal) 1889-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Exports (real) 
1889-1929 Lipsey (1963) 
1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
Short-term Interest Rate (nominal) 1889-2011 Shiller (2005) 
Inflation Rate 1891-2013 Shiller (2005) 
France 
GDP (real) 1896-2010 Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
Total Credit (nominal) 1896-2009 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Mortgage Credit (nominal) 1896-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
GDP (nominal) 1896-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Short-term Interest Rate (nominal) 1896-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Consumer Price Index 1896-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Denmark 
GDP (real) 
1876-1970 Kaergård (1991) 
1966-2010 Official National Accounts 
Total Credit (% of GDP) 1875-2005 Abildgren (2006) 
Mortgage Credit (% of GDP) 1875-2005 Abildgren (2006) 
Short-term Interest Rate (nominal) 1875-2005 Abildgren (2006) 
Consumer Price Index 1875-2012 Abildgren (2010) 
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A2: Endogenous oscillations in 2D ODE systems 
A system of difference (or differential) equations exhibits endogenous oscillations if the 
eigenvalues of the relevant Jacobian matrix (in our case (1)) are complex conjugates (see 
Chiang 1984, p. 633-45). Accordingly, in such a system the roots of the characteristic equation 
of the Jacobian matrix are the eigenvalues (λ): 
 
𝜆2 − 𝜆𝑇𝑟(𝐽) + det (𝐽) = 0 ⇒   𝜆1,2 = ±
𝑇𝑟(𝐽) ± √𝑇𝑟(𝐽)2 − 4det (𝐽)
2
 
 
Therefore, in the context of a 2-dimensional Jacobian matrix (see (1)), the sufficient condition 
for oscillations is that the discriminant (∆) of its characteristic equation must be negative, given 
complex eigenvalues. The discriminant of a 2D Jacobian matrix can be calculated as a function 
of its trace and determinant, as follows: 
 
∆ = 𝑇𝑟(𝐽)2 − 4 det(𝐽) < 0 ⇔ (𝐽11 + 𝐽22)
2 − 4(𝐽11𝐽22 − 𝐽21𝐽12) < 0  
⇔ (𝐽11 − 𝐽22)
2 + 4𝐽21𝐽12 < 0  
 
Apparently, since the term (J11-J22 )
2 is positive, the necessary condition for oscillations is that 
the product of the off-diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix, i.e. J21J12, must be negative.  
In terms of our estimations, when both estimates for the off-diagonal elements of the 
implied Jacobian matrix have opposite signs and are statistically significant, I proceed to the 
calculation of the discriminant to evaluate if the sufficient conditions are met as well. 
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A3: Unit Root test results 
Table A2: ADF Unit Root Tests  
Country Variable ADF test  
  Levels 1st Differences Conclusion 
UK 
Log(GDP) 
1.22 
(1) 
-8.43 
(0) 
I(1) 
BDEBT 
-0.83 
(0.95) 
-9 
(0) 
I(1) 
MDEBT 
1.09 
(0.99) 
-3.09 
(0.1) 
I(1) 
Log(I) 
-0.725 
(0.969) 
-10.031 
(0.00) 
I(1) 
INT_RATE 
-5.87 
(0) 
- I(0) 
USA 
Log(GDP) 
-1.08 
(0.92) 
-6.16 
(0) 
I(1) 
BDEBT 
-2.11 
(0.53) 
-7.61 
(0) 
I(1) 
MDEBT 
-3.64 
(0.03) 
- I(0) 
Log(I) 
-0.9 
(0.95) 
-8.62 
(0) 
I(1) 
INT_RATE 
-6.75 
(0) 
- I(0) 
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A4: Identification of ML estimations with AR(1) error terms  
Autoregressive errors of order one are of the following form: 
𝑢𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔𝑢𝑔𝑡−1  +  𝑒𝑔𝑡 (𝑖) 
𝑢𝑑𝑡 = 𝜌𝑑𝑢𝑑𝑡−1  +  𝑒𝑑𝑡 (𝑖𝑖) 
Where 𝑒𝑔𝑡 and 𝑒𝑑𝑡 are white noise processes. Replacing equations (𝑖) and (𝑖𝑖) into equations 
(3) and (4), we get the following AR(2) representations of our model: 
gt = (𝐴1 + 𝜌𝑔)gt−1 − A1𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑡−2 +  𝐴2dt−1  +  𝐴2𝜌𝑔dt−2 + ugt (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
dt = 𝐵1gt−1 + 𝐵1ρ𝑑gt−2 + (𝐵2 + 𝜌𝑑)dt−1 + B2𝜌𝑑dt−1 + udt (𝑖𝑣) 
Equations (𝑖𝑖𝑖) and (𝑖𝑣) can be estimated through ordinary least squares. However, here only 
𝐴2 and 𝐵1 are identifiable. If both parameters are statistically significant in the AR(2) 
representations (𝑖𝑖𝑖) and (𝑖𝑣), then we can proceed to estimate equations (3) and (4), allowing 
the AR(1) error processes (𝑖) and (𝑖𝑖), using maximum likelihood. If either 𝐴2 or 𝐵1 is not 
statistically significant in (𝑖𝑖𝑖) or (𝑖𝑣), then (3) or (4), respectively, will not be identified with 
AR(1) errors. The results below suggest that this specification cannot be applied in our cases. 
Table A3: AR(2) estimations– Corporate cycles (Full-sample) 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Dependent Variable: Δlog(GDP) Dependent Variable: Δ(BDEBT) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 0.395*** 4.295 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 0.276*** 2.998 
Δlog(GDP)t-2 -0.070 -0.740 Δ(BDEBT)t-2 0.054 0.591 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 0.086 0.513 Δlog(GDP)t-1 0.116** 2.245 
Δ(BDEBT)t-2 -0.355** -2.161 Δlog(GDP)t-2 -0.099* -1.899 
R-squared 0.173 
 
R-squared 0.105 
 
DW stat 1.903 
 
DW stat 1.996 
 
UNITED STATES 
Dependent Variable: Δlog(GDP) Dependent Variable: Δ(BDEBT) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 0.518*** 4.592 Δ(BDEBT)t-1 -0.301 -1.154 
Δlog(GDP)t-2 -0.088 -0.818 Δ(BDEBT)t-2 -0.040 -0.161 
Δ(BDEBT)t-1 -0.544 -1.552 Δlog(GDP)t-1 3.758*** 4.639 
Δ(BDEBT)t-2 -0.268 -0.770 Δlog(GDP)t-2 -1.006 -1.253 
R-squared 0.338 
 
R-squared 0.259 
 
DW stat 1.929 
 
DW stat 1.963 
 
Note: Constant terms’ coefficients are not reported. 
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A5: Interest rate-driven cycle – France (Full sample)  
Overall, no concrete evidence for interest-driven cycles is found in any country other than 
France. Again, allowing only MA(1) errors is applicable. As reported below, France’s growth 
is slightly interest rate-burdened (-0.008), meaning that a rise in the short-term interest rate 
rises interest payments, thus decrease growth. Simultaneously, its interest rate seems to be very 
strongly procyclical (6.52), which implies that it is driven by investment demand, as the 
relevant business cycles models assume, creating an endogenous oscillation mechanism. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant, and the R-squared values of both equations are the 
highest among all countries (0.722 and 0.183), underlining the strength of this trivial, 
underlying endogenous relationship.  
Table A4: France - Interest rate-driven Cycle (Full Sample) 
FRANCE 
Dependent Variable: Δlog(GDP) Dependent Variable: Δ(INT_RATE) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 0.995*** 52.718 Δ(INT_RATE)t-1 -0.015 -0.082 
Δ(INT_RATE)t-1 -0.008*** -17.326 Δlog(GDP)t-1 6.520* 1.785 
MA(1) -0.725*** -7.383 MA(1) -0.516** -2.361 
R-squared 0.722 
 
R-squared 0.183 
 
DW stat 1.569 
 
DW stat 1.794 
 
Notes: Constant terms’ coefficients, inverted MA roots, and error variances are not reported. 
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A6: Post-1980 Mortgage debt-driven cycle - Denmark 
The only case study in which a Minskyan mortgage debt cycle was found in Denmark over the 
period 1980 – 2005. Both relevant coefficients are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs, i.e. mortgage debt decreases GDP growth (-0.072) and, simultaneously, GDP 
growth boosts mortgage lending (0.280). In both equations, the values of R-squared are quite 
high, so their predictive power is satisfactory, whilst the Durbin-Watson statistics’ values are 
around 1.9, rejecting the possibility of autocorrelation. Although, the inverted MA root of the 
debt equation is equal to unity, which indicates non-invertibility issues. 
Table A5: Denmark - Mortgage Debt Cycle (Post-1980) 
DENMARK 
Dependent Variable: Δlog(GDP) Dependent Variable: Δ(MDEBT) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Δlog(GDP)t-1 0.873*** 4.930 Δ(MDEBT)t-1 0.688*** 4.038 
Δ(MDEBT)t-1 -0.072* -1.772 Δlog(GDP)t-1 0.280** 1.994 
MA(1) -1.000 -0.000 MA(1) -0.151 -0.659 
R-squared 0.17 
 
R-squared 0.35 
 
DW stat 1.90 
 
DW stat 1.89 
 
Notes: Constant terms’ coefficients, inverted MA roots, and error variances are not reported. 
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Chapter 2 
The Comparative Political Economy of Financialisation and 
the Labour Share in the long-run: Evidence from France, 
Sweden, and the USA 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the research field of financialisation has gained prominence among social 
scientists from different disciplines (see van der Zwan, 2014), who attempt to explain how the 
expansion of the financial sector and its dominance over the real economy affects socio-
economic relations in the neoliberal era (e.g. Krippner, 2005; Davis and Kim, 2015). Few 
scholars within this literature have attempted to evaluate empirically a particular aspect of the 
financialisation of the economy since the early 1980s: whether it has contributed to rising 
income inequality, and more specifically to the reduction of the labour share. Alvarez (2015), 
Guschanski and Onaran (2018), Dünhaupt (2017), Stockhammer (2017), Wood (2017), and 
Köhler et al. (2018) provide econometric evidence that rising household indebtedness, interest 
and dividend payments, and financial globalisation, among other factors, play key roles for the 
decline in labour’s bargaining power (Darcillon, 2015; Meyer, 2017), and thus exacerbate the 
fall in wage shares during the last four decades (IMF, 2017).  
The reference point for most contemporary studies is the post-War experience, hence 
the arguments of the income distribution debate are commonly based on the comparison 
between the ‘Golden Age’ and Neoliberalism (Bengtsson and Ryner, 2015; Hein, 2015). This 
might give the false impression that the current regime is a permanent new stage of capitalism, 
as it was hypothesized for the ‘Golden Age’ as well (see Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972), treating 
implicitly the current period as unique. Authors such as Esteves (2011) and Fasianos et al. 
(2018) examine the historical evolution of different financial variables arguing that similar 
patterns of increased dominance of the financial sector over the real economy have existed in 
many economies in the pre-1945 period as well. These findings raise the question of whether 
those earlier financialisation periods had similar characteristics with the current one in different 
countries, and whether financialisation has been associated with reductions in the wage share 
in historical perspective. Consequently, the main research question that this study seeks to 
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answer: whether financialisation has been related to reductions in labour’s income share since 
the late 19th century, and if yes, which financial variable has been more dominant throughout 
time, using time series econometric analysis and utilising annual historical macroeconomic 
data for France (1911-2010), Sweden (1891-2000), and the USA (1929-2015). Following the 
mainstream typology within the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 
2003), France is chosen as an example of an advanced coordinated continental European 
country, Sweden represents the Nordic statist model of capitalism, whilst the USA is examined 
as the archetypical liberal market economy. Although, given the time dimension of the dataset 
of this study, it is of great importance to evaluate to what extent those standard definitions hold 
in historical perspective, based on the analysis of the determinants of functional income 
distribution, providing a comparative political economy analysis without historical deficit 
(Amoore et al., 2000). 
In general, a shortcoming of the existing econometric studies on labour share’s 
determinants is the quite limited time horizon, examining at best the post-1960’s period. As a 
consequence, most studies use panel data analysis to avoid biases due to the short time 
dimension, potentially omitting important country-specific information, which constitutes 
another significant deficiency. The single exception among them is the study of Bengtsson 
(2014b) who centres on Sweden’s labour share using historical macroeconomic data but does 
not consider the impact of financialisation, trade globalisation, or technology. Therefore, the 
main contributions of the present study are two: First, it is the first that estimates the 
determinants of the wage share using historical macroeconomic data for other countries beyond 
Sweden; Second, it is the very first econometric study that scrutinises the impact of 
financialisation on the wage share extending the time horizon to the late 19th and early 20th 
century. 
Recently, Köhler et al. (2018) have attempted to outline the different channels through 
which financialisation contributed to the decrease in labour’s income share since the early 
1980’s, highlighting the roles of household indebtedness, enhanced exit options for firms, 
shareholder value maximisation, and rising mark-ups due to increasing financial overhead 
costs. Regarding the first dimension, Kim et al. (2017) have presented the theoretical argument 
that increased household indebtedness may decrease workers’ bargaining power, since debt 
service commitments increase their cost of job loss, as job functions as collateral for borrowing. 
Thus, rising household indebtedness can contribute to rising income inequality, as workers may 
prefer to retain their job even with a decreasing wage rather than risk to lose it. Argitis and 
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Dafermos (2013) contend that this is not necessarily the case, as workers’ may demand higher 
wages to cover their debt service commitments. Corporate indebtedness and interest rate 
variations may also have distributional implications because of debt and interest payments 
increasing financial overhead costs, but as Hein (2007) claims their effect on real wages 
depends on whether price mark-ups are interest-elastic or rigid, i.e. on whether capitalists have 
the power to pass those increases into the mark-up at the expense of workers. Centering on 
another distributional aspect of financialisation, the shareholder value maximisation principle, 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) have argued that shareholders put pressure on firms’ managers 
to focus on keeping share prices high through raising the debt ratios or the dividend payout 
ratio (i.e. increase the overhead financial costs), and, subsequently, improve firms’ 
deteriorating financial positions by squeezing wages. Evidently, there is a consensus that 
financialisation does play a key role for income distribution, but the expected effects of the 
relevant indicators bring some theoretical controversy. Since many of the factors that define 
the impacts of the financial variables depend on country-specific characteristics, individual 
country analysis can provide us with interesting insights. Especially with respect to the long 
time dimension of the time series of this study it is fundamental to examine the relevant 
financial series and evaluate to what extent the pre-WWII form of financialisation was similar 
to the post-1980’s, i.e. whether the stylised facts for the latter period hold for the former as well 
in our case studies. In particular, as shown in section 2, the mortgage and corporate debt shares 
of GDP have the most interesting long-term patterns as private indebtedness exhibits long 
cycles, reaching substantially high levels even in the late 19th century, suggesting that its 
potential distribution impact can hold in historical perspective. In contrast, the fluctuations of 
the real share price index suggest that for all three case studies shareholder value orientation is 
a characteristic of the neoliberal phase of financialisation, rather than a historical stylised fact. 
Unfortunately, due to the use of historical macroeconomic data in this study, the availability of 
more sophisticated financialisation variables is limited, hence the analysis of this paper is 
restricted to the private debt ratios, the real interest rate, and the real share price index. Beside 
of financialisation, for the sake of completeness, other theoretical arguments related to the 
distributional effects of unionisation, welfare spending, trade globalisation, and technical 
change are examined in long-term perspective as well. 
Ultimately, the econometric estimations of the present chapter, based on the 
unrestricted Error-Correction Model (UECM), suggest that indeed financialisation has been 
leading to decreases in the labour shares of our three case studies in historical perspective. 
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Regarding France, the results show that the negative long-run effect of household (mortgage) 
debt and the positive effect of welfare spending are the main drivers of its labour share. For 
Sweden, the findings indicate that the negative impact of the mortgage debt ratio and the 
positive effect of union density are the key factors for the determination of its wage share, with 
the latter being larger. In addition, real share prices and stock market capitalisation decrease 
the Swedish labour in historical context. The results for the USA show that its wage share is 
driven by the positive effect of welfare spending and the negative effect of financialisation. 
Overall, as expected by the political economy approach, indeed financialisation has been a key 
driver of labour’s income share, as the negative effect of the mortgage ratio is the most robust 
cross-country finding, whilst historically welfare expenditures and unionisation have been 
playing central roles in certain countries. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the phenomenon of 
financialisation in historical perspective, examining the evolution of the two main private debt 
aggregates and real share prices in the long-term, whose fluctuations have important 
behavioural consequences for income distribution. Section 3 reviews critically the theoretical 
arguments within the existing literature on functional income distribution’s determinants, 
focusing mainly on recent contributions that scrutinise the impact of financialisation. Section 
4 reports the main findings of the relevant econometric studies. Section 5 presents the baseline 
specification and the econometric methodology. Section 6 reports the historical datasets for 
France, Sweden, and the USA, discussing the patterns of the main explanatory variables. The 
results of the baseline and the robustness estimations, and the standardised coefficients are 
presented in Sections 7 and 8. Lastly, Section 9 summarizes the findings of this study and 
discusses their economic, historical, and political implications. 
 
2. Financialisation in historical perspective 
The phenomenon of the financialisation of the economy since the early 1980s, i.e. the rise of 
neoliberalism, and its destabilising role for the macroeconomy have been explored thoroughly 
by several recent studies (see Krippner, 2005; van der Zwan, 2014; Davis and Kim, 2015). 
Notably, Bengtsson and Ryner (2015) and Hein (2015) centre on its negative impact on income 
distribution in the late post-WWII period, along with other elements of neoliberalism such as 
trade globalisation, welfare state retrenchment, and declining unionisation. Despite those 
studies provide important insights on the characteristics of the dominance of the financial sector 
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over the economy and its linkage with the rise in income inequality in the neoliberal era, they 
do not examine financialisation in historical perspective. 
Extending their analysis beyond the narrow post-WWII focus of the financialisation 
literature, few social scientists have attempted to explore whether finance-dominated periods 
have existed in earlier phases of capitalism as well, but without providing clear definitions of 
financialisation. Galbraith (1954) in his historical study of the 1929 financial crash in the USA, 
argues that rising household indebtedness and firms’ shareholder value orientation 
characterised the early 20th century US economy which eventually led to the financial crisis. In 
spite of providing some interesting descriptive data for this historical period in the USA, 
Galbraith’s book is more focused on depicting the attitude of the policy makers and the 
politicians right before and after the crisis, rather than a strictly academic study. Arguing from 
a Marxist perspective, Arrighi (1994) claims that a large-scale financial expansion is not a 
novel development since similar events have been observed even earlier than the 19th century. 
He contends that as the old accumulation regime struggles to retain high profitability, the shift 
to the financial sector to seek higher revenues is its last attempt to survive. In this regard, the 
financial expansion of the early 20th century is associated with the collapse of the old British 
regime, whilst the industrial expansion of the ‘Golden Age’ was the product of the rise of the 
new US regime (Arrighi 1994, p. xii). Accordingly, the current neoliberal shift towards the 
financial sector is associated with the fall of the post-WWII US regime. Arrighi’s implicit 
definition of financialisation is heavily inspired by the classical Marxist thought, i.e. it is 
expressed in terms of mobility of capital towards sectors with higher returns. In his narrative, 
under certain historical circumstances at the international level, this sector is the financial 
sector, thus the economy shifts towards it. Financialisation is also studied in a historical context 
by Kotz (2003) who attempts to generalize the Marxist Social Structures of Accumulation 
(SSA) theory, into a long waves framework of interchanging regulated and liberal institutional 
structures, based on the experience of the US capitalism. Kotz’s interpretation of 
financialisation here is linked to historical periods of financial deregulation, which allow banks 
to exert control over large non-financial firms, without clarifying how banks derive that power 
over the real economy though. Based on a discussion of the growth rates and the historical 
development of the institutional framework of the USA, Kotz outlines the 1899-1917 and 1947-
75 eras as the two regulated regimes, and the 1919-37 and post-1980’s periods as the liberal 
accumulation regimes. The absence of analysis of relevant financial variables does not allow 
to make clear which variables are crucial for each period (hence the potential implications for 
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income distribution), so financialisation is narrowly defined in institutional terms as financial 
deregulation. The latest relevant contribution is Fasianos et al. (2018) who review the 
financialisation literature within economics from a Post-Keynesian perspective, with reference 
to the US economic history of the 20th century. Their main conclusion is that US capitalism has 
experienced two long waves of financialisation, providing a periodisation similar to Kotz’s 
(2003), by stressing the role of financial deregulation. The authors remark that the pre-WWII 
financialisation period shares several similarities regarding institutional structures and 
practices with the current one, including rising household indebtedness, shareholder value 
orientation (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), and free capital mobility, which evidently affect 
income distribution as discussed in the next section (e.g. for the impact of household debt see 
Kim et al. 2017 and for capital mobility see Rodrik, 1997). In spite of the interesting attempt 
to discuss the pre-WWII financialisation in terms of the contemporary financialisation 
literature, this study does not succeed in providing a clear definition of financialisation or 
answer precisely what are the main differences between the two finance-dominated periods. 
The implicit definition of financialisation is -as in Kotz (2003)- related to a broad discussion 
of structural changes that occurred due to financial liberalisation which is loosely connected to 
the discussion of the historical financial series.  
Despite those studies come from different fields of social sciences or schools of thought 
within political economy, eventually, they draw similar conclusions, suggesting that the 
dominance of finance is not a novel structural change of the post-1980’s neoliberalism. 
Apparently, most studies use the USA as a point of reference for their historical analyses of 
financialisation, since, probably due to data availability at the time. According to Esteves 
(2011), the financial sector has developed substantially in several other advanced economies 
as well before WWII, providing relevant descriptive statistics for Germany, France, and the 
UK, amongst others. Using capital account openness and foreign capital stocks as proxies for 
financial integration, Esteves discusses financial globalisation as a component of the broader 
global integration process of the late 19th and early 20th century. Overall, Esteves does not 
provide an explicit discussion of financialisation as a distinct phenomenon (and does not 
examine sophisticated financial variables), but his analysis of global financial integration 
suggests that the financial markets have always been a core component of the capitalist system 
of advanced economies, at least since the late 19th century. In this respect, given the focus of 
the present study, it is meaningful to study the long-term distributional effects of 
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financialisation, and scrutinise other countries beyond the USA, by utilising recently developed 
historical macroeconomic datasets.  
To demonstrate that financialisation is not a novel structural development at least for 
the three countries of this study, I examine the graphs of three important financialisation 
indicators: the corporate debt ratio, the mortgage debt ratio, and the real share price index. The 
choice of those variables as measures of the degree of financialisation of an economy has to do 
with the implied structural behavioural changes that they bring into an economy, such as 
increased household vulnerability and shareholders’ dominance over firms’ management (see 
next Section). It is worth pinpointing that using historical macroeconomic data limits 
substantially the availability of better indicators for certain financialisation channels which are 
used in relevant studies who examine the neoliberal era, e.g. the share buyback ratio instead of 
real stock prices as a proxy for shareholder value orientation. 
As a first step, plots of the GDP shares of the debt aggregates -the two main financial 
variables used in the estimations of this study- are provided, calculated using data from Jordà 
et al. (2017). The variables are examined in terms of shares of the national income in order to 
capture the relative size of the financial sector, i.e. its dominance over the economy. In Figure 
1, graph (i) shows the series for France, graph (ii) the series for Sweden, and graph (iii) the 
series for the USA. In France, we observe that the share of the corporate debt is historically 
larger than the share of the household debt. More precisely, corporate indebtedness in France 
is substantially high even during the 1920s, between 30 and 40%, whilst it reaches its peak in 
the early 1970s, rather than in the financialisation period. On the contrary, household debt is 
relatively low until the 1950s where it starts to steadily rise, with a steeper rise since the 2000s. 
In Sweden, the plot shows a different financial integration process, as the pre-1930’s 
financialisation period seems to be mainly related with the expansion of business credit, which 
reaches even close to 60% of GDP in the 1910s and 1920s, whereas mortgage debt varies from 
10 to over 30%. The situation changes drastically in the post-WWI period, where the share of 
mortgage debt rises sharply from around 20% in the early 1950s to approximately 80% in the 
2010s, being consistently larger than the share of the business debt. During the same period, 
corporate debt declines slightly between 1950 and 1975, where the two debt aggregates start 
moving in parallel. The picture is -more or less- similar for the USA, with corporate debt being 
more important in the pre-WWII financialisation era, and household debt being more dominant 
since the 1950s. As a conclusion, both aggregates of private indebtedness -as key financial 
variables related to bargaining power- have been substantially high since the late 19th century, 
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with some interesting cross-country and cross-period differences which depict the form of 
financialisation in each economy. The most notable quantitative observation about the two 
variables is that in France and the USA corporate debt has an overall downward trend since the 
early 1970s, i.e. in both countries the neoliberal financialisation experience was accompanied 
by a household financialisation process and a (mild) corporate de-financialisation process. This 
does not seem to be the case for earlier periods where both debt aggregates move in parallel -
to some extent-, especially in the USA. Regarding Sweden, despite the changes in the relative 
importance of the business and mortgage debt ratios during the Great Depression, the two 
aggregates grow in parallel in the early 20th century and since the 1950s. It is worth pinpointing 
that even during the ‘Golden Age’, the most regulated era of the 20th-century capitalism in 
terms of the financial and the industrial sector, private indebtedness reached substantially high 
levels. More precisely, for all three countries either mortgage, corporate debt, or both rise 
steadily between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, highlighting that the dominance of the 
financial sector has always been critical for the economy, even during periods that it is 
supposed to be restricted. 
As an additional step in the examination and comparison of the pre- and post-WWII 
financialisation periods, I also look at the historical evolution of the real share price index in 
our three case studies. Real share prices are examined as a proxy for the shareholder value 
maximisation process, depicting managers’ endeavour to increase shareholders’ stake by 
buying back shares, which constitutes an important behavioural change related to the 
financialisation of an economy. This eventually leads managers to attempt squeezing labour’s 
income to improve firms’ deteriorating financial position. It is true that real share prices are 
not an ideal proxy for shareholder value maximisation, as this indicator does not only capture 
financialisation as a structural process, but also financial bubbles. Given the historical focus of 
this study, as stated earlier, the availability of historical financial series is a significant 
limitation, therefore, the real share price index is considered as the best available proxy for the 
hypothesis of shareholder value orientation. Ideally, shareholder value maximisation would be 
better captured by the share buyback ratio which represents more accurately managers’ 
attempts to retain high share prices in the short-term. As shown in Figure 2, in France real share 
price inflation occurred even in the pre-WWII financialisation era. Episodes of real stock price 
booms are observed around the 1930s, during the WWII period, and from the mid-1950’s to 
the late 1960s. However, clearly, the most rapid boom of real stock prices occurs since the mid-
1980s reaching its peak in the early 2000s, i.e. in during the neoliberal financialisation era. 
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Regarding Sweden, a notable pre-WWII expansion in real share prices is observed from 1900 
to approximately 1920, which occurred substantially earlier than the 1930’s boom in France 
and lasted for a longer period. Between 1925 and 1980, Swedish real share prices remain 
relatively stagnant, while a rapid increase occurs from the early 1980s, which escalates further 
from the 1990s. Great volatility appears between 1990 and 2010, which probably is an 
indication of a financial bubble, rather than of financialisation, as prices fluctuate in relatively 
short time intervals implying that they are generated by momentum traders’ decisions. This is 
similar to what we observe in France during the same period. In the USA, we observe a boom 
period from the early 1950s to the 1970s, in which real share prices almost doubled. This is 
followed by a decline until the mid-1980s, i.e. the early neoliberal era, where real stock prices 
start increasing rapidly. Especially after the early 2000s, real share prices begin to fluctuate 
much more frequently in short time intervals as in France and Sweden. Interestingly, the 
fluctuations seem to be synchronised with those of French and Swedish real share prices over 
the period 1990-2010, implying that this high volatility period captures a bubble rather than 
financialisation per se.  
Recapitulating, in France the pre-WWII financialisation period was characterised 
mainly by corporate indebtedness, while in the post-WWII period the dominance of finance is 
depicted mainly by the rapid rise in household debt, the relatively high levels of corporate debt 
(despite its sharp decline between 1970 and 1990), and real stock price inflation. In Sweden, 
the picture is slightly different with the notable differences that both debt aggregates rise in 
parallel in the post-WWII period. Real share prices’ volatility escalates significantly after the 
1990s, as in France, but a significant 20-year boom period occurred also in the early 20th 
century. Finally, in the USA, private debt aggregates have remained historically in high levels, 
with corporate debt dominating the pre-WWII period and mortgage debt dominating the post-
WWII period, as in Sweden. Real share price inflation in the USA has occurred both in 
regulated Fordist and in the post-Fordist neoliberal, with the latter being much more rapid. 
71 
 
 
Figure 3: Private debt aggregates in historical perspective 
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Figure 4: Real stock price indices in historical perspective
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3. Theoretical perspectives on functional income distribution 
The functional income distribution debate can be epitomized by the distinction between the 
neoclassical and the political economy approach, two substantially different methodological 
frameworks that attempt to explore the driving forces behind its shifts. On the one hand, the 
neoclassical paradigm targets, primarily, capital-augmenting technological change and, 
secondarily, the different impacts of trade globalisation on emerging and advanced economies, 
as the only parameters that can shift the, otherwise stable, factor income shares. On the other 
hand, the political economy approach centres on the inherent characteristics of free-market 
capitalism that lead to unequal distribution towards profits, stressing the roles of 
financialisation, trade globalisation, welfare expenditures, and unionisation (see Rodrik 1997; 
Stockhammer 2012; Bengtsson and Ryner 2015; Hein 2015), inspired mainly by Kalecki’s 
(1951) pioneering analysis of functional income distribution as a function of the price mark-
up. In general, the choice of factor income shares as dependent variables, represents the 
political economy class-based approach, expressing a specific social conflict relationship 
(Bengtsson and Ryner 2015). Classless inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient or the 
Theil index, depict unequal distribution among individuals, i.e. they are theoretically more 
related to the concept of methodological individualism, which is central in neoclassical 
economics.   
According to Stockhammer (2012, p. 121): “Financialization is a term that summarizes 
a broad set of changes in the relationship between the ‘financial’ and the ‘real’ sector, which 
give greater weight to financial actors or motives”. The financialisation of the economy since 
the rise of neoliberalism during the early 1980s has several characteristics, such as (i) rising 
shareholder value orientation and short-termism of management (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000); (ii) rising tendency of dividend and interest payments (Stockhammer 2004); (iii) 
increasing salaries of the top management employees (Hein 2015); and (iv) steadily rising 
(household) indebtedness. As argued in the previous section, such developments existed during 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries as well, despite its distributional effects have not been 
studied yet, in terms of factor income shares.9 With respect to income distribution, as shown in 
theoretical studies, rising indebtedness may have important distributional effects through its 
effect on firms’ and/or workers’ bargaining power. An early attempt to model (corporate) debt 
                                                 
9 Roine et al. (2009) is the only study that uses annual historical macroeconomic data and estimates the 
distributional effects of financial development, finding that it increases the top income shares, based on panel data 
analysis. 
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and interest payments’ distributional effects into a Kaleckian distribution model has been made 
by Hein (2007), who centres on the potential impact of interest rate variations on the price 
mark-up. Distinguishing between interest-elastic and interest-inelastic mark-ups, Hein claims 
that in the latter case there is no effect on real wages, i.e. income redistribution occurs only 
from firms to rentiers, due to debt service. Argitis and Dafermos (2013) argue that increases in 
corporate indebtedness make firms attempting to limit wage growth in order to improve their 
financial position, implying an elastic mark-up. In addition, they also embed households’ 
indebtedness into the wage setting function contending that its effect on workers’ bargaining 
power is negligible. On the one hand, it may lead to a more aggressive wage bargaining strategy 
in order to improve their financial position. On the other hand, high debt commitments make 
workers more insecure about defaulting on their debt, therefore they avoid endangering their 
employment by negotiating more aggressively for higher wages. Building on the latter 
scenario, i.e. the positive correlation between workers’ indebtedness and financial insecurity, 
Kim et al. (2017) present a stock-flow-consistent (SFC) model in which they incorporate 
households’ debt commitments into a cost of job loss function10 and show that rising household 
indebtedness can lead to reductions in the wage share. Another aspect of financialisation that 
affects income distribution is shareholder value orientation, i.e. shareholders induce firms to 
be short-termist and focus on preserving the value of share prices in high levels by increasing 
their debt ratios or their dividend payout ratio (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Eventually, 
this process increases overhead costs, so firms attempt to cut costs by decreasing wages in 
order to improve their financial position. Overall, very few empirical studies attempt to clarify 
the relative distributional effects of financial variables, whilst none of them explores this 
phenomenon beyond the post-WWII era, i.e. before the 1960s, despite private debt 
accumulation has been extensive at least since the late 19th century, as shown in the previous 
section. 
The distributional impact of trade globalisation is another controversial topic between 
neoclassical economists and those who follow the political economy approach. The 
neoclassical globalisation hypothesis is being derived from the well-known Stolper-Samuelson 
(1941) theorem, which predicts that trade openness will diminish global income inequalities, 
since it should decrease the wages in the advanced countries and increase them in the emerging 
                                                 
10 Darcillon (2015) and Meyer (2017) provide econometric evidence that financial intermediation and the size of 
the financial sector decrease workers’ bargaining power, employment protection, and the development unions’ 
institutional structures, but they do not test their direct effects on inequality. 
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economies, i.e. the abundant factor will benefit in each case. The two very strong theoretical 
hypotheses behind this theorem are that all economies are in a stable full-employment state, 
and the mobilities of capital and labour must be equal to zero. Contrarily, authors within the 
political economy approach argue that this prediction is only partly true since trade openness 
weakens workers’ bargaining position even in the emerging economies, as it benefits the more 
mobile factor, i.e. capital (Rodrik 1997). Stockhammer (2012) and Hein (2015) link trade (and 
financial) openness to increased exit options for the firms, which evidently empowers capital 
owners and weakens the working class, hence globalisation’s effects are harmful to real wages 
regardless. Nevertheless, Palley (2018) stresses that the pre-WWII and post-WWII trade 
globalisation periods were very different qualitatively, as the former was motivated by trade 
gains, and not the domestic conflict over the determination of wages. Hence, trade openness 
may have benefited both factors of production in the pre-WWII era, instead of providing more 
exit options to firms. 
The fall of the post-WWII welfare state and the decrease in the unionisation of workers 
are pointed out as another two major factors that led to the fall of the wage shares in the 
advanced economies since the early 1980s. This dimension has been thoroughly discussed 
within the field of political science, but also within the non-mainstream political economy 
approach (see Marglin and Schor 1992). Welfare expenditures, especially when they are related 
to labour market spending and upward redistribution of income, can increase the bargaining 
power of labour as they decrease the cost of job loss. Regarding unionisation, following 
Kalecki’s (1954) monopoly pricing framework, strong trade unions can squeeze the price mark-
up, thus shift distribution towards wages, increasing its share of the national income. 
Last, the neoclassical argument about shifts in factor income shares is centred on the 
capital-augmenting nature of technology. Given a high elasticity of substitution between 
workers and machinery (Hicks 1932), technological advancements will affect the composition 
of production inputs, i.e. the demand for labour will fall as less labour input will be needed to 
produce the same amount of goods. In theory, technology may indeed decrease real wages if 
and only if the elasticity of substitution between the capital and labour is larger than one. 
 
4. Determinants of functional income distribution: A review of the empirical 
literature 
In recent years, and especially after the 2007-8 financial crisis, the interest in the determinants 
of the wage share has been growing substantially within the empirical literature. Based on the 
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theoretical arguments presented in the previous section, several scholars provide evidence for 
the underlying causes of shifts in factor income shares, beyond the purely technical neoclassical 
perspective. 
Argitis and Pitelis (2001) provide evidence for industrial profit share’s determinants in 
the USA and the UK (1963-97), testing for monetary policy effects. The use of industrial profit 
share aims to explore the intracapitalist distribution conflict dimension of financialisation. 
Their time series estimations results indicate that the nominal money lending interest rate has 
a strongly negative and statistically significant impact, which suggest that financialisation 
induces redistribution from productive sectors to rentiers. They also control for the money 
wage rate, unemployment, and strike intensity, yielding the expected signs. Later, Hein and 
Schöder (2011) develop a post-Kaleckian growth and distribution model and, subsequently, 
estimate functions for investment, savings, and the profit share. Following the general-to-
specific ARDL methodology and using time series data for the US and Germany (1960-2007), 
they report robust results of strongly negative effects of changes in the real long-term interest 
rate on the profit share, given the debt-to-capital ratio, suggesting that their price mark-ups are 
interest-elastic. 
By the same token, Dünhaupt (2017) estimates adjusted labour share’s determinants 
using various specifications for a panel of 13 countries (1986–2007), focusing on globalization, 
shareholder value orientation, and government activity. The coefficients obtained by these 
estimations indicate robust negative effects for changes in trade openness, outward FDI, 
shareholder value, interest payments, and unemployment. In addition, she reports that 
government activity has a strongly positive -and robust- impact on distribution, as expected. 
Although, peculiarly, the effect of unionization appears to be negative and statistically 
significant –in contrast to what is expected from a Kaleckian perspective. The author attributes 
this issue to biases due to the short time dimension of the panel. 
Another recent econometric study on the determinants of the wage share is 
Guschanski’s and Onaran’s (2018) paper, which uses sectoral level data for eight advanced 
OECD countries (1970–2011). Despite some notable cross-country differences, the findings 
show that technological change’s impact is statistically insignificant, whilst the negative effects 
of globalisation, welfare state retrenchment, labour’s diminishing bargaining power, and 
financialisation prevail. Not surprisingly, the negative effect of the household debt ratio is 
stronger in the most advanced countries of the sample, i.e. in the USA, the UK, and Germany.  
The last study on the macro distributional effects of financialisation comes from the 
field of international political economy, conducted by Wood (2017). The inspiration of this 
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study is the Varieties of Residential Capitalism (VORC) approach, hence it focuses mainly on 
the effects of mortgage accumulation. The estimations utilize both time series and panel data 
analysis for a dataset which includes UK, US, Denmark, and Sweden (1979-2012). The 
financialisation variable used is the outstanding mortgage stock, controlling also for 
unemployment, the right-left index (RILE), and (non-)liberal welfare state regimes. The panel 
results show that mortgage stock’s effect is negative and statistically significant. However, 
despite the estimators obtained in the cross-country time series estimations are negative as well, 
they are robust only for the US and the UK, underlining a potential linkage between household 
debt commitments and their wage negotiating power.  
Alvarez (2015) focuses on the firm level and estimates the effects of the financial 
interest and financial profits on the real wages of 6980 French non-financial corporations, over 
the period 2004-2013. The econometric findings of the fixed-effects panel data models 
estimated, show that both financial variables decrease the wage share and their magnitude is 
stronger compared to the effects of the real variables included, such as trade openness and 
labour market institutions. Similar findings are reported by Köhler et al. (2018) utilising a panel 
dataset of 14 OECD countries over the period 1992-2014. The estimation results of this study 
provide robust evidence that non-financial corporations’ financial payments and financial 
liberalisation decrease the labour share. The negative impact of trade globalisation is also 
consistent, but the impact of household debt is insignificant.  
Stockhammer (2017) estimates private wage share’s determinants for an unbalanced 
panel dataset of 71 countries from 1970 to 2007, giving prominence to the distinction between 
developing and advanced economies. The negative effect of financial globalisation seems to 
be the most crucial factor that has been contributing to the decline of wage shares. Also, this 
study shows that the impact of globalization and welfare state retrenchment is clearly negative 
and robust. The most interesting finding is that the negative globalisation effect holds clearly 
for the developing economies as well, which disproves the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem. 
Harrison’s (2002) econometric study is the first paper that estimated the impact of 
globalisation on the labour share, utilizing a panel of over 100 countries (1960-1997). Her main 
findings indicate that the capital-labour substitution ratio and capital controls have a positive 
effect on the wage share, while globalisation’s impact is negative. The effects of globalisation 
are being tested through trade openness, exchange rate crises and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) inflows. The paper by Jayadev (2007) tests econometrically the relationship between 
capital mobility and functional income distribution using panel data methodology for a sample 
of up to 80 countries (1970-2001). His main robust findings are that capital accounts openness 
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and real interest rate decrease the labour share. However, it is noted that the coefficients vary 
notably when one distinguishes among low, middle, and high-income countries. The report 
published by the ILO (2011) estimates functional distribution’s determinants for regional 
groups of developing countries, underlining that the bargaining power of labour has been 
undermined due to financialisation and trade openness.  
One of the latest empirical contributions that scrutinise the trade globalisation – 
functional income distribution nexus is the study of Hung and Hammett (2016). The scope of 
this study is to assess globalisation’s impact on the manufacturing labour share of the USA 
(1999-2009), from a mainstream perspective. The explanatory variables include changes in 
import penetration, changes in the export share, changes in the TFP growth rate, in the relative 
foreign employment, in the FDI outflows-to-GDP ratio, in unionization, and in capacity 
utilization. The authors argue that, overall, globalisation’s effect is negative but ambiguous, 
since the estimators of import penetration and the FDI outflows-to-GDP ratio are negative, 
while the export share’s and relative foreign employment’s effects are positive. However, it 
should be noted that the negative effects of the former are consistently statistically significant 
in almost every specification. 
Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2010) test the distributional effects of unemployment 
benefits, bargaining coordination, union density, and the minimum wage on the labour share 
and personal inequality, inspired by a mainstream labour market institutions story. The panel 
estimations utilise a dataset of 16 OECD countries (1960–2000). Regarding the labour share 
estimations, the signs of the coefficients of unionization and minimum wage vary substantially, 
while the effects of unemployment benefits are negative, but insignificant in the vast majority 
of the reported specifications. The impact of bargaining coordination is positive and 
statistically significant in all specifications, which in a ‘neoclassical world’ would result in 
high unemployment, as actual wages would rise over their optimal market-clearing level.  
In one of the earliest wage share determinants studies, Cowling’s and Molho’s (1982) 
use inter-industry/cross-section time series analysis for the UK economy (1968 and 1973), in 
order to test empirically Kalecki’s (1954) degree of monopoly hypotheses. The explanatory 
variables include the Herfindahl index of concentration, the five-firm concentration ratio, 
advertising spending as a percentage of sales, imports as a percentage of sales plus imports, 
unionization, working days lost due to strikes, and collective bargaining coverage. The reported 
findings show unambiguously negative concentration and advertising effects, and positive 
unionization effects (which are not statistically robust though). 
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Fichtenbaum (2009) inspired by the mixed empirical results on the impact of 
unionisation on the labour share, distinguishes between production workers and supervisory or 
CEO employees, arguing that the income of latter is irrelevant to changes in union membership. 
Using the US economy as a case study (1949-2006), he constructs three distinct labour share 
indicators by excluding or weighting the income of non-production workers over the value 
added, and estimates the effects of union density, finding that it indeed increases the wage 
share, as in Kalecki (1954).  
Social scientists such as Kristal (2010), Hancke (2012), and Bengtsson (2014a) 
examine how unionisation, welfare state retrenchment, and political factors affect the labour 
share, using post-WWII panel datasets. While Kristal (2010) and Bengtsson (2014a) find robust 
positive coefficients for union density, Hancke (2012) finds insignificant effects on the wage 
share. Hancke argues that his results are due to the inflation-averse stance of independent 
conservative central bankers in advanced economies, who adjust aggressively monetary policy 
to the expected inflationary effect of rising wages. Thus, even strong unions take into account 
the uncertainty of such a potential monetary policy reaction, making them more reluctant in 
their negotiations for higher wages. Bengtsson (2014b) studies Sweden’s manufacturing labour 
share (1900-2000) in historical context, using three-year averages specifications. His findings 
suggest that effects of union density are positive but insignificant (which he argues that is due 
to the small sample size, given the three-year average specification) and that the main 
statistically significant findings are the positive effect of government spending and the negative 
effect of inflation.  
Last, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) test empirically the neoclassical assumption on 
the distributional effects of technology, using a panel of 13 industries in 12 OECD countries 
(1972-93). The obtained results, according to the authors, support partially their capital-
augmenting technology scheme (measured by TFP), but some big discrepancies do exist mainly 
due to the effect of workers’ bargaining power, i.e. union density. Advancing, IMF’s (2007) 
outlook report estimates the effects of globalisation, technical change, and labour market 
institutions on functional inequality, for a panel dataset of 18 OECD countries (1983-2002). 
The two technology variables are the ICT capital stock and the capital-labour substitution ratio, 
which according to the authors are the primary factors that explain the fall of the Labour shares. 
The second prominent study which conducts functional distribution econometric estimations 
in order to test the neoclassical technology story is EC’s (2007) report. The estimations show 
that the capital-to-labour ratio has a positive effect, while the estimators of the ICT services 
per employee are not statistically robust, thus the results are inconclusive. 
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5. Specifications and Econometric methodology  
As shown in the previous section, most empirical studies within the functional income 
distribution determinants literature utilise panel data analysis and focus on the post-1970’s 
period. Hence, the motivation for this study is twofold. First, to examine distributional effects 
in historical perspective, especially regarding financialisation which as demonstrated in section 
2 is not a novel post-WWII development. Second, to demonstrate that cross-country differences 
matter, hence time series analysis can reveal valuable information about domestic economies’ 
structures, which otherwise remain overlooked. Thus, the estimations utilise annual historical 
macroeconomic data for France (1911-2010), Sweden (1891-2000), and the USA (1929-
2015).11 The estimations are based on the unrestricted Error-Correction Model (UECM) (see 
Sargan 1964, Davidson et al. 1978), i.e. both the short-run (first-differenced) and the long-run 
(level) effects of the independent variables are estimated. According to Pesaran and Shin 
(1999), this parametrisation of the standard ECM model can efficiently yield estimates of 
potential cointegrating (long-run) relationships, even among variables with different 
integration orders, i.e. I(0) and I(1). From an economic perspective and given the length of the 
historical time series used, our interest is focused on the long-run coefficients which depict the 
long-term equilibrium relationships among the variables, rather than on the short-run effects 
which reveal the speed and direction of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium in 
response to temporary distortions. The econometric specification incorporates different 
arguments on the determination of the labour share, focusing on the effects of government 
spending, unionisation, and trade globalisation, but mainly on testing the impact of different 
measures for financialisation. Choosing two countries with weaker (France and the USA) and 
one with stronger trade union structures (Sweden) allows us to evaluate the argument of Argitis 
and Dafermos (2013) that the negative distributional effects of mortgage indebtedness are 
relatively more limited (or even perverse) in countries coordinated labour market institutions. 
Accordingly, the baseline specification is of the following form: 
𝛥(𝑊𝑆𝑡) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑊𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡−1  + 𝛼3𝑈𝐷𝑡−1 + 
𝛼4𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝛥𝑧
𝑁
𝑛=0
+ 𝜀𝑡           (1) 
                                                 
11 Data sources and descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix A1 and A2. 
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where 𝑊𝑆 is the (adjusted) wage share, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 is government consumption (% of GDP), 𝑈𝐷 
is union density (% of labour force), 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 is trade openness (% of GDP), 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is the 
mortgage debt-to-income ratio (% of GDP), 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is the business debt-to-income ratio (% 
of GDP), and 𝑧 is a vector that includes short-run (first-differenced) effects of variables. The 
terms 𝑎0 and 𝜀𝑡  are the constant and the error term, respectively. 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 is defined as the sum 
of exports and imports divided by the level of output, while 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 (𝛥(𝐺𝐷𝑃)) is included 
among the short-run (first-differenced) effects in order to control for the counter-cyclicality of 
the labour share. Government spending is used as a proxy for welfare spending, which is 
assumed to decrease the cost of job loss and lead to more equal distribution through the 
provision of benefits, thus a positive impact on the labour share is anticipated 
(𝜕𝛥(𝑊𝑆)/𝜕𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 > 0). For Sweden, as Esping-Andersen (1996) and Lundberg and Åmark 
(2001) argue that the experience of the extensive universal Swedish welfare state model is 
mainly a post-1970’s development rather than a historical stylized fact. Thereby, its 
distributional effects in historical context may be moderate, compared to the rest countries 
where universal social insurance was established even in the pre-WWII period. Proceeding 
further, -following Kalecki’s (1951) ‘degree of monopoly’ framework- unionisation is 
expected to empower workers against capital, hence its effect on the Labour’s income share is 
expected to be positive, due to the decrease in the price mark-up (𝜕𝛥(𝑊𝑆)/𝜕𝑈𝐷 > 0). It is 
anticipated that the positive impact in the cases of France and the USA will be less strong since 
their unions have weaker institutional positions compared to the Scandinavian countries, as 
collective bargaining is conducted mainly in the firm and individual level. Trade globalisation, 
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, measures the enhanced international capital mobility, i.e. increased exit options for the 
firms, which ultimately translates to enhanced bargaining power for the most mobile factor, 
i.e. capital (Rodrik, 1997), thence a negative sign is expected (𝜕𝛥(𝑊𝑆)/𝜕𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 < 0). 
Although, according to Palley’s (2018) recent study on the characteristics of trade globalisation 
in historical perspective, the earlier phases of globalisation (pre-WWI and Golden Age) were 
driven by trade gains, hence they were indeed mutually beneficial for labour and capital in 
industrialised countries, despite they created macroeconomic imbalances. In contrast, the 
current neoliberal globalisation period is driven by the domestic distributional conflict between 
labour and capital, so it reflects more accurately increased exit options for capital. In this 
respect, the effects of trade globalisation in historical context are likely to be negligible. 
Mortgage (household) indebtedness impact on functional income distribution is negligible 
within the theoretical literature, as argued in the previous section. A negative effect would 
82 
 
indicate that workers’ rising financial vulnerability leads to loss of bargaining power, since it 
increases their cost of job loss (Kim et al. 2017), thus, to rising income inequality 
(𝜕𝛥(𝑊𝑆)/𝜕𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 < 0). If the opposite holds, that would show that workers could attempt 
to actively improve their financial position by demanding higher wages (Argitis and Dafermos 
2013). Regarding the business debt-to-income ratio (𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇), its statistical significance 
depends on the elasticity of the mark-up with respect to the debt payments (Hein 2007; Argitis 
and Dafermos 2013). The interest rate may also be related to households’ financial 
vulnerability, since an increase in it will further worsen their financial position, thus a negative 
effect on real wages would suggest that the deterioration of bargaining power dominates, 
following the rationale of Argitis and Dafermos (2013). 
The real short-term interest rate (𝐼𝑁𝑇) is included in specification (2) as an additional 
financial control variable which may be related to households’ financial vulnerability and the 
elasticity of the mark-up. A rise in it increases both household and corporate debt payments, at 
the expense of workers’ bargaining power, thus. As a further test, in specification (3) the 
adjusted wage share is replaced with the private wage share (𝑊𝑆𝑃) as the dependent variable, 
following Stockhammer’s (2017) formulation12, to prevent potential endogeneity issues with 
government consumption, our proxy variable for welfare spending. In the fourth main 
specification, the real stock prices index (𝑃𝑆) is incorporated as a control variable to proxy 
shareholder value orientation, through asset price inflation. As argued earlier, this variable may 
not fully depict the effect of the shareholder value maximisation principle, as it also captures 
bubbles, hence it is included as an additional control, rather than in the baseline specification 
(1). Regarding robustness tests, the impact of capital augmenting technical change, in the form 
of Total Factor Productivity (𝑇𝐹𝑃), is evaluated in specification (5). Following the neoclassical 
narrative, capital augmenting technology has negative effects on real wages, under the strong 
assumption of well-behaved production function and high elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour, i.e. larger than one. In the robustness specification (6), average trade tariffs 
(𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐹) replace trade openness, as an alternative measure for trade regulation, which is 
expected to have a positive effect on the wage share, as it limits capital mobility, thus exit 
options for firms. In specification (7), stock market capitalisation as a percentage of the GDP 
(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃) is included as an additional control variable which proxies financial deepening. Its 
                                                 
12 As the government sector is, by definition, non-profitable, its wage share is one hundred per cent, thus the 
private wage share is calculated as: 𝑊𝑆 = (1 − 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆) ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝑃 + 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝐺 ⇒ 𝑊𝑆𝑃 = (𝑊𝑆 − 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆)/
(1 − 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆), where 𝑊𝑆𝐺 is the government sector wage share. 
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effect on the labour share is expected to be negative, as financial deepening depicts increased 
exit options for firms in the financial sector and the degree of shareholder value orientation, 
hence rising bargaining power for capital. Finally, in the last robustness check (spec. (8)) the 
short-run coefficients are in first lags (without contemporaneous coefficients) in order to 
evaluate potential simultaneity issues.13 
 
6. Historical data sources and stylised facts 
The compiled historical macroeconomic dataset of this study includes annual series from 
various sources, covering the periods 1911-2010 for France, 1891-2000 for Sweden, and 1929-
2015 for the USA.14 More precisely, the wage share for the USA, Sweden, France, come from 
BEA NIPAs, Edvinsson (2005), and Piketty and Zucman (2014), respectively. As shown in 
Figure 3 below, the early financialisation phase of the pre-WWII period in France and Sweden 
was characterised by a decline in the wage shares, as expected. From 1920 to 1950 a clear 
upward trend is observed for all three countries. In the Golden Age, i.e. between 1950 and 
1975, the wage shares of France and the USA remain relatively stable, whilst during the same 
period, Sweden’s labour share increases steadily. Eventually, as highlighted in most studies on 
the determinants of the labour share, in the neoliberal post-1980’s period real wages reduce 
uniformly. It is worth noting that the decline is milder in the case of the USA, whereas the 
French labour share decreased dramatically from the late 1970s to the early 1990s but then 
remains relatively stagnant until today. 
 
                                                 
13 As a further test to justify the choice of specification (1) as baseline, in Appendix A3 can be found estimation 
results with two lags for the short-run coefficients. Using these specifications as starting points and testing down 
based either on information criteria or on the R-squared values, the optimal specification is found to be the simplest 
form of ECM, i.e. the baseline specification (1). 
14 I am grateful to Erik Bengtsson for providing most historical series for Sweden, and for his advice on potential 
data sources for the other case studies. 
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Figure 5: Labour share (%) 
 
The mortgage debt ratio, the corporate (non-mortgage) debt ratio, and the real interest 
rate data for all countries are calculated using data from Jordà et al. (2017). Since historical 
corporate debt series are not available for our case studies, it is approximated by subtracting 
mortgage debt from total private debt (see Figure 1). The government consumption ratio comes 
from BEA NIPAs for the USA, from Jordà et al. (2017) for Sweden, and from Piketty and 
Zucman (2014) for France. As depicted in Figure 4, the share of the government sector 
expanded from less than 10% in 1929 to almost 25% in the early 1950s. After that point, 
government consumption reduces steadily until today reaching again approximately 10%. This 
observation is interesting since the share of the public sector declines even during the Golden 
Age, in which the US state is supposed to follow Keynesian-inspired expansionary policy. 
Contrasting the government spending series with those of the US labour share, indeed they 
seem to be strongly positively correlated, as expected. In France, the share of government 
spending was considerably low until WWII (below 5%), where it starts to expand rapidly. The 
initial steep increase probably has to do with armament expenditures during the war years, but 
the rise in government expenditure continues to rise at a steady rate until the 1980s. After the 
early 1980s, i.e. the neoliberal period, the spending share of the French public sector still grows, 
but, evidently, at a slower rate compared to the early post-WWII period. The variation in these 
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series seems to be positively correlated with the relevant labour share series since 1920, whilst 
for the earlier period, the steep decline of the French wage share does not seem to be correlated 
with the stagnant government consumption share. Regarding Sweden, its government sector 
share shows a slight upward trend between 1890 and WWII, where it begins to increase rapidly 
from around 15% to over 35% in the mid-1980’s welfare retrenchment era. With respect to its 
correlation with the Swedish labour share, that seems to be quite strong over the period 1950-
2000, but the two series seem to be delinked in the 1890-1950 era. It should be noted that the 
use of government spending as a proxy for welfare state expenditures has certain shortcomings 
since this indicator includes several other types of expenditures, such as public employment 
and pensions. In this regard, it could be argued our proxy is not ideal, but given the availability 
of historical macroeconomic data, government spending is the most reliable variable for that 
purpose. The fluctuations of the historical public spending series for Sweden are in line with 
the argument of Esping-Andersen (1996) who claims that the extensive welfare state is mainly 
a post-WWII development rather than a historical stylised fact. From a qualitative perspective, 
Lundberg and Åmark (2001) argue that despite the pre-WWII social spending in Sweden was 
higher compared to many countries, the population coverage of those expenditures was quite 
limited due to gender, age, and place discrimination. In spite of the lower share of public 
spending, such social security discrimination did not exist in the pre-WWII France, as a more 
universal social insurance system was established under the pressure of social groups like the 
feminist movement and agricultural workers, among others (Dutton 2002). In this respect, 
regarding income distribution, it is likely that government spending will be relatively more 
important in the case of France.  
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Figure 6: Government consumption (% of GDP) 
 
The series for union density come from OECD and Donado and Wälde (2012). For 
France, the union density series have randomly missing values before 1960, thus the data are 
interpolated for this period using a log-linear approximation.15 Figure 5 shows that unionisation 
rose significantly in France, Sweden, and the USA from the late 19th century to approximately 
1950. For Sweden, the rate of increase was relatively higher and continued until the mid-1990s 
in which it reached its peak at over 80%. In France and the USA, a steep decline started at 
around 1950, with the downward trend persisting until today, reaching the levels of the early 
20th century. Contrariwise, in Sweden the steady reduction in union membership begins much 
later, i.e. in the mid-1990s, decreasing to the levels of the late 1950s during the current period. 
In total, the rate of unionisation is substantially higher in Sweden in historical perspective, 
implying that its potential impact on the wage share should be stronger. Comparing the series 
with the relevant labour share series (see Figure 3), we observe that in the pre-WWII period 
where union density increased indeed the wage shares increased as well. In the Golden Age 
(1950-late 1970’s), unionisation and the wage share increase together only in Sweden, while 
in France and the USA union membership declines, but the labour share relatively stable, with 
                                                 
15 Imputing the randomly missing observations is necessary in that case, because, otherwise, the econometrics 
software used (EViews) limits automatically the total time dimension of the estimations to a significant extent. 
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a steep increase in France during the early 1980s. This could imply a structural change in wage 
setting negotiation procedure in France and the USA in the post-WWII period, which 
undermined the role of unions to some extent. In this regard, union density seems to be stronger 
correlated with real wages in Sweden in the full period, thus it is more likely to obtain 
statistically significant estimates with the expected signs. 
 
 
Figure 7: Union density (%) 
 
The exports and imports series used for the calculation of trade openness are derived from BEA 
NIPAs for the USA, from Schön and Krantz (2015) for Sweden, and from Piketty and Zucman 
(2014) for France. As a different measure of trade openness, the average trade tariffs series 
come from Roine et al. (2009). Considering the first indicator, i.e. the share of the foreign sector 
(Figure 6), it seems that trade openness is a phenomenon that characterises mainly the post-
WWII era, rather than the full period. More precisely, trade openness was quite restricted in 
Sweden and the USA until the mid-1970s, contrary to France where even in the late 19th century 
its level was above 20%. The series appear to synchronise after the mid-1970s, where trade 
openness rises rapidly for all countries, becoming almost double in size in France and Sweden, 
and approximately triples in the USA in which reaches over 30% of GDP. With respect to the 
fluctuations of the labour share series reported above, the two indicators appear to be negatively 
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correlated only during the late post-WWII era, i.e. after 1980, and not in historical context. The 
argument that trade globalisation is mainly a post-WWII phenomenon rather than a historical 
stylised fact also finds support in the average trade tariff series. Figure 7 shows that imposed 
tariffs were increased in the pre-WWII period (with a temporary steep fall in WWI), whilst 
they declined dramatically in the post-1945 period, which is also clearly reflected in the trade 
openness series for all three countries. As both proxies for trade do not seem to be highly 
correlated with labour shares in the full historical period but only in the post-1980 era, their 
potential effect on the wage share is ambiguous. Focusing on the qualitative aspect of trade 
globalisation, Palley (2018) argues that the pre-WWII globalisation period was rather driven 
by trade gains, which benefited both capital and labour. In contrast, the post-WWII trade 
globalisation trend which escalated in the neoliberal era was motivated by the conflict between 
capital and labour, which resulted in the capital seeking cheaper labour in foreign countries 
driving down wages in the global level, i.e. benefiting the most mobile rather the abundant 
factor of production (Rodrik, 1997). Consequently, given the long time dimension of this study, 
it is unlikely that trade globalisation exerted a robust negative effect on the labour share in 
historical perspective. 
 
 
Figure 8: Trade openness (% of GDP) 
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Figure 9: Average Trade Tariffs 
Regarding the other control variables, the TFP (per hours worked) series come from 
Bergeaud et al. (2016). The real stock price indices are derived from Le Bris and Hautcoeur 
(2010), Shiller (2005), Waldenström (2014). Stock market capitalisation data come from Roine 
et al. (2009). 
 
7. Econometric results 
7.1 France (1911-2010) 
Starting with main results for France (Table 1), in specification (1)  𝑈𝐷, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 
have the expected long-run signs, with 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 being statistically significant at 
the 1% levels. In specification (2), where 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is included in the baseline specification, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, and 𝐼𝑁𝑇 exhibit the expected signs in the long-term. Among the long-term 
effects 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 are statistically significant, at the 1% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The rest variables are not statistically significant. In specification (3), where the 
wage share is replaced by the wage share of the private sector as the dependent variable, all 
long-term coefficients remain unchanged in terms of signs, statistical significance, and with 
minor variations in magnitude. More precisely, the expected signs of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 
remain statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. With respect to 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 
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this suggests that its positive impact on the wage share is not biased due to endogeneity. The 
addition of 𝑃𝑆 as a control variable for asset price inflation in order to proxy shareholder value 
orientation (spec. (4)), does not affect notably the long-run coefficients, as 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 
and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 have the expected signs. As in the baseline specification, the long-run effects of 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. The 
long-run coefficient of 𝑃𝑆 is statistically insignificant, showing that indeed shareholder value 
orientation has not been an important driver of the French wage share. Regarding the short-
term effects, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and 𝑈𝐷 have the expected signs, with 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. According to the critical values of the Durbin-Watson (DW) and 
the Breusch-Godfrey (BG) tests, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected 
in specifications (1), (3), and (4).  
Overall, the baseline results for France indicate that the two major drivers of declines 
in the wage share are welfare expenditures and financialisation, in the form of mortgage 
indebtedness. With respect to the second finding, it seems that in France indeed rising 
household debt levels induce higher inequality, providing historical evidence for the argument 
of Argitis and Dafermos (2013) and Kim et al. (2017). The rest variables have insignificant 
long-term effects, despite 𝑈𝐷 and 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 exhibit the correct signs in some cases. The positive 
impact of welfare spending is also confirmed in the short-run coefficients as well, where the 
coefficient of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 has the expected sign and is statistically significant in (1), (2), and (3). 
The strong welfare spending effects were anticipated given the universal character of the 
French social security model even in the pre-WWII period (Dutton, 2002). 
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Table 1: France (1911-2010) - Main results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
WS(-1) -0.278*** -3.627 -0.254*** -3.144   -0.274*** -2.945 
WSP(-1)     -0.243*** -3.526   
UD(-1) 0.011 0.131 -0.067 -0.702 0.030 0.320 -0.012 -0.131 
OPEN(-1) 0.011 0.257 -0.051 -0.940 0.023 0.482 -0.010 -0.175 
GCONS(-1) 0.318*** 3.851 0.336*** 3.920 0.231*** 2.778 0.317*** 3.041 
MDEBT(-1) -0.155*** -2.558 -0.117* -1.809 -0.161** -2.381 -0.149** -2.385 
BDEBT(-1) 0.018 1.020 0.017 0.921 0.018 0.892 0.020 0.935 
INT(-1)   -0.095 -1.577     
PS(-1)       0.004 0.139 
C 16.815 3.277 17.534 3.349 13.865 2.947 17.370 2.971 
Short-run effects        
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.157 1.301 0.134 1.090   0.161 1.218 
Δ(WSP(-1))     0.129 1.079   
Δ(GROWTH) -0.009 -0.795 -0.008 -0.616 -0.009 -0.747 -0.008 -0.655 
Δ(UD) 0.112 0.373 0.022 0.072 0.145 0.429 0.032 0.079 
Δ(OPEN) -0.085 -1.515 -0.035 -0.426 -0.097 -1.538 -0.024 -0.299 
Δ(GCONS) 1.530*** 3.327 1.848*** 3.554 1.689*** 3.403 2.189*** 3.913 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.164 0.695 0.097 0.393 0.145 0.548 0.023 0.091 
Δ(BDEBT) -0.037 -1.000 -0.032 -0.847 -0.043 -1.055 -0.019 -0.500 
Δ(INT)   0.069 1.387     
Δ(PS)       0.017 0.372 
 
 
R2 0.48  0.50  0.44  0.49  
DW 1.53  1.58  1.57  1.57  
BG 0.10  0.00  0.14  0.13  
Notes: In (1), (2), and (4) the dependent variable is the adjusted wage share, while in (3) it is the adjusted wage share of the 
private sector (calculated as in Stockhammer (2017)), both in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
To evaluate the robustness of the main findings, an additional round of four 
specifications is estimated, interchanging control variables in the baseline specification (1). In 
specification (5) where the effect of 𝑇𝐹𝑃 is added, the negative effect of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 (statistically 
significant at the 10% level) and the positive effect of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 (statistically significant at the 
1% level) are the only statistically significant long-term coefficients. The coefficient of 𝑇𝐹𝑃 
itself is statistically insignificant in the short- and the long-term, providing no evidence for the 
neoclassical technical change narrative. In specification (6) where 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 is replaced by 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹, once again, the only statistically significant long-term coefficients are those of 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively), both having the expected signs. 
Adding 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 as an additional control variable for financialisation in specification (7) affects 
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significantly the long-term coefficients for France, as only the coefficients of 𝑈𝐷 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 
have the expected signs, but none of them is statistically significant. The long-run effect of 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 itself is positive rather than negative and statistically insignificant, contrary to what is 
expected. Nevertheless, the short-run coefficient of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 has the correct positive sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Lastly, replacing the contemporaneous short-run effects 
with their first lags also influences the long-run coefficients, since now 𝑈𝐷, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 do have the expected signs, but again none of them is statistically significant. To sum 
up, the robustness specification (5) and (6) confirm that financialisation is the main driver of 
the wage share in France, and that welfare spending also plays a key role. In specifications (7) 
and (8) the results change notably, becoming inconclusive as all long-term coefficients become 
insignificant. A possible explanation for those findings in specification (7) is that the shorter 
length of the 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 series (1930-2005) creates biases as the sample size decreases significantly, 
thus the estimates are not considered to be as reliable as the main results. 
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7.2 Sweden (1891-2000)  
For Sweden, in specification (1) the long-term coefficients of 𝑈𝐷, 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇. Among 
those coefficients, the negative sign of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and the positive sign of 𝑈𝐷 are statistically 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels, as expected. Similar results are obtained in specification 
(2), where 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is included, in terms of signs and statistical significance as well. Again, 𝑈𝐷 
increases the wage share and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 decreases the wage share, being statistically significant 
at the 1% and the 5% levels, respectively. The long-term coefficient of 𝐼𝑁𝑇 itself has the 
Table 2: France (1911-2010) - Robustness tests 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
WS(-1) -0.309*** -3.712 -0.253*** -3.194 -0.158** -2.049 -0.216*** -2.527 
UD(-1) -0.047 -0.427 -0.001 -0.008 0.101 1.478 0.092 0.967 
OPEN(-1) 0.030 0.613   0.050 0.998 -0.008 -0.159 
GCONS(-1) 0.441*** 2.751 0.288*** 3.381 -0.069 -0.755 0.043 0.426 
MDEBT(-1) -0.130* -1.760 -0.134** -2.313 -0.011 -0.209 0.027 0.389 
BDEBT(-1) 0.029 1.493 0.018 0.958 0.001 0.094 0.000 -0.025 
TFP(-1) -0.429 -0.818       
TARIFF(-1)   -0.010 -0.093     
SCAP(-1)     0.012 1.008   
C 19.341 3.362 15.612 3.095 9.948 2.027 14.348 2.462 
Short-run effects        
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.190 1.544 0.143 1.188 -0.100 -0.877 0.463*** 3.416 
Δ(GROWTH) -0.006 -0.538 -0.010 -0.895 -0.004 -0.375   
Δ(GROWTH(-1))       -0.009 -0.730 
Δ(UD) 0.163 0.517 0.058 0.191 0.060 0.206   
Δ(UD(-1))       -0.005 -0.016 
Δ(OPEN) -0.063 -1.081   -0.041 -0.587   
Δ(OPEN(-1))       0.120 1.391 
Δ(GCONS) 1.342*** 2.775 1.519*** 3.339 1.750*** 4.288   
Δ(GCONS(-1))       -0.418 -0.701 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.117 0.491 0.149 0.640 -0.306 -1.549   
Δ(MDEBT(-1))       -0.095 -0.362 
Δ(BDEBT) -0.041 -1.114 -0.018 -0.518 -0.029 -0.924   
Δ(BDEBT(-1))       -0.008 -0.191 
Δ(TFP) -2.157 -1.213       
Δ(TARIFF)   0.291 1.481     
Δ(SCAP)     0.001 0.069   
 
 
R2 0.50  0.48  0.65  0.25  
DW 1.58  1.54  2.17  2.25  
BG 0.04  0.01  0.23  0.00  
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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expected sign, but it is not statistically significant. In specification (3) the two long-term 
coefficients that have the expected signs are 𝑈𝐷 and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, are the only statistically 
significant ones, at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The long-term coefficient of BDEBT 
also has the correct negative sign, but it is statistically insignificant. In total, the results of 
specification (1) are indeed robust to the private sector wage share as well. In specification (4), 
the effects of 𝑈𝐷, 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 exhibit the expected signs in the long-run, while the rest 
two coefficients have perverse signs. As in specification (1), the positive coefficient of 𝑈𝐷 and 
the coefficient of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. In 
addition, the control variable 𝑃𝑆 has the expected negative sign, but it is not statistically 
significant. However, here, the perverse coefficients of trade globalisation (𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁) and 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 are also statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels.  
In Sweden, the two key variables for functional income distribution are union density 
and mortgage debt. The negative impact of mortgage indebtedness on the wage share is 
consistently robust, as minor variation is observed in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance, confirming the theoretical argument of Argitis and Dafermos (2013) and Kim et 
al. (2017). As in France, rising household indebtedness reduces real wages in Sweden as well. 
Additionally, labour’s bargaining power, measured by union density, decreases the mark-up, 
as Kalecki (1954) assumes, leading to higher real wages. The real short-term interest rate (INT) 
has the expected long-run sign as well, but it is statistically insignificant, therefore no safe 
conclusion can be drawn for the interest-elasticity of price mark-ups in Sweden. It is also worth 
mentioning that the long-term coefficients of trade openness (OPEN) also exhibit perverse 
signs in all four specifications, implying that for Sweden globalisation has not benefited the 
most mobile production factor, i.e. capital (see Rodrik 1997), which could be compatible with 
the story of Palley (2018) that the pre-WWII globalisation period was driven by trade gains 
and not class conflict. Regarding statistical issues, in specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) the 
values of the DW statistic remains within the acceptable bounds of 1.5 to 2.5, hence serial 
correlation can be rejected. By the same token, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
cannot be rejected according to the BG test in all four main specifications. 
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Table 3: Sweden (1891-2000) - Main results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
WS(-1) -0.164*** -2.316 -0.144* -1.957   -0.224*** -2.966 
WSP(-1)     -0.175** -2.474   
UD(-1) 0.039*** 2.679 0.037** 2.565 0.043*** 2.755 0.051*** 2.706 
OPEN(-1) 0.334* 1.760 0.333* 1.757 0.376* 1.854 1.025*** 3.019 
GCONS(-1) -0.070 -1.107 -0.076 -1.186 -0.081 -1.245 -0.153** -2.198 
MDEBT(-1) -0.057** -2.444 -0.054** -2.326 -0.061** -2.411 -0.080*** -3.361 
BDEBT(-1) -0.014 -0.794 -0.012 -0.653 -0.017 -0.880 -0.008 -0.384 
INT(-1)   -0.001 -0.017     
PS(-1)       -0.955** -2.143 
C 11.400 2.293 10.046 1.944 11.688 2.435 13.814 2.690 
Short-run effects        
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.005 0.047 -0.030 -0.275   -0.012 -0.111 
Δ(WSP(-1))     0.036 0.320   
Δ(GROWTH) 0.000 -1.166 -0.001 -1.542 0.000 -1.106 0.000 -0.669 
Δ(UD) -0.156 -1.541 -0.139 -1.377 -0.143 -1.309 -0.176* -1.743 
Δ(OPEN) -0.958** -2.263 -0.866** -2.022 -1.031** -2.227 -0.513 -1.102 
Δ(GCONS) 0.223* 1.849 0.183 1.482 0.208* 1.603 0.151 1.250 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.217*** 2.789 0.194** 2.342 0.233*** 2.760 0.248*** 3.181 
Δ(BDEBT) 0.058 1.072 0.035 0.656 0.052 0.885 0.048 0.902 
Δ(INT)   0.078* 1.889     
Δ(PS)       -1.484*** -3.117 
 
 
R2 0.47  0.50  0.46  0.56  
DW 1.77  1.94  1.81  1.86  
BG 0.67  0.68  0.75  0.80  
Notes: In (1), (2), and (4) the dependent variable is the adjusted wage share, while in (3) it is the adjusted wage share of the 
private sector (calculated as in Stockhammer (2017)), both in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
As in France, the robustness tests for Sweden also confirm the robustness of the baseline 
findings. In specification (5), the addition of TFP affects the long-run effects, to some extent, 
as now 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, and 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 have the expected signs, which are statistically significant at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. Capital-augmenting technology’s long-term impact, measured 
by the 𝑇𝐹𝑃, has a positive and statistically significant sign, in contrast with the neoclassical 
story. In this specification, the negative long-term coefficient of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 becomes statistically 
significant, suggesting that government spending exacerbated rather than decreased income 
inequality, probably driven by the discriminatory character of the Swedish social spending 
model in the pre-WWII period (Lundberg and Åmark 2001). The results of specification (6) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹 replaces 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, does not affect significantly the baseline findings. The 
negative long-run effect of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and the positive long-run impact of 𝑈𝐷 are the only 
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statistically significant coefficients, both at the 5% level. The effect of 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 again has the 
correct negative sign, but it is statistically insignificant. In specification (7), adding 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 in 
the baseline specification (1) provides interesting results as the robustness of the negative 
impact of financialisation is underlined. More specifically, both long-term coefficients of 
𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 do have the expected negative signs and are statistically significant at the 
1% level, showing that household indebtedness and shareholder value maximisation have been 
decreasing Swedish workers’ bargaining power, hence their income share. However, the long-
term effects of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively, but with perverse signs, which underline the importance of the qualitative 
differences of the pre-WWII trade globalisation period and the country-specific characteristics 
of the early non-universal Swedish welfare state model. Last, in specification (8) the long-term 
effects of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, and 𝑈𝐷 have the expected signs. Among those, the negative 
coefficients of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 remains statistically significant at the 1% level, and 𝑈𝐷 at the 5% level. 
As in specification (7), the long-term coefficients of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 have perverse signs 
and are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Overall, the robustness 
check specifications, suggest that the baseline findings for Sweden are robust, since the effects 
of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and  𝑈𝐷 hold consistently. It is worth noting that 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 also exhibits the 
correct sign, providing additional evidence for the negative impact of financialisation on 
labour’s income share, in line with the arguments of the political economy approach on 
shareholder value maximisation (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). The role of technology also 
seems to play a role for Sweden, to some extent, as it is statistically significant, but since its 
effects changes signs between the short- and the long-term, it remains negligible.  
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Table 4: Sweden (1891-2000) - Robustness tests 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
WS(-1) -0.227*** -3.271 -0.190*** -2.715 -0.356*** -3.467 -0.077 -1.042 
UD(-1) 0.011 0.637 0.052** 2.309 0.004 0.114 0.041** 2.460 
OPEN(-1) 0.003 0.013   1.579*** 4.224 0.555** 2.312 
GCONS(-1) -0.194*** -2.802 -0.076 -1.155 -0.217** -2.265 -0.116* -1.696 
MDEBT(-1) -0.079*** -3.461 -0.041** -2.023 -0.081*** -3.114 -0.078*** -2.818 
BDEBT(-1) -0.029* -1.697 -0.002 -0.106 0.002 0.074 -0.004 -0.228 
TFP(-1) 1.220*** 2.780       
TARIFF(-1)   -0.117 -0.857     
SCAP(-1)     -0.085*** -3.826   
C 17.482 3.487 14.392 2.972 26.130 3.335 5.114 0.981 
Short-run effects        
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.016 0.155 -0.067 -0.540 0.038 0.275 0.133 1.079 
Δ(GROWTH) 0.000 0.218 -0.001 -1.241 0.000 0.723   
Δ(GROWTH(-1))       -0.001 -1.502 
Δ(UD) -0.216** -2.277 -0.135 -1.274 -0.287** -2.199   
Δ(UD(-1))       0.061 0.536 
Δ(OPEN) -0.738* -1.807   -0.325 -0.458   
Δ(OPEN(-1))       -0.629 -1.187 
Δ(GCONS) 0.087 0.749 0.216* 1.693 0.032 0.255   
Δ(GCONS(-1))       -0.347** -2.579 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.196*** 2.714 0.221*** 2.647 0.250*** 2.893   
Δ(MDEBT(-1))       -0.066 -0.724 
Δ(BDEBT) 0.022 0.421 0.101* 1.797 -0.030 -0.497   
Δ(BDEBT(-1))       0.003 0.054 
Δ(TFP) -5.300*** -2.957       
Δ(TARIFF)   0.219 0.920     
Δ(SCAP)     -0.081 -1.462   
 
 
R2 0.57  0.46  0.60  0.33  
DW 1.83  1.70  2.38  2.12  
BG 0.01  0.55  0.01  0.08  
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
7.3 USA (1929-2015) 
Regarding the last case study, the USA, in specification (1) the long-term effects of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 
and 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, 
the long-term coefficient of 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 has a perverse sign, i.e. positive, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, as well. Identical results in terms of statistical significance and 
magnitude are obtained in specification (2), where 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is included. The interest rate itself is 
not statistically significant and has a weak perverse long-term effect. Using the wage share of 
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the private sector as the dependent variable (spec. (3)) does not affect the long-term 
coefficients. The expected sign of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 remains statistically significant at the 5% level, 
whereas the perverse sign of 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar findings 
with the baseline specification are obtained in specification (4) as well, in terms of signs, 
magnitude, and robustness of coefficients. The only notable difference is that the negative wage 
share effect of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 is statistically significant at the 10% level. Regarding the post-estimation 
diagnostics, the values of the DW test are between 1.88 and 1.96 for the four specifications, 
i.e. within the 1.5-2.5 bounds, suggesting the absence of serial correlation problems. The results 
of the BG test also suggest that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 5: USA (1929-2015) - Main results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
WS(-1) -0.193*** -3.346 -0.202*** -2.913   -0.254*** -4.514 
WSP(-1)     -0.168*** -2.625   
UD(-1) 0.001 0.038 0.007 0.359 -0.019 -0.730 -0.004 -0.252 
OPEN(-1) 0.004 0.226 0.015 0.648 0.014 0.599 -0.049* -1.968 
GCONS(-1) 0.035** 2.609 0.035** 2.474 0.020 0.316 0.037** 2.932 
MDEBT(-1) -0.054** -3.200 -0.061*** -3.244 -0.069*** -3.264 -0.051*** -3.169 
BDEBT(-1) 0.071*** 2.743 0.078*** 2.729 0.086*** 2.790 0.063** 2.623 
INT(-1)   0.004 0.161     
PS(-1)       0.001*** 3.216 
C 11.952 3.097 12.297 2.723 9.874 2.225 16.382 4.321 
Short-run effects        
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.241** 2.350 0.250** 2.223   0.178* 1.834 
Δ(WSP(-1))     0.182 1.627   
Δ(GROWTH) -0.001*** -4.070 -0.001*** -3.810 -0.001*** -2.919 -0.001*** -3.817 
Δ(UD) 0.029 0.716 0.025 0.596 0.073 1.310 0.031 0.740 
Δ(OPEN) 0.315*** 4.053 0.300*** 3.508 0.336*** 3.661 0.233*** 3.039 
Δ(GCONS) 0.059*** 2.733 0.057** 2.382 -0.258*** -3.105 0.073*** 3.815 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.047 1.321 0.030 0.772 0.058 1.378 -0.023 -0.645 
Δ(BDEBT) -0.091 -1.614 -0.096 -1.642 -0.111 -1.634 -0.049 -0.974 
Δ(INT)   0.010 0.534     
Δ(PS)       0.000 -0.861 
 
 
R2 0.65  0.66  0.53  0.71  
DW 1.92  1.90  1.92  1.90  
BG 0.32  0.20  0.41  0.11  
Notes: In (1), (2), and (4) the dependent variable is the adjusted wage share, while in (3) it is the adjusted wage share of the 
private sector (calculated as in Stockhammer (2017)), both in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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As in the main estimations, the results of the robustness estimations for the USA are 
mixed, with respect to what is expected in theory. In specification (5), where 𝑇𝐹𝑃 is added, the 
expected positive long-run effect of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 is statistically significant at the 5% level. 𝑇𝐹𝑃 
itself is not statistically significant, thus the neoclassical technical progress story is found to be 
irrelevant for the USA. Again, in specification (6) the signs, magnitude, and robustness of the 
coefficients remain unchanged. In specification (7) which includes SCAP as a control variable, 
the long-term signs remain similar to the baseline specification. Although, only 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 are statistically significant at the 5% level, and the long-run effect of 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 is positive 
and statistically significant. Those results make the impact of financialisation on the US wage 
share even more unclear, rather than clarifying it. Ultimately, in specification (8) all long-run 
coefficients remain similar, i.e. 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, and 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 exhibit the correct signs. Yet, 
the only statistically significant coefficient is the perverse negative long-term effect of 𝑈𝐷. 
Summarising the main findings, financialisation and welfare spending are the main drivers of 
the labour share of the USA since 1929. While the robust positive impact of welfare spending 
is clear, the results are less straightforward for financialisation, as mortgage indebtedness 
decrease the labour share as expected, but business debt increases it. Therefore, the only way 
to clarify the overall impact of financialisation is to calculate the standardised coefficients for 
the regression, to make the relative effects comparable. Furthermore, the impact of trade 
globalisation is sensitive to the inclusion of certain financial variables, i.e. it exhibits the 
expected sign and is statistically significant only when 𝑃𝑆 is included (spec. (4)). On top of 
that, it should be noted that the effect of government consumption has the expected positive 
sign and is robust in the short-term as well. The impact of unionisation is negligible as it 
changes signs and it is statistically insignificant. As in France and Sweden, the estimations for 
the USA are free of serial correlation, according to the critical values of the DW statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
Table 6: USA (1929-2015) - Robustness tests 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
WS(-1) -0.209*** -3.377 -0.162** -2.356 -0.204*** -2.942 -0.136* -1.984 
UD(-1) 0.004 0.217 -0.014 -0.831 -0.007 -0.252 -0.038* -1.896 
OPEN(-1) 0.007 0.247   -0.021 -0.771 -0.036 -1.599 
GCONS(-1) 0.032** 2.119 0.046*** 3.325 0.078 1.130 0.020 1.352 
MDEBT(-1) -0.063*** -3.061 -0.044*** -2.646 -0.044** -2.149 -0.021 -0.979 
BDEBT(-1) 0.080*** 2.880 0.065*** 2.971 0.068** 2.279 0.014 0.459 
TFP(-1) 0.018 0.262       
TARIFF(-1)   -0.007 -0.320     
SCAP(-1)     0.007** 2.078   
C 12.823 3.056 10.175 2.312 11.856 2.396 10.200 2.267 
Short-run effects        
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.231** 2.220 0.161 1.460 0.207 1.599 0.308** 2.355 
Δ(GROWTH) -0.001*** -4.103 -0.001*** -2.587 -0.001*** -3.144   
Δ(GROWTH(-1))       0.001 1.258 
Δ(UD) 0.033 0.787 0.068 1.485 0.049 0.881   
Δ(UD(-1))       -0.062 -1.360 
Δ(OPEN) 0.305*** 3.835   0.290*** 3.543   
Δ(OPEN(-1))       0.019 0.198 
Δ(GCONS) 0.042 1.623 0.016 0.747 0.198** 2.144   
Δ(GCONS(-1))       0.056** 2.329 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.053 1.438 0.011 0.261 -0.040 -1.024   
Δ(MDEBT(-1))       -0.033 -0.785 
Δ(BDEBT) -0.118* -1.925 -0.030 -0.467 0.000 -0.004   
Δ(BDEBT(-1))       0.149** 2.245 
Δ(TFP) 0.464 1.042       
Δ(TARIFF)   0.090 1.055     
Δ(SCAP)     -0.002 -0.401   
 
 
R2 0.66  0.61  0.60  0.50  
DW 1.91  1.96  2.05  2.01  
BG 0.14  0.36  0.17  0.94  
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
8. The Comparative Political Economy of the labour share in historical 
perspective 
The last step of the empirical analysis of this study is to go beyond the narrow concept of 
statistical significance (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004) and explore the economic significance of 
the relative effects. To achieve that, it is necessary to test for the stability of the coefficients 
through the CUSUM test and calculate the standardized coefficients of the baseline 
specification (1) for each country in order to make them comparable. That allows to (a) evaluate 
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if the econometric results are consistent throughout the full period and whether unknown 
structural breaks exist; and (b) assess the relative sizes of the effects, providing a comparative 
political economy analysis on how different institutional settings have been affecting functional 
income distribution in each case during the last century. As reported in Appendix C, the 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) control charts for the baseline specification (1) provide no evidence 
for changes in the process mean, i.e. unknown structural breaks, in either country at the 5% 
level. This finding suggests that indeed finance has been integral to the capitalist system of 
production of all three countries. Table 7 summarises the standardised long-run coefficients for 
each case study.16 
 
Table 7: Standardised long-run coefficients 
  France Sweden USA 
UD(-1) 0.037 0.630 0.007 
OPEN(-1) 0.066 0.411 0.058 
GCONS(-1) 1.384 -0.388 0.339 
MDEBT(-1) -1.023 -0.352 -0.798 
BDEBT(-1) 0.246 -0.099 0.519 
Notes: Calculations are based on the baseline specification (1). Only standardised long-run 
coefficients are reported. 
 
Focusing on the coefficients that are statistically significant in the baseline specification 
(1) for France, the magnitude of the standardised coefficient of 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is smaller than that of 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 (in absolute values), hence the impact of welfare spending prevails. In Sweden, the 
standardised coefficients of statistically significant effects show that the positive impact of 
union density (𝑈𝐷) on the wage share is dominant over the negative effect mortgage 
indebtedness (𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇) and the positive effect of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, as its magnitude is larger in absolute 
terms. Lastly, for the USA, the magnitudes of both financialisation variables, 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, are larger than the standardised effect of government spending. Comparing the two 
contradicting signs of the coefficients of the debt aggregates, the negative effect of the 
mortgage ratio is larger than the positive impact of the business debt ratio, therefore 
financialisation total effect on the wage share is negative, as expected. 
Taking into consideration the standardised results for the three countries, the negative 
impact of household financialisation on the wage share is consistent in all of them, providing 
support for the political economy approach. This result suggests that indeed rising household 
indebtedness decreases worker’s bargaining power, thus their share of national income (Kim 
                                                 
16 The standardized coefficients are calculated as follows. The estimated coefficient obtained is multiplied by the 
ratio of the standard deviation of the explanatory variable over the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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et al. 2017) in historical perspective, rather than makes them demand higher wages to improve 
their financial position even in countries with strong trade unions structures like Sweden 
(Argitis and Dafermos, 2013). Nevertheless, the negative impact of mortgage debt is indeed 
weaker in Sweden, which implies that the disciplinary effects are limited in countries with 
strong labour power resources. From a Veblenian conspicuous consumption perspective, one 
could challenge these findings in terms of a potential reverse underlying causality. Veblen 
(1899) argued that people whose income is decreasing want to keep their consumption 
expenditure at the same level, thus they are willing to increase their indebtedness to cover the 
growing gap. Despite there is some logic in this argument, Veblen makes a fundamental 
restrictive hypothesis: he assumes that the commercial banking system is naïve enough to lend 
money without taking into account borrowers’ income level. Beyond this logical inconsistency, 
recent empirical studies have shown that household borrowing is rather driven by real estate 
prices, and not by increasing income inequality (Moore and Stockhammer, 2018; Stockhammer 
and Wildauer, 2018) 
In France, welfare spending also plays a key role for the determination of real wages, 
suggesting that declines in social spending decrease workers’ bargaining power, as it includes 
unemployment benefits among other things, which is directly linked to their cost of job loss. 
In Sweden, the main driver of the wage share is union density which has a positive effect, 
providing evidence for Kalecki’s (1954) argument that trade unions can decrease mark-ups, 
thus shifting income distribution towards higher wages. This result is in contrast with the 
findings of Bengtsson (2014b) who finds insignificant union density effects for the same 
period, using, however, a three-year averages model. According to the robustness estimation 
(and especially specification (5)), there is also weak evidence that corporate debt accumulation 
decreases the Swedish labour share, i.e. firms attempt to improve their financial position by 
squeezing wages (Hein, 2007; Argitis and Dafermos, 2013). For the USA, considering that the 
overall effect of financialisation is negative, welfare spending is the most influential 
determinant of its labour share, which, as in France, leads to higher real wages. In total, the 
main finding of the present study is that mortgage debt is consistently associated with decreases 
in the labour income shares of all three countries since the late 19th century. As scholars like 
Esteves (2011) and Fasianos et al. (2018) argue, using descriptive analysis, patterns of 
financialisation can be traced in many advanced economies even in the pre-WWII period. This 
study makes a further step by estimating the effects of financialisation on the labour shares of 
France, Sweden, and the USA covering the pre-WWII period and finding that it has been a key 
factor for. 
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Besides the main findings that had the expected signs, it is also meaningful to evaluate 
the rest findings and non-findings of this study. The most notable among them is the 
statistically insignificant coefficients of union density in France and the USA. From a 
Kaleckian perspective, that result is unexpected as in his framework unions strengthen workers, 
leading to a squeeze in the price mark-up (Kalecki, 1954). One possible explanation, as 
discussed earlier, is that collective bargaining in those countries is more decentralized, hence 
union membership is not as strictly linked with the wage setting negotiation as it is in the 
Scandinavian countries. Another possibility for those unexpected findings is that since the 
compiled historical union density series include data from different sources, discrepancies in 
measurement might influence the results, as even for the post-WWII period there are significant 
issues with the measurement of this variable (Visser, 2006).17 The role of trade openness is also 
negligible, as for France and Sweden the coefficients change signs very often among 
specifications and are very rarely statistically significant, whilst in Sweden, it is consistently 
positive. That indicates that class relations and bargaining power with respect to wages has 
been relatively inelastic to international trade shocks in the former countries. In Sweden, it 
seems that the results are driven by the pre-WWII trade globalisation period, which, unlike the 
neoliberal globalisation period, is not motivated by class conflict, hence it does not benefit 
capital at the expense of labour (Palley, 2018). In a historical context, Roine et al. (2009) also 
find insignificant effects of trade globalisation on top income shares, using panel data analysis 
for the same period. In addition, the estimations of this study provide no support for the 
neoclassical capital-augmenting technology story, as the coefficient of 𝑇𝐹𝑃 is insignificant for 
France and the USA, whilst it has a perverse positive impact for Sweden. This non-finding is 
in line with most empirical studies on the determinants of the wage share who find insignificant 
or negligible technology effects, implying that, in reality, the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour is not as large as neoclassicals assume. Additionally, in Sweden 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 has 
a surprising negative effect on the labour share (not robust though), which, as argued earlier, 
is not a totally unexpected finding as the pre-WWII form of social security system in this 
country was characterised by age, gender, and place discrimination, exacerbating income 
inequality. Last but not least, the real wage effects of the interest rate have the expected 
negative signs in France and Sweden, but they are statistically insignificant for all three 
countries.  Accordingly, in the terms of Hein (2007), there is weak evidence that price mark-
                                                 
17 For instance, Visser (2006) notes that unionisation statistics for France are commonly inaccurate as they may 
include nonpaying members. Also, the series for the USA vary significantly depending on whether they come 
from the Current Population Survey or calculated using administrative data. 
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ups are interest-inelastic in historical perspective in France and Sweden, but not in the USA. 
As Hein and Schöder (2011) find positive interest payments effects on the US profit share 
(using the long-term interest rate though), the interest-elasticity of the US price-mark-ups 
seems to be a recent development. 
 
9. Conclusions 
A growing body of literature in social sciences argues that financialisation is a phenomenon 
that has not arisen for the first time since the early 1980s, as historical macroeconomic data 
indicate similar patterns in advanced economies even during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries (e.g. Esteves, 2011; Fasianos et al. 2018). Interestingly enough, very few studies have 
attempted to examine the impact of financialisation on the macroeconomy in historical 
perspective18, and especially its effects on income distribution. The only exception in the 
distribution literature is the historical panel data study of Roine et al. (2009) who focus on 
personal income inequality, finding that financial development increases top income shares. 
Regarding functional income distribution, the only historical data study that estimates the 
determinants of the labour share for Sweden is Bengtsson (2014b), who, however, does not test 
any hypothesis related to financialisation. The present study fills this gap in the empirical 
literature on income distribution by estimating the effects of mortgage indebtedness, corporate 
indebtedness, short-term real interest rate, real stock prices, and stock market capitalisation 
(among other variables) on the wage shares of France (1911-2010), Sweden (1891-2000), and 
the USA (1929-2015). Another advantage of using series with such long time dimension is that 
reliable time series analysis can be conducted, allowing to unveil important country-specific 
information, which in a panel data context is lost.  
The econometric findings of the present study strongly suggest that financialisation 
decreases the labour income share in France, Sweden, and the USA. More precisely, the key 
financial variable is mortgage debt which decreases the wage shares of the three countries, 
confirming that accumulation of debt by households deteriorates their bargaining position, thus 
exacerbates income inequality, as suggested by Argitis and Dafermos (2013) and Kim et al. 
(2017). Similar results have been reported by Guschanski and Onaran (2018) and Wood (2017) 
for the post-WWII period, but the finding of the present study establishes that the balance of 
power between labour and capital has been subject to households’ financial commitments not 
                                                 
18 The vast majority of the empirical studies that examine financialisation in historical context center on business 
cycle analysis and the determinants of banking crises (e.g. Schularick and Taylor 2012). 
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only in the neoliberal era but at least since the early 19th century. In particular, this finding is 
of great significance as it shows that financialisation always mattered for coordinated market 
economies like France, for liberal market economies such as the USA, and for statist economies 
like Sweden. This result is more thought-provoking in the cases of coordinated and statist 
economies, i.e. France and Sweden respectively, where the distributional impact of finance 
should be comparatively modest in theory, as it is in the post-1980 period e.g. in Sweden (see 
Wood 2017). This outcome indeed challenges the traditional VoC typology and shows that to 
some extent it is biased from the post-WWII experience. For France, the estimations also show 
that welfare spending increased its labour share during the last century. The effect of stock 
price inflation on the French wage share is insignificant, implying that shareholder value 
orientation did not lead French firms to wage cutting to balance the increases in their overhead 
financial costs in historical perspective. As highlighted in section 2, rapid asset price inflation 
is rather a post-1980 development for France, and not a historical stylised fact. For Sweden, 
the other key variable, apart from mortgage debt, is union density which increases the labour 
share, confirming Kalecki’s (1954) assumption that union density can reduce the mark-up, thus 
real profits. This underlines that indeed the well-established bargaining system of Sweden has 
been crucial throughout time. Also, this finding is consistent with the results of Bengtsson 
(2014b) who also finds a positive wage share impact of unionisation for approximately the 
same historical period in Sweden, but with statistically insignificant coefficients. Furthermore, 
the negative real wage effect of shareholder value orientation becomes evident in Sweden, both 
in terms of the effects of real stock prices and stock market capitalisation as well. Regarding 
the USA, the positive effect of government spending is the second consistently robust finding, 
showing that welfare expenditures increase the labour share, probably due to their negative 
effect on the cost of job loss, thus on the bargaining power of workers. The other statistically 
significant coefficient, i.e. business debt, has a perverse sign, whose economic intuition is 
obscure. 
Recapitulating, the main findings of this study underline that the financialisation of the 
economy has been associated with increased household vulnerability at least during the last 
century in France, Sweden, and the USA. Nevertheless, variables which are directly linked to 
labour’s bargaining power and the cost of job loss, i.e. union density and welfare expenditures, 
seems to have stronger impacts on real wages. Relating the findings of the present study with 
recent relevant studies on demand regimes who show that domestic aggregate demand has been 
wage-led since the mid-19th century (Stockhammer et al. 2018) several interesting policy 
conclusions can be drawn. First, financial regulation can contribute simultaneously to social 
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equality and better macroeconomic performance, as total demand reacts positively to increases 
in wage shares, whilst financialisation decreases them, at least during the last century. More 
precisely, according to the main results for the three countries restricting speculative mortgage 
borrowing to households and discouraging shareholder value orientation can be effective steps. 
Second, expanding the welfare expenditures and strengthening collective bargaining processes 
through trade unions are the other two essential steps towards social equality and optimal 
macroeconomic performance, as such policies will boost real wages, which in turn will increase 
total aggregate demand. Apparently, such conclusions have been suggested by most relevant 
studies who examine empirically the determination of wage shares and the nature of demand 
regimes in the Neoliberal period. The main contribution of the present study is that provides 
robust evidence that those policy recommendations, given the underlying nature of the 
distributional conflict between capital and labour, have been relevant for the last century or 
even more. Regarding future research, it becomes evident that country-specific characteristics 
matter as important cross-country differences among the three case studies are observed.  A 
typical example with respect to the rest of the relevant literature is the negative effect of 
mortgage indebtedness whose effect is found to be statistically significant by authors who use 
individual country analysis rather than panel data, such as the present study, Guschanski and 
Onaran (2018), and Wood (2017). As new historical labour share series become available, 
future studies should focus on estimating the impact of financialisation on income distribution 
for other countries as well in order to examine to whether our current perception about stylised 
facts on income distribution is biased by the post-WWII or neoliberal experiences, or if some 
of those are indeed historical stylised facts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
Appendix 
A1: Data sources 
Table A1: Original data sources 
Country Variable Period Source 
France 
Wage Share (adjusted) 1896-2010 Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
GDP (real) 1896-2010 Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
GDP (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Government Consumption 1896-2010 Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
Exports and Imports (real) 1896-2010 Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
Total Private Debt (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Mortgage Debt (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Real Stock Price Index 1854-2007 Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010) 
Total Factor Productivity 1890-2012 Bergeaud et al. (2016) 
Interest rate (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Inflation rate 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Trade Tariffs (average) 1900-2006 Roine et al. (2009) 
Stock Market Capitalisation 1930-2005 Roine et al. (2009) 
Union Density 
1910-1959 Donado and Wälde (2012) 
1960-2014 OECD 
Sweden 
Wage Share (adjusted) 1875-2000 Edvinsson (2005) 
GDP (real) 1875-2000 Schön and Krantz (2015) 
GDP (nominal) 1875-2000 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Government Consumption 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Exports and Imports (real) 1875-2000 Schön and Krantz (2015) 
Total Private Debt (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Mortgage Debt (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Real Stock Price Index 1870-2013 Waldenström (2014) 
Total Factor Productivity 1890-2012 Bergeaud et al. (2016) 
Interest rate (nominal) 1870-2013 Waldenström (2014) 
Inflation rate 1290-2008 Edvinsson and Söderberg (2011) 
Trade Tariffs (average) 1900-2006 Roine et al. (2009) 
Stock Market Capitalisation 1930-2005 Roine et al. (2009) 
Union Density 
1890-1959 Donado and Wälde (2012) 
1960-2014 OECD 
USA 
Wage Share (adjusted) 1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
GDP (real) 1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
GDP (nominal) 1889-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Government Consumption 1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
Exports and Imports (real) 1929-2015 BEA NIPAs 
Total Private Debt (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Mortgage Debt (nominal) 1870-2013 Jordà et al. (2017) 
Real Stock Price Index 1891-2013 Shiller (2005) 
Total Factor Productivity 1890-2012 Bergeaud et al. (2016) 
Interest rate (nominal) 1890-2011 Shiller (2005) 
Inflation rate 1890-2011 Shiller (2005) 
Trade Tariffs (average) 1900-2006 Roine et al. (2009) 
Stock Market Capitalisation 1930-2005 Roine et al. (2009) 
Union Density 
1881-1959 Donado and Wälde (2012) 
1960-2014 OECD 
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 A2: Descriptive statistics, unit root tests, and correlation matrices 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics and unit root tests  
  WS WSP GROWTH GCONS UD OPEN MDEBT BDEBT INT PS TARIFF TFP SCAP 
France   
Mean 76.38 71.68 22.56 13.65 16.53 34.83 17.93 52.05 -0.70 9.89 5.59 4.92 35.74 
Median 76.42 71.51 13.58 16.31 14.20 31.84 14.65 55.49 1.22 4.73 4.30 3.20 25.78 
Max 98.47 81.03 88.68 24.83 46.20 56.63 53.16 108.69 10.84 59.17 21.70 11.60 112.56 
Min 60.17 59.17 -43.96 1.60 7.20 13.87 0.97 11.32 -57.06 1.41 1.02 1.10 6.05 
Obs 115 106 104 106 105 106 96 90 103 114 116 117 78 
ADF levels 0.40 0.07 0.01 0.98 0.19 0.87 0.99 0.55 0.02 0.86 0.11 0.99 0.62 
ADF diff 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Sweden   
Mean 69.91 67.26 37.53 17.75 51.11 5.51 34.82 29.34 0.42 13.0 5.17 5.00 37.95 
Median 69.63 66.88 21.97 15.13 66.73 4.45 30.07 28.82 2.53 5.56 4.90 4.30 26.19 
Max 81.85 79.96 199.35 37.74 83.86 14.84 79.40 54.36 23.95 72.94 11.00 11.00 147.12 
Min 55.59 51.73 -81.36 6.16 0.70 1.68 11.48 9.71 -39.95 2.17 0.80 1.20 3.03 
Obs 126 126 125 131 125 126 139 139 136 110 113 123 67 
ADF levels 0.72 0.34 0.00 0.89 0.31 0.99 0.84 0.30 0.15 0.51 0.07 0.99 0.89 
ADF diff 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00 
USA   
Mean 64.84 59.62 17.84 16.12 17.59 15.86 21.50 20.57 1.62 6.94 8.98 5.89 75.07 
Median 65.09 59.37 18.86 14.44 13.55 11.96 18.74 20.57 1.93 5.038 6.00 5.70 62.45 
Max 69.82 64.58 54.00 47.34 34.23 36.82 43.30 32.04 16.12 21.94 28.90 11.80 163.56 
Min 60.54 55.82 -41.17 9.09 4.03 4.61 6.14 5.39 -17.12 1.30 1.44 1.70 33.00 
Obs 103 97 86 87 125 87 125 125 121 148 116 123 77 
ADF levels 0.58 0.27 0.00 0.31 0.51 0.99 0.69 0.51 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.99 0.79 
ADF diff 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table Α3: Correlation matrices 
 WS WSP GROWTH GCONS UD OPEN MDEBT BDEBT INT PS TARIFF TFP 
France 
WS 1            
WSP 0.84 1           
GROWTH 0.20 -0.08 1          
GCONS 0.63 0.12 0.51 1         
UD 0.60 0.48 -0.19 0.02 1        
OPEN 0.19 -0.21 0.68 0.65 -0.53 1       
MDEBT 0.51 0.04 0.61 0.89 -0.22 0.78 1      
BDEBT 0.68 0.39 0.38 0.77 0.52 0.33 0.65 1     
INT -0.18 0.09 0.04 0.18 -0.62 0.20 0.16 -0.09 1    
PS -0.15 -0.45 0.47 0.47 -0.58 0.65 0.49 -0.06 0.12 1   
TARIFF -0.21 -0.05 -0.41 -0.63 0.34 -0.74 -0.68 -0.60 -0.19 -0.35 1  
TFP 0.21 -0.02 0.63 0.87 -0.40 0.75 0.95 0.64 0.26 0.67 -0.64 1 
Sweden 
WS 1            
WSP 0.99 1           
GROWTH 0.44 0.45 1          
GCONS 0.47 0.40 -0.32 1         
UD 0.79 0.79 0.55 0.90 1        
OPEN 0.46 0.46 0.61 0.78 0.63 1       
MDEBT 0.49 0.48 0.38 0.53 0.58 0.80 1      
BDEBT -0.44 -0.45 -0.32 0.41 -0.45 -0.01 0.07 1     
INT 0.30 0.27 0.13 -0.09 0.18 0.47 0.17 0.32 1    
PS -0.11 -0.12 0.45 0.40 0.28 0.75 0.68 0.23 -0.19 1   
TARIFF -0.55 -0.52 -0.46 -0.93 -0.80 -0.71 -0.66 0.06 -0.42 -0.43 1  
TFP 0.73 0.72 0.62 0.94 0.85 0.87 0.84 -0.14 0.20 0.66 -0.88 1 
USA 
WS 1            
WSP 0.19 1           
GROWTH -0.41 -0.31 1          
GCONS 0.59 0.02 -0.13 1         
UD 0.79 -0.15 -0.33 0.60 1        
OPEN -0.78 -0.43 0.46 -0.52 -0.75 1       
MDEBT -0.34 -0.62 0.36 -0.57 -0.03 0.80 1      
BDEBT -0.61 0.33 0.10 -0.57 -0.61 0.26 0.06 1     
INT -0.23 -0.13 0.17 -0.23 -0.11 0.13 0.31 0.46 1    
PS -0.52 -0.17 0.54 -0.39 -0.52 0.88 0.62 -0.09 -0.10 1   
TARIFF 0.16 0.62 -0.45 0.19 -0.34 -0.64 -0.65 0.35 -0.22 -0.57 1  
TFP -0.06 -0.68 0.51 -0.27 0.28 0.84 0.87 -0.30 0.23 0.76 -0.85 1 
110 
 
A3: ECM specifications with two short-run lags – Testing down starting point 
Table Α4: ECM specifications with two short-run lags 
  France Sweden USA 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects      
WS(-1) -0.209*** -2.817 -0.037 -0.419 -0.221*** -2.610 
UD(-1) 0.014 0.125 0.030* 1.774 0.013 0.421 
OPEN(-1) -0.027 -0.544 0.418 1.507 0.020 0.682 
GCONS(-1) 0.134 1.154 -0.152* -1.989 0.043** 2.150 
MDEBT(-1) -0.034 -0.378 -0.316*** -3.566 -0.075*** -2.761 
BDEBT(-1) 0.007 0.311 -0.021 -1.020 0.108*** 2.556 
C 14.501 2.926 2.778 0.447 13.023 2.477 
Short-run effects      
Δ(WS(-1)) 0.105 0.733 -0.132 -0.964 0.342** 2.511 
Δ(WS(-2)) 0.080 0.507 -0.113 -0.885 -0.143 -1.042 
Δ(GROWTH) -0.003 -0.284 0.000 -0.859 -0.001*** -2.705 
Δ(GROWTH(-1)) 0.003 0.171 -0.001 -1.274 0.000 -0.712 
Δ(GROWTH(-2)) 0.026* 1.832 0.000 -0.561 -0.001 -1.149 
Δ(UD) 0.151 0.480 -0.319*** -2.837 0.019 0.342 
Δ(UD(-1)) -0.193 -0.706 -0.007 -0.056 -0.009 -0.181 
Δ(UD(-2)) 0.125 0.430 -0.032 -0.282 0.028 0.579 
Δ(OPEN) -0.070 -0.858 -1.031*** -2.210 0.350*** 3.546 
Δ(OPEN(-1)) 0.123 1.435 0.333 0.454 0.012 0.110 
Δ(OPEN(-2)) -0.106 -1.291 1.161 1.597 0.096 0.907 
Δ(GCONS) 1.604*** 3.476 0.022 0.142 0.109*** 3.928 
Δ(GCONS(-1)) 0.190 0.381 -0.018 -0.117 0.017 0.538 
Δ(GCONS(-2)) 0.192 0.338 0.252 1.476 -0.020 -0.626 
Δ(MDEBT) 0.002 0.007 0.294*** 3.223 -0.010 -0.150 
Δ(MDEBT(-1)) 0.055 0.189 -0.033 -0.330 0.061 0.810 
Δ(MDEBT(-2)) -0.104 -0.390 -0.091 -0.904 0.001 0.015 
Δ(BDEBT) -0.041 -1.148 0.022 0.357 0.017 0.238 
Δ(BDEBT(-1)) 0.038 0.985 0.006 0.116 -0.022 -0.254 
Δ(BDEBT(-2)) -0.072** -2.284 0.136** 2.557 -0.141* -1.832 
 
 
R2 0.63  0.57  0.66  
DW 2.23  1.95  2.07  
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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A4: Specification (1) CUSUM control charts 
 
Figure A1: CUSUM control charts 
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Chapter 3 
Financialisation and the Top 1% in the Neoliberal era: A 
Comparative Political Economy Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
The neoliberal regime of accumulation has brought important structural changes in most 
advanced political economies. The most widely acknowledged and common among these 
changes is the rise in income inequality, which has been highlighted by the political economy 
approach (Stockhammer, 2015), but also by neoclassical scholars and international institutions 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; IMF, 2017). The issue of inequality also gained attention 
within a wider audience during the post-2007 crisis era through the popular works of Piketty 
(2014) and Atkinson (2015). Piketty and Atkinson offer a discussion of the structural causes 
behind the rise in income inequality and go beyond the usual measures of income inequality 
like the labour share and the GINI coefficient, stressing the underlying politics behind the 
income distribution indicators. Piketty pinpoints the significance of top income shares, as they 
represent specific social groups with distinct economic and political interests. The top one per 
cent income share has become the most popular among those measures, as it featured 
prominently in the recent US presidential election campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders. The 
public discussion about the rise of the top one per cent has mainly focused on the issue of 
taxation, rather than on the politics behind it or on the causes behind its rise. The political 
interest of this indicator lies in the fact that it includes capital owners and the working rich, i.e. 
includes both capitalists and workers who form a diverse social group. Such a social group is 
of great interest as it goes beyond the Classical Political Economy workers-capitalists 
dichotomy which stresses only the role of distribution between wages and profits, as in Smith 
(1776), Ricardo (1817), and Marx (1867, 1885, 1894). Examining how diverse but powerful 
social groups can form coalitions to protect their interests, i.e. their share of the national income 
can unveil how the distribution of power in the society has changed since the times of classical 
political economists.  
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The vast majority of the studies on the determinants of income inequality has centered 
either on functional income distribution (Bengtsson and Ryner, 2015) or on personal income 
inequality indices (Daudey and García-Peñalosa, 2007; Checchi and García-Peñalosa, 2010), 
examining mainly the impacts of skill-biased technical change, trade globalisation, and labour 
market institutions. In most of these studies, an important aspect of neoliberalism is missing: 
the effects of the financialisation of the economy. In general, financialisation is a broad term 
that refers to the increased dominance of the financial sector over the real economy, but, still, 
there is no unifying framework for the analysis of its macro and microeconomic effects. So far, 
the analysis of financialisation is based on the separate examination of specific channels of 
influence, e.g. Minskyan financial fragility (Nikolaidi and Stockhammer, 2017). Regarding 
distribution, several studies have explored the impact of different financialisation channels on 
the functional distribution of income, reporting that financialisation has benefited 
disproportionately capital at the expense of labour. Such channels include rising household 
indebtedness (Guschanski and Onaran, 2018; Wood, 2017), shareholder value orientation (Lin 
and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Alvarez, 2015; Dünhaupt, 2017; Köhler et al., 2018), and 
financial globalisation (Stockhammer, 2017). A small strand in the distribution literature also 
estimates the effects of financialisation on the top one per cent income share, providing 
evidence that higher income inequality is induced by the expansion of the financial sector 
(Roine et al., 2009; Volscho and Kelly, 2012; Dünhaupt, 2014; Flaherty, 2015; Godechot, 
2016; Huber et al. 2017). Although, a drawback of the literature is the extensive use of panel 
data analysis which omits crucial country-specific information and does not allow a thorough 
comparative political economy analysis. The very few studies which do focus on the country 
level, centre exclusively on the liberal market economy of the USA (Volscho and Kelly, 2012; 
Keister and Lee, 2014), overlooking other varieties of capitalism across the world. Thus, 
several important questions remain open and unanswered: Is financialisation affecting the top 
one per cent income share and does that occur through the same channels in all types of 
economies? How different are the results in liberal and coordinated Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 2001)? Can the regulation of the financial sector lead to a more 
egalitarian distribution path? What other factors supported the rise of the top one per cent in 
the neoliberal era?  
The aim of the present chapter is to seek answers to those questions, responding to the 
call of Hager (2018) for more thorough studies on the drivers of top income shares in different 
types of economies. To achieve that, this chapter follows a time series-based comparative 
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political economy approach, focusing on four case studies that represent four distinct varieties 
of capitalism in the neoliberal era. The first case study of this chapter is the archetypal liberal 
market economy (LME) of the United States (1974-2011), which was shocked by the asset 
(housing) market collapse of 2007-8. The second case study is the export-driven economy of 
Germany (1972-2010), a sector coordinated market economy in terms of its labour market, 
which has also been governed mostly by conservative governments and its growth in the 
neoliberal era was driven by its exports (Stockhammer et al., 2016), i.e. trade globalisation. 
The third case study of this chapter is the social-democratic nation coordinated market 
economy (NCME) of Sweden (1981-2012), which represents the Nordic model of capitalism 
during neoliberalism, i.e. a small open economy with an extensive welfare state and strong 
trade union institutions. The selection of these countries as case study aims to offer a thorough 
comparative analysis on which channels of neoliberalism and financialisation have contributed 
to the rise of the top one per cent income share in four diverse examples of advanced political 
economies. Besides the common explanatory variables that include labour market institutions, 
trade globalisation, and technical change, the goal of this study is to compare the impacts of 
different financial variables on the top one per cent, aiming to unveil cross-country 
discrepancies. In asset-based LMEs where speculative asset price dynamics are more 
influential for the macroeconomic, the effects of shareholder value orientation should be 
relatively stronger. The impacts of private debt ratios are expected to be relatively stronger in 
credit-based CMEs, where the financial system is more regulated mainly operating through the 
banking system. Trade globalisation is anticipated to be dominant in the neo-mercantilist, 
export-oriented economy of Germany. In Sweden, it interesting to evaluate the effects of 
household debt since as a statist-developmentalist country (Schwarz and Seabrooke, 2008) 
those might be controversial. This is due to the protection of indebted homeowners by the state 
which can diversify the disciplinary effect of household debt accumulation (Froud et al., 2002; 
Langley, 2007; Argitis and Dafermos, 2013; Kim et al., 2017; Wood, 2017).  
The methodology that is followed is based on time series econometric analysis and 
more specifically on the unrestricted error-correction model (ECM). This model allows 
assessing the long as well as the short-run effects of the explanatory variables, yielding 
unbiased estimates when the variables are integrated of either order zero or one. 
The second section of this chapter provides a descriptive comparative statistical 
analysis of the evolution of the top one per cent income shares in the United States Germany, 
and Sweden since the 1970s and contrasts them with the fluctuations in financial variables such 
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as share prices, household debt, and corporate debt during the same period. The third section 
presents the theoretical arguments that link the rise of financialisation during the neoliberal era 
with changes in the distribution of power, thus with the rise in income inequality. Additionally, 
the third section also discusses thoroughly the empirical findings of the studies that explore the 
impact of finance on the top one per cent. The fourth section presents the specifications that 
are estimated and justifies the choice of the unrestricted error-correction model as estimating 
technique. Section five reports the baseline econometric findings for each country and the 
results of five additional robustness specifications. Section six outlines the results of the 
calculation of the standardised coefficients for the baseline specification in order to assess and 
compare the political economy and policy implication of the main econometric findings. 
Overall, the key findings of the present study are as follows. In Germany, an export-
oriented coordinated market economy, the three key variables are union density, government 
spending, and trade openness, which do exhibit the anticipated negative, negative, and positive 
signs, respectively. Regarding financial variables, the real share price index has a positive 
short-run effect, but a perverse negative impact in the long-run. In Sweden, the results show 
that the rise in corporate indebtedness and shareholder value orientation increase the top one 
per cent income share. In contrast, household debt has a perverse negative impact, probably 
due to the fact that indebted households are more protected in this economy, as discussed later 
in section seven. Last, in the United States, shareholder value orientation and household debt 
accumulation contributed to the rise of the top one per cent, along with the decline in the rate 
of unionisation. The strong effect of share prices is indeed expected as the United States 
represent the asset-based liberal market economy model. 
 
2. The evolution of the top 1% in SCMEs, NCMEs, and LMEs in the 
neoliberal era 
Income inequality and the term ‘top one per cent’ started featuring prominently in the public 
discussion only after the 2007-08 financial collapse, despite wage shares in most advanced 
economies have been falling since the early 1980s (see Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; IMF, 
2017). The publication of Piketty’s opus magnum Capital in the Twenty-first Century, which 
highlights income inequality as one of the primary problems of political economy, played a 
pivotal role in this regard as it became popular within academia, politicians, and the general 
public. Piketty’s analysis involves different measures of inequality, stressing measurement 
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issues but also their underlying political implications. Among those measures, the top 
percentile income share features prominently, as its historical evolution is of particular interest 
both from a quantitative and qualitative perspective. From a quantitative perspective, its 
explosive increase in the neoliberal period is a phenomenon that occurred mainly in the 
Anglophone countries, rather than in continental Europe or in Japan  (Piketty, 2014, pp. 315-
321). From a qualitative perspective, the composition of the top percentile is also very 
significant, since according to Piketty (2014, pp. 276-278) the demographics of this indicator 
have changed compared to the early 20th century. More precisely,  at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the top one per cent used to represent the rentier class, i.e. it was constituted primarily 
by income from capital. This has changed in the neoliberal era, where labour income prevails 
over capital income in the top one per cent of advanced political economies.19 This discrepancy 
translates to a crucial demographic change: the top percentile has become the income share that 
includes capital owners and the top managerial class, i.e. the working super-rich. This change 
in the composition of this social group in the late 20th century has important political and 
economic implications. The first step in the analysis of the top percentile income share in this 
study is to examine the evolution of this indicator in four distinct Varieties of Capitalism: the 
Dirigiste, sector coordinated French economy, the export-driven, sector coordinated German 
economy, the social democratic nation coordinated economy of Sweden, and the liberal market 
economy of the USA.  
Starting with the archetypal liberal market economy of the United States has 
experienced the most dramatic increase in its top percentile income share, along with other 
anglophone countries, as highlighted in Piketty (2014). Starting from slightly over 8 per cent 
of GDP in 1975, the top percentile reached the first peak at over 20 per cent in 2001, i.e. the 
collapse of the dot-com bubble. This tremendous expansion of the top percentile income share 
was followed by a slowdown reaching less than 16 per cent in 2003, where a new rapid increase 
began. The second wave of expansion ended with the Wall Street collapse of 2007-8 where it 
approached 23 per cent of national income, its all-time peak during neoliberalism. As expected, 
the expansion in the liberal market economy of the USA is much more rapid compared to the 
coordinated economies discussed above. At its peak, the income share of the top one per cent 
in the USA was at least double that of Germany and Sweden. Also, it is worth mentioning that 
                                                 
19 According to Piketty (2014) income from capital exceeds income from labour only in the top 0.1 per cent 
incomes share. 
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the two declines occurred during financial collapses, which implies that the US top percentile 
is linked to shareholder value fluctuations, as anticipated in an asset-based liberal economy. 
 
Figure 1: USA – Top 1% (Source: World Inequality Database) 
 
For the export-oriented, coordinated market economy of Germany, the picture is 
slightly different as its top percentile rose rapidly only after 1995, and especially after 2002 
with the establishment of the common European currency and the Hartz reforms. Between 1972 
and 1990, i.e. before the German reunification treaty of 1990, the income share of the top one 
per cent remained relatively stable between 10 and 11 per cent of GDP, followed by a mild 
slowdown to slightly over than 9 per cent during the 1990-1995 transition period. In the 
succeeding period, i.e. the era of European integration and the Hartz reforms, the top one per 
cent income share in Germany grew substantially until the 2007-8 financial meltdown. That 
becomes more evident in the 2002-2008 period, where the income share of the top percentile 
increased from around 10.5 per cent to over 14 per cent. This rapid rise is probably related to 
the pro-capital Hartz reforms which included the decrease of unemployment benefits, 
workforce casualisation, and the provision of start-up grants to new entrepreneurs. The political 
instability in Europe after the 2007-8 crisis had an effect on the income of the top percentile in 
Germany, declining to approximately 13 per cent in 2010. Summarising, it seems that the 
118 
 
neoliberal accumulation regime did not affect the top percentile in Germany in its early phase, 
i.e. the 1980s, where its trend is stable. The big shift occurred as European political and 
economic integration proceeded in the late 1990s and the 2000s. It must be noted that in 
comparison with Sweden (see below), the income share of the German top one per cent has 
been substantially higher during Neoliberalism. This shows that on average the German top 
class earns substantially more than its Swedish counterpart.  
 
Figure 2: Germany – Top 1% (Source: World Inequality Database) 
The impact of neoliberalism on the top one per cent income share becomes quite evident 
in the case of Sweden, despite its long social democratic tradition. The income share of the top 
one per cent rose steadily from around 4 per cent in 1982 to approximately 11 per cent in 2001. 
This great increase of 7 per cent is even larger than the 6 per cent expansion of the top percentile 
in Germany over the period 1995-2008. Between 2001 and 2012 the Swedish top one per cent 
fluctuates noticeably. From 2001 to 2003 a sharp decrease to slightly over 7 per cent occurred, 
followed by an equally sharp rise to almost 10 per cent in 2007. Smaller fluctuations are 
observed in the post-2007-8 crisis period, with the Swedish top percentile stabilising between 
8 and 9 per cent of GDP. Overall, the level of the income share of the top one per cent in 
Sweden started from quite low in the early 1980s compared to Germany. The great expansion 
of the top one per cent occurred only after the mid-1990s where it eventually caught up with 
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the rest coordinated economies at around 9-10 per cent of GDP. Despite its social democratic 
welfare state tradition, Sweden failed to avoid the rise of the top one per cent like in most 
countries. This shows that the drivers of its top percentile are other than the government 
intervention, which has been more influential for the functional distribution of income between 
profits and wages. 
 
Figure 3: Sweden – Top 1% (Source: World Inequality Database) 
 
3. Financialisation, power relations, and the Top 1% in the neoliberal era 
The distribution of income, and thus income inequality has been a central problem in political 
economy since the times of the classical political economy. Ricardo (1817) was among the first 
scholars within political economy that stressed the importance of changing power relations for 
class conflict, hence the distribution of income between workers, capitalists, and rentiers. Of 
course, the distributive conflict is also central in Marx (1867, 1885, 1894) who endeavours to 
link income distribution with the occurrence of endogenous crises of the capitalist system. 
Inspired by the classical political economists, the field of Power Resources Theory (PRT) has 
emerged during the late 1970s attempting to explain discrepancies in welfare state regimes 
across countries (Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983). In addition, PRT offers a basic analytical 
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framework for the determination of income distribution which has become a key reference 
point for the top income share literature (see Hager, 2018). According to this framework, when 
workers achieve to organise themselves into trade unions and actively support left-wing 
political parties, they can exert power over their employers and achieve a more egalitarian 
distribution of income. As the top one per cent depicts a dominant social group of our times, 
strong collective bargaining institutions and redistributive policies should decrease its share of 
the GDP. Naturally, this argument is not novel, as Kalecki (1954) also argued that the stronger 
workers become by organising themselves into unions, the more likely is that they will achieve 
to decrease income inequality.  
Regarding other changes in the global economy, what is missing in the classical PRT 
income distribution framework is how different aspects of neoliberalism might be affecting 
income inequality. This shortcoming comes from the fact that the framework was initially 
developed during the early phases of neoliberalism. Rodrik (1997) raises the issue of income 
inequality at the international level by discussing the impact of trade globalisation and capital 
mobility. Rodrik argues that capital mobility tends to benefit the most mobile factor of 
production, i.e. capital, instead of the abundant factor. This translates to increased capital gains 
both in advanced and developing economies, suggesting that income inequality either in the 
form of higher profit shares or rising top income shares will be induced by trade openness. 
Harrison (2002), Jayadev (2007), and Stockhammer (2017) provide empirical evidence for 
Rodrik’s argument, showing that trade openness and capital mobility decreases the wage shares 
of advanced and emerging economies. 
Another main aspect of neoliberalism that is missing in the early PRT is how the 
financialisation of the economy changes power relations, thus affects income distribution. The 
concept of financialisation is ill-defined within the literature as it includes several dimensions. 
In general, financialisation refers to the phenomenon of the increased dominance of the finance 
sector and its actors over the real economy, which has important behavioural as well as 
macroeconomic implications. Studies within the political economy tradition have proposed 
different channels through which financialisation has been correlated with increases in 
inequality and top income shares in neoliberalism (e.g. Hein, 2015). Financialisation in 
advanced economies during neoliberalism has four distinct dimensions: (i) financial 
globalisation; (ii) housing market financialisation; (iii) corporate financialisation the form of 
rising financial overhead costs due to business indebtedness; and (iv) the financialisation of the 
corporate governance. Despite scholars have explored these channels separately from a 
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theoretical and an empirical perspective, still, there is no coherent theory of financialisation 
that includes all aspects in a unifying framework. Such a grand theory of financialisation would 
allow distinguishing which channels of financialisation are linked to the decline of the wage 
shares and which are related to the rise of top income shares. However, creating such a unifying 
theory is a non-trivial task, thus it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide it. As the 
existing empirical studies on the impact of financialisation on the top one per cent, this study 
seeks to examine which channels of financialisation have been dominant in different countries. 
Such results allow drawing important conclusions on differences and similarities in relation to 
the existing literature, which eventually will enhance our understanding of this phenomenon 
and provide necessary information for the creation of a unifying framework of financialisation. 
A first attempt to outline how financialisation could alter power relations and thus 
induce higher income inequality can be found in the seminal paper of Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2000). This paper argues that financialisation has made shareholders to press firm managers 
to become short-termists, i.e. increase their debt ratios in order to buy back shares aiming to 
maintain the value of share prices in the short-term in high levels, i.e. maximise dividend 
payments. This procedure leads to increases in firms’ overhead costs, so managers tend to 
squeeze wages in order to improve the financial position of the firm, inducing higher income 
inequality. As shareholder value maximisation aims to increase payments to shareholders, 
which are a vital part of the income from capital in the top income shares, the rise of the top 
percentile in the neoliberal era is linked to this process.  
Another channel through which the financialisation of the economy have changed the 
foundations of the classical PRT income distribution approach is the rapid growth of household 
debt accumulation. The argument that increased levels of household debt decrease the 
bargaining power of labour first appeared within the Foucauldian political economy tradition 
(Froud et al., 2002; Langley, 2007). Argitis and Dafermos (2013), Kim et al. (2017) and Wood 
(2017) have elaborated this point by claiming that this deterioration in workers’ bargaining 
power can lead to higher income inequality. This occurs as increased debt service commitments 
raise the cost of job loss of workers; thus, they wish to maintain their current job, i.e. secure 
the current inflow of income, even by accepting a lower wage rate in order to avoid defaulting 
on their debt and lose their residence (since the vast majority of household debt is indeed 
mortgage debt). Furthermore, the interest payments regarding the service of household debt 
commitments constitute an upward redistribution of income towards the non-productive, 
financial sector. As interest payments are income from capital, which dominates the 
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composition of top income shares, rising household indebtedness may be indeed connected to 
the increase of the top one per cent. However, Argitis and Dafermos (2013) claim that the 
linkage between household indebtedness and income inequality is not straightforward as it 
depends on domestic labour market institutions. More precisely, they argue that in a country 
with strong pro-labour collective bargaining structures, like a Nordic NCME such a Sweden, 
workers can be powerful enough to demand higher wages to enhance their financial position. 
In this case, household debt can indeed lead to lower income inequality. Contrariwise, in a 
liberal market economy where labour market institutions do not protect the working class, the 
impact of household debt on income inequality will be positive, as it induces working class’ 
self-discipline, as suggested by Foucauldian scholars. 
The financialisation of non-financial corporations is a third channel which affects 
power relations, challenging the relevance of the classical PRT framework. This channel of 
influence is particularly understudied in the literature, as very few scholars have examined it 
either from a theoretical or an empirical perspective. Argitis and Dafermos (2013) discuss the 
potential implications of corporate indebtedness for income inequality. As corporate debt 
increases the financial position of the firms worsens, hence firm managers tend to attempt to 
limit wage growth to counterbalance this deterioration. If firms are powerful enough to achieve 
that, then corporate indebtedness will decrease the wage income. According to Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), growing household indebtedness also has a positive effect on elite 
workers who are indeed part of the top percentile. Their argument is that the redistribution of 
income from productive non-financial firms to financial corporations tends to favour high-
skilled elite workers who can be employed in the latter, instead of the unskilled lower working 
class which cannot reallocate easily.  
Focusing on the empirical literature that explores the impact of financialisation on the 
top one per cent income share, very few studies can be found. The first empirical study that 
explores the impact of finance on top income shares is the seminal paper of Roine et al. (2009). 
This study utilises a panel dataset of 16 economies over the course of the 20th century (1900-
2000). To estimate the top income shares equations the authors use a standard first differenced, 
fixed effects GLS regression model, which theoretically yields unbiased estimates utilising 
samples such large size. The main dependent variables include the top one per cent, the top 0.1 
per cent, the next nine percentiles of the top decile (Top10-1), and the bottom nine deciles. One 
of the main explanatory variables regarding financialisation is dummies for banking and 
currency crises, and the development of the financial sector proxied by Bank deposits, Stock 
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market capitalisation, and Total market capitalisation. The other independent variables include 
trade openness, government spending, GDP per capita, and the marginal tax rate. The 
econometric findings suggest that both bank deposits and stock market capitalisation induce 
increases in the top income shares. In addition, banking crises affect negatively top income 
shares, as such crises lead to rapid decreases in shareholder value which is linked to capital 
income, which prevails in top income shares. Both results offer support to the shareholder value 
orientation hypothesis. Moreover, the results show that the effects of trade globalisation do not 
seem to have a significant effect on top income shares over the 20th century. 
In a more recent empirical study, Volscho and Kelly (2012) estimate the effects of 
financialisation on the top one per cent of the USA over the period 1949-2008. The econometric 
estimations of this study utilise the single-equation error-correction model, in order to estimate 
the short and the long-run effects of the independent variables. The main financialisation 
variables used in this study are the real S&P 500 Composite Index and the Shiller Home Price 
Index. Other independent variables include the real GDP, the unemployment rate, trade 
openness, union membership, the marginal tax rate, and dummies for the political party that 
prevails in the Congress and the party of the elected president. The main regression findings 
provide robust evidence that the top percentile in the USA during the twentieth century was 
driven by the governing party, declining unionisation, tax rate policy, and financial asset 
bubbles. The positive effects of the S&P 500 are consistent in the short- and the long-run, while 
both are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Regarding the second financialization 
variable, the Shiller Home Price Index, it does have the expected positive sign in the short- and 
the long-run, but only the latter coefficients are indeed statistically significant. Both results 
suggest that asset price booms induce income inequality since such booms increase capital 
income which is a large portion of top income shares. Particularly the home price booms may 
be also related to residential investment by elite workers, who are part of the top percentile in 
the neoliberal era, which creates an additional capital income channel that increases income 
inequality. 
Another econometric study that examines the determinants of income inequality in the 
US economy over the period 1967-2010 is the paper of Van Arnum and Naples (2013), who, 
however, focus on the GINI coefficient rather than on top income shares. The main explanatory 
variables related to financialisation that is used is the percentage value added to GDP by the 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) sector, in order to capture the dominance of 
financialisation over the real economy. The econometric estimations based on the Prais-
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Winsten20 methodology and standard first differences models provide robust evidence that the 
size of the FIRE sector increased the GINI coefficient in the USA. This constitutes additional 
evidence that financialisation not only induced higher income shares in the USA as shown in 
Volscho and Kelly (2012) but also gave rise to overall income inequality as measured by the 
GINI coefficients. 
Focusing on a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010, Dünhaupt (2014) 
estimates the impact of corporate governance and financialisation on various measures of 
income inequality, including the top one per cent. The regressions of this study are based both 
on random and fixed effects panel data models, allowing for panel-corrected standard errors in 
the latter. Regarding the main explanatory variables, Dünhaupt uses stock market capitalisation 
and net dividend payments as a share of value added by non-financial corporations as proxies 
for shareholder value orientation. Other variables include power resources indicators such as 
union membership, left cabinet strength, unemployment, and social spending, along with trade 
openness, FDI outflows, technical progress, top marginal tax rates, and female participation. 
The results of the estimations show that the two shareholder value indicators are associated 
with greater income inequality either in terms of the GINI coefficients or in terms of the top 
percentile. This once again suggests that increases in capital income due to rising share prices 
benefit disproportionately top incomes. Union density, growth, top tax rates, and trade 
globalisation are also found to be statistically significant and lead to the decline of top income 
shares. 
The empirical study of Flaherty (2015) is another case which shifts the focus from the 
case study of the US economy by estimating the determinants of top percentile for a panel of 
14 OECD countries over the period 1990-2010. The econometric estimations of this study are 
based on fixed-effects OLS regression models and the Arellano-Bond Generalised Methods of 
Moments (GMM) dynamic approach. The explanatory variables include the domestic total 
credit volume, the FIRE gross operating surplus, financial globalisation, market capitalisation, 
banking sector liberalisation, banking supervision, a financial reform index, government 
consumption, unionisation, trade openness, economic globalisation, capital taxation, and 
female labour force participation. As anticipated trade globalisation, government spending, and 
union density exhibit positive, negative, and negative effects, respectively, whilst they are 
statistically significant in the vast majority of the estimations. This shows that indeed inequality 
                                                 
20 The Prais-Winsten model is a variation of the Cochrane-Orcutt least squares estimation that take into account 
the first observation in order to deal with serial correlation of AR(1) type in linear models. 
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is exacerbated by enhanced capital mobility, and declining unionisation and welfare spending. 
With respect to financialisation, the econometric results indicate that the FIRE gross operating 
surplus has a robust positive impact on the top one per cent, keeping its statistical significance 
at the 1 per cent level in all cases. The effects of financial globalisation, banking liberalisation 
and supervision, and the financial reform index also have the anticipated positive signs, 
providing further evidence that financialisation benefits disproportionately the top income 
shares. Overall, the findings show that the shift towards the financial sector either in terms of 
its size or in terms of liberal institutional towards this direction has shaped power resources 
during neoliberalism in a wide range of advanced economies leading to the rise of top income 
shares. A drawback of using measures of financialisation related to the size of the financial 
sector or policy decision is that one cannot draw conclusions about the validity of specific 
behavioural assumptions, such as the shareholder value maximisation hypothesis or the 
household debt-labour bargaining power nexus. 
Godechot (2016) contributed to the study of the determinants of income inequality -
including top income shares- by extending both the time horizon to 1970-2011 and the number 
of case studies included in the panel dataset to 18 advanced economies. This study include a 
wide variety of different measures of financialisation including net distributed income as a 
proxy for shareholder value orientation, household debt and household shares (share of GDP) 
as a proxy for household financialisation, and non-financial firms’ financial income and assets 
(share of GDP) as a proxy for the financialisation of non-financial firms, among others. Other 
control variables include the GDP per capita, union density, import prices, and stock exchange 
indices. The author initially chooses to estimate the specifications of this study through 
classical fixed-effects models. As a further step, he also uses error-correction regressions, 
including a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, in order to account for issues 
of serial correlation handle potential reverse causality problems. As in the study of Flaherty 
(2015), Godechot’s econometric findings suggest the main driver of top income shares has 
been the growth and the profitability of the financial sector, with corporate and household 
financialisation play a secondary role. The author’s interpretation of the results is that the 
deregulation of the financial sector in the neoliberal era allowed rising banking concentration 
and profitability which fueled persistent increases in financial rents. As financial rents are 
linked to top income shares this led to their explosion during the late 20th and early 21st century. 
Finally, the most recent empirical study that scrutinises the determinants of the top 
percentile income share is the paper of Huber et al. (2017). This study utilises a panel dataset 
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of 18 advanced industrial democracies that covers the period from 1960 to 2012, the longest 
period covered in any relevant study of the post-World War II period. The main goal of Huber 
et al. (2017) is to evaluate whether the rise of the top percentile was primarily a political or an 
economic phenomenon, thus they include a wide range of political and policy variables, such 
as dummies for the Golden Age era, the pre-Single European Act period, the political 
orientation of the government. The explanatory variables set also includes power resources 
variables like union density, the power of works councils, and centralisation of bargaining. 
Besides policy and power resources indicators, the estimations include economic and 
financialisation indicators, e.g. stock market capitalisation, the size of the financial sector, trade 
openness, outward FDI, economic growth, and top marginal tax rates. The results of six rounds 
of regressions based on the Prais-Winsten approach show that the most robust explanatory 
factors of the top percentile income share are the political orientation of the government, 
unionisation, power of works councils, bargaining centralisation, and stock market 
capitalisation. The election of right-wing governments indeed induces higher top income 
shares, while the decline of union membership and the de-centralisation of bargaining also 
contributed towards the same direction. With respect to financialisation, the positive impact of 
stock market capitalisation on the top one per cent provides support to the shareholder value 
orientation hypothesis that contends that managers’ efforts to retain high the values of stock 
prices high and increase dividend payments benefits elite workers and capital owners which 
constitute this income share. In total, most statistically significant drivers of the top one per 
cent are power resources variables, which suggests that its rise is closely linked to indicators 
that capture the diminishing bargaining power of labour. 
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Table 1: Overview of related empirical studies 
Authors 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Financial variables Data 
Roine et al. (2009) 
Top 0.1 per cent; 
Top10-1; bottom nine 
deciles 
Banking and currency crises’ 
dummies; Bank deposits; Stock 
market capitalisation; Total 
market capitalisation. 
16 economies, 
1900-2000 
Volscho and Kelly 
(2012) 
Top 1 per cent 
S&P 500 Composite Index; 
Shiller Home Price Index 
USA, 1949-2008 
Dünhaupt (2014) 
Top income shares, 
GINI 
Stock market capitalisation; Net 
dividend payments 
13 OECD 
countries, 1980-
2010 
Flaherty (2015) Top 1 per cent 
Domestic total credit volume; 
FIRE gross operating surplus; 
Financial globalisation; Market 
capitalisation; Banking sector 
liberalisation; Banking 
supervision; Financial reform 
index 
14 OECD 
countries, 1990-
2010 
Godechot (2016) Top income shares 
Net distributed income; 
Household debt and household 
shares (share of GDP); Non-
financial firms’ financial income 
and assets (share of GDP) 
18 advanced 
economies, 
1970-2011 
Huber et al. (2017) Top 1 per cent 
Stock market capitalisation; Size 
of the financial sector 
18 advanced 
economies, 
1960-2012 
 
4. Econometric specification, data sources, and stylised facts 
As shown above, the econometric studies that explore the effect of financialisation on the top 
one per cent either focus on the archetypal liberal market economy case study of the USA or 
utilise panel data analysis which potentially omits crucial country-specific information and 
does not allow comparative analysis. Aiming to provide a thorough comparative political 
economy perspective on the impact of neoliberalism, and more precisely the effect of 
financialisation, on the top one per cent this chapter focuses on four distinct varieties of 
capitalism focusing on four case study that represent four distinct varieties of capitalism in the 
neoliberal era: (i) the archetypal liberal market economy (LME) of the United States (1974-
2011), whose growth in the late financialisation era was characterised by the housing asset 
market boom which ended with the collapse of 2007-8, sinking the economy into the deepest 
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recession since the Great Depression of the 1930’s; (ii) the export-driven economy of Germany 
(1972-2010), a sector coordinated market economy also governed mostly by conservative 
governments whose growth regime in the neoliberal era is largely dependent on its exports 
(Stockhammer et al., 2016), i.e. trade globalisation; and (iii) the social-democratic nation 
coordinated market economy (NCME) of Sweden (1981-2012), a typical example of the Nordic 
model of capitalism during neoliberalism, i.e. a small open economy with an extensive welfare 
state and strong trade union institutions. This is the first study within the top one per cent 
econometric literature that examines individual case study other than the liberal US economy 
and the first comparative political economy inquiry on this subject. In order to provide a 
thorough assessment on the reasons behind the rise of the top one per cent income share in each 
case study, the estimations include a wide variety of explanatory variables that include mainly 
financialisation indicators, but also several power resources and trade globalisation variables. 
The econometric estimations are based on the unrestricted Error-Correction Model (UECM) 
(see Sargan 1964, Davidson et al. 1978), including a lagged dependent variable, in order to 
address potential serial correlation issues of a standard OLS regression in levels. This model 
includes both the short-run (first-differenced) and the long-run (level) effects of the 
independent variables. Pesaran and Shin (1999) argue that this parametrisation of the standard 
ECM model can efficiently estimate cointegrating (long-run) relationships among the 
variables, even if they are of different integration orders, i.e. I(0) and I(1). The inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable allows limiting potential reverse causality issues, caused by serial 
correlation. The choice of this specification was based on a testing down procedure starting 
with a higher number of short-run lags (3) and decreasing them based on information criteria 
and R-squared values. This econometric specification is not new in the top one per cent 
literature as Volscho and Kelly (2012) use the same single-equation estimating strategy in their 
study of the US economy, while Godechot (2016) also utilises the same model but in a panel 
data context. Therefore, the baseline specification of the present study is of the following form: 
𝛥(𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡) =  𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑇𝑂𝑃1𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑊𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡−1  + 𝛼4𝑈𝐷𝑡−1 + 
𝛼5𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐻𝐻𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝛥𝑧
𝑁
𝑛=0
+ 𝜀𝑡           (1) 
Where 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 is the top one per cent income share, 𝑊𝑆 is the (adjusted) wage share, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 is 
government consumption (as a share of GDP), 𝑈𝐷 is union density (% of labour force), 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
is trade openness (imports plus exports as a share of GDP), 𝐻𝐻𝐷 is the household debt-to-
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income ratio (as a share of GDP), 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is the business debt-to-income ratio (as a share of 
GDP), and 𝑃𝑆 the real share price index. Vector 𝑧 includes short-run (first-differenced) effects 
of all variables, including the GDP growth in order to control for the short-run effects of the 
business cycle. The terms 𝑎0 and 𝜀𝑡  are the constant and the error term, respectively. 
The effect of the 𝑊𝑆 as a proxy for the potential impact of functional income inequality 
on personal income inequality and top income shares (Atkinson, 2009). This hypothesis is also 
tested by Flaherty (2015). The effect of 𝑊𝑆 on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 depends on the composition of the 
top percentile in each case. As suggested by Piketty (2014), during the neoliberal wage income 
still prevails over capital income even in the top one per cent, hence its effect could be even 
positive if elite workers income dominates. In cases which capital income prevails the effect 
of 𝑊𝑆 on 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 shall be negative, as redistribution towards wages decreases it. The effect of 
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 should be negative, as in principle state interventionism aims to empower 
labour and pursue a more egalitarian income distribution. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that its 
effect will be stronger in the cases of coordinated market economies, i.e. Germany and Sweden, 
where state interventionism is part of their policy regime. Regarding 𝑈𝐷, its impact on the 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1 shall be negative, as unions aim is to reduce income inequality. However, this 
relationship is not as straightforward as in the case of the functional income distribution, since 
the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 include both wage and profit income. In principle, as in the case of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, the 
positive effects of unionisation are expected to be stronger in the cases of coordinated 
economies. In particular, it is expected that the effects will be more dominant in the nation 
coordinated economy of Sweden, where union are relatively more powerful as bargaining takes 
place at the national level. This is not the case in Germany or the USA where bargaining takes 
place at the plant or the firm level, hence the effects shall be comparatively less strong.  With 
respect to 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, trade openness, it is anticipated that it will exhibit a positive effect on income 
inequality, as it depicts enhanced capital mobility which shifts income distribution towards 
capital income. In addition, the size of the foreign sector in an economy represents how much 
it relies on its exports. As in our cases, their export sectors are mainly focused to high-quality 
products (e.g. cars in the case of Germany) it is expected that the orientation towards those 
sector benefits skilled workers instead of unskilled, hence wage inequality induces further the 
rise of top income shares. Following the country classification of Stockhammer et al. (2016) 
which suggests that Germany is a typical example of a heavily export-oriented economy, it is 
anticipated that the effect of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 on its 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 will be more dominant compared to the other 
case study.  
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Moving on to the financialisation variables, the effect of 𝐻𝐻𝐷 on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 is expected 
to be negative as the accumulation of household debt decreases the bargaining power of labour 
and induces redistribution towards capital through the debt service payments. Nonetheless, this 
might not be the case in statist-developmentalist economies (Schwarz and Seabrooke, 2008) 
where indebted homeowners are protected by the state. Therefore, as long as household 
indebtedness leads to the purchase of an asset (i.e. a residency) which eventually empowers 
workers position, the effect might well be even negative. A negative effect in Sweden would 
also be in line with the argument of Argitis and Dafermos (2013) who claim the disciplinary 
effects of household indebtedness depend on labour market institutions. Their argument 
suggests that in an economy with strong pro-labour market institutions workers may well 
demand higher wages to cover the debt service costs, which shall lead to lower income 
inequality. Regarding the impact of 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1, this is expected to be positive as 
corporate financialisation induces redistribution from the productive sectors to the finance 
sector, increasing capital income from finance. As the top one per cent is the income share of 
rentiers and elite workers, it is expected to rise as financial rents increase. Last but not least, 
the third financial variable included in the baseline specification is 𝑃𝑆, whose effect on 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 
is also expected to positive, as it is a proxy for shareholder value orientation.21 As managers 
endeavour to keep share prices high in order to maximise payments to shareholders and also 
keep their own wages high, higher income inequality is induced both in terms of elite 
employees’ income and capital income, both of which are part of the top percentile. 
Beyond the baseline specification, five additional specifications are estimated to 
evaluate the robustness of the main findings. In the second specification, the real short-term 
interest rate, 𝐼𝑁𝑇, is included as a financial control variable. Its effect on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 shall be 
positive, since higher interest rates increase household and business debt service costs, 
inducing the redistribution of income towards higher income shares. In the third specification, 
stock market capitalisation, 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃, replaces 𝑃𝑆 as an alternative measure of shareholder value 
orientation, which is also expected to increase the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1. In the fourth specification, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 is 
replaced by the terms of trade, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, as an alternative institutional variable for trade 
openness. Furthermore, the corporate tax rate, 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋, is added in specification five in order to 
evaluate if taxation on capital income affects significantly top income shares. Finally, in the 
                                                 
21 Admittedly, dividend payments would be a better proxy, as share prices also capture the financial bubble effect. 
However, the time horizon of dividend payments series is relatively short which would limit substantially the 
overall time horizon of the estimations to the post-1990’s period. 
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last robustness specification 𝑇𝐹𝑃 is added a rough proxy of technological progress, aiming to 
test the neoclassical argument that inequality is induced by skill differentials among workers 
due to technical progress, thus should exhibit a positive effect. 
In the appendix can be found data sources and graphs, descriptive statistics, the results 
of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests, and the correlation matrices for all 
variables and countries. The outcome of the ADF unit root tests suggests that all variables for 
all four countries are either integrated of order zero or one, which justifies that the equations 
can be estimated through the standard UECM. 
 
5. Econometric results 
5.1 USA (1974-2011) 
For the USA, in the baseline specification (1) 𝑈𝐷, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝐻𝐻𝐷, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, and 𝑃𝑆 do have 
the anticipated signs in the long-run. Among those, the long-run coefficients of 𝑈𝐷 and 𝑃𝑆 are 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Regarding the short-run, the two statistically 
significant coefficients are those of 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝑃𝑆 (at the 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively) 
and do have the expected positive signs. In specification (2), the results remain almost identical 
in terms of statistically significance and magnitude of the coefficients. 𝑈𝐷 has the anticipated 
negative long-run sign and is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The same holds for 
𝑃𝑆 which keeps its positive sign in the short and the long-run, and in both cases remain 
statistically significant at the same levels with (1). In specification (3), where 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 replaces 
𝑃𝑆 as an indicator for shareholder value orientation, the results change slightly. Here, the two 
statistically significant long-run coefficients are those of 𝐻𝐻𝐷 and 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 at the 5 and 10 per 
cent levels, respectively, both having the expected positive signs. As with 𝑃𝑆 in the previous 
specifications, 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 also keeps its positive sign in the short-run and remains statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. In specification (4) in which OPEN is replaced by TRADE, 
the results also change slightly compared to the baseline specification. Now, all variables 
exhibit the anticipated signs in the long-run. Among them, the only statistically significant 
coefficients is that of UD at the 5 per cent level. In the short-run, BDEBT and PS are 
statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively, and both exhibit the expected 
signs as in (1). In specification (5) the long-run coefficients of 𝑈𝐷, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝑃𝑆, and 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 
are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The effects of 𝑈𝐷, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, and 𝑃𝑆 do have 
the expected signs, but 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 exhibits a perverse sign, i.e. increase in corporate taxation induce 
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lower rather than higher income inequality. In the short-run, the coefficients of 𝑈𝐷 and 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 
keep their expected signs and also are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Finally, 
specification (6), where 𝑇𝐹𝑃 is added as a control variable, provides evidence that 𝑈𝐷 and the 
three financialisation variables are the main drivers of the top percentile. 𝑈𝐷 and 𝑃𝑆 are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent levels, whilst 𝐻𝐻𝐷 and 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 are statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent levels. All four variables exhibit the expected signs in the long-
run. With respect to the short-run coefficients, once again, 𝑈𝐷 and 𝑃𝑆 are the two statistically 
significant ones, both keeping their anticipated negative and positive signs, respectively. In a 
nutshell, the LME of the United States has experienced a rapid increase in its top one per cent 
income share in the neoliberal era mainly due to the decline in unionisation and the 
financialisation of its economy. The main findings show that the impact of financialisation was 
multi-channel as both shareholder value orientation and private indebtedness have contributed 
positively. This is contrast with the findings for the SCME of Germany, where the impact of 
financialisation on the top percentile was through a single channel. 
The econometric findings for the USA suggest that the two main long-run drivers of 
the top percentile in the neoliberal era have been union density and shareholder value 
orientation. The accumulation of household and corporate debt also seems to play a role to 
some extent. According to the Durbin-Watson (DW) test, none of the specifications faces issues 
of autocorrelation, thus we may conclude that the signs of the statistically significant long-run 
coefficients suggest strong cointegrating relations. The Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test also 
provides similar evidence for specifications (3), (4), (5), and (6), but not for (1) and (2).
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Table 2: United States – Determinants of the top one per cent income share, 1974-2011   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
    
TOP(-1) -1.504*** -3.307 -1.628*** -3.277 -1.146*** -2.326 -1.392*** -3.240 -1.866*** -4.612 -1.733*** -3.394 
WS(-1) 0.342 0.829 0.314 0.714 -0.456 -0.582 0.418 1.009 0.634* 1.750 0.235 0.574 
UD(-1) -0.432** -2.264 -0.472** -2.239 0.504 0.816 -0.412** -2.230 -0.915*** -3.696 -0.662*** -2.716 
GCONS(-1) -0.862 -1.227 -0.700 -0.960 -0.997 -1.015 -0.675 -1.165 -0.081 -0.122 -0.925 -1.235 
OPEN(-1) -0.224 -0.596 -0.280 -0.725 -0.465 -0.754   0.191 0.551 0.010 0.026 
HHD(-1) 0.096 1.394 0.082 1.081 0.216** 2.046 0.089 1.215 -0.008 -0.123 0.128* 1.824 
BDEBT(-1) 0.175 1.668 0.164 1.530 0.130 0.936 0.158 1.390 0.282*** 2.961 0.205* 1.811 
PS(-1) 0.078** 1.992 0.102** 2.059   0.055 1.507 0.087*** 2.592 0.126*** 2.363 
INT(-1)   0.139 0.615         
SCAP(-1)     0.065* 1.836       
TRADE(-1)       0.027 0.399     
CTAX(-1)         2.037*** 2.910   
TFP(-1)           -0.030 -1.648 
C 0.034 0.093 0.065 0.170 0.387 0.629 -0.116 -0.362 -0.290 -0.898 0.378 0.888 
Short-run effects        
    
Δ(TOP1(-1)) 0.122 0.526 0.204 0.813 -0.136 -0.457 0.110 0.484 0.282 1.296 0.263 1.051 
Δ(GROWTH) 0.000 -0.165 0.000 -0.247 0.000 -0.686 0.000 0.211 0.000 1.064 0.000 0.583 
Δ(WS) 0.635 1.359 0.643 1.353 0.677 1.023 0.766 1.678 1.006*** 2.435 0.688 1.501 
Δ(UD) -0.520 -1.601 -0.366 -1.015 0.970 0.691 -0.463 -1.400 -0.830*** -2.840 -0.627* -1.799 
Δ(GCONS) -0.893 -1.145 -0.409 -0.443 -2.359 -1.602 -0.478 -0.599 -0.055 -0.077 -0.779 -0.829 
Δ(OPEN) -0.260 -0.999 -0.172 -0.624 0.020 0.060   -0.242 -1.102 -0.163 -0.585 
Δ(HHD) -0.125 -0.632 -0.126 -0.627 -0.102 -0.432 -0.035 -0.284 -0.020 -0.109 0.051 0.227 
Δ(BDEBT) 0.342** 2.008 0.218 0.922 0.126 0.367 0.386*** 2.967 0.572*** 3.496 0.278 1.592 
Δ(PS) 0.108*** 2.539 0.113*** 2.488   0.086** 2.141 0.044 0.992 0.098** 2.326 
Δ(INT)   0.213 1.180         
Δ(SCAP)     0.045* 1.774       
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Δ(TRADE)       0.080 0.898     
Δ(CTAX)         1.872** 2.164   
Δ(TFP)           -0.022 -0.586 
 
 
R2 0.82  0.83  0.88  0.82  0.89  0.85  
DW 2.34  2.45  2.14  2.29  2.20  2.33  
BG 0.09  0.04  0.23  0.74  0.15  0.10  
Notes: The dependent variable is the top one per cent income share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
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5.2 Germany (1972-2010) 
In Germany, the long-run coefficients of 𝑈𝐷, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and 𝐻𝐻𝐷 exhibit the anticipated 
signs in the baseline specification (1). Among those, the coefficients of 𝑈𝐷, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, and 
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 are statistically significant at the 5, 10, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. It should be 
noted that the correct sign of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 remains in the short-run as well, being statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level. Regarding financialisation, the only statistically significant 
coefficient is that of 𝑃𝑆 which has a perverse long-run and an expected short-run sign, 
remaining statistically significant at the 1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. In specification 
(2), in which 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is included, the results change slightly since now the only statistically 
significant long-run coefficients are the anticipated positive sign of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 and the perverse 
sign of 𝑃𝑆, both at the 1 per cent level. In the short-run, the impact of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 remains negative 
as expected and is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. In specification (3), where 
𝑃𝑆 is replaced by 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃, the results are similar to specification (1), as the statistically 
significant long-run coefficients are those of 𝑈𝐷, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃. The first three 
do keep the expected signs, but 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 has a perverse sign, like 𝑃𝑆 in (1). In the short-run, the 
coefficients of 𝑈𝐷 and 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 keep the correct signs and are statistically significant at the 5 
and 10 per cent levels, respectively. The short-run coefficients of 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 has the expected 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, similar to 𝑃𝑆 in (1). In 
specification (4) where 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 replaces 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, the long-run estimators change moderately, 
since in this specification 𝑈𝐷 keeps the anticipated negative sign and 𝑃𝑆 the perverse negative 
sign, both statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Moving on to specification (5), the 
results are almost identical to (1), as in the long-run 𝑈𝐷, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁, and 𝑃𝑆 are the only 
statistically significant coefficients, keeping the same signs. The same holds in the short-run 
where the only statistically significant estimates are those of 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑃𝑆 which do have 
the anticipated signs. Ultimately, in the final specification (6) the addition of 𝑇𝐹𝑃 does not 
alter substantially the findings. 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 keep their expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 𝑃𝑆 also is again statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level, still keeping a perverse sign in the long-run. In the short-term, the results remain 
similar to (1) and (5), since 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑃𝑆 have the correct signs and are statistically 
significant at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively. Overall, the results justify the 
characterisation of Germany as export-driven as the rise of its top one per cent can be attributed 
to trade globalisation, and to the decline in union density and government spending. The role 
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of financialisation is less clear as the impact of share prices alters between the short and the 
long-run.  
As expected, in the export-driven, coordinated economy of Germany the effects of 
unionisation, trade globalisation, and government spending are robust. With respect to the 
effects of financialisation on the top one per cent income share in Germany, the estimations 
suggest that it is actually shareholder value orientation that matters both in the short and the 
long-run. Regarding post-estimation diagnostics, in five out of six estimations the Durbin-
Watson and the Breusch-Godfrey tests suggest the absence of autocorrelation, hence those 
results are considered reliable. The absence of autocorrelation cannot be rejected only in 
specification (3). The absence of serial correlation suggests that indeed the statistically 
significant long-run coefficients depict strong cointegrating relationships.
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Table 3: Germany – Determinants of the top one per cent income share, 1972-2010   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
    
TOP(-1) -0.769*** -3.991 -0.602*** -2.773 -0.759*** -3.644 -0.401* -1.853 -0.816*** -3.991 -0.630*** -3.556 
WS(-1) 0.004 0.053 -0.016 -0.213 0.023 0.290 -0.003 -0.032 -0.025 -0.305 0.042 0.476 
UD(-1) -0.087** -2.033 -0.041 -0.809 -0.091* -1.879 -0.142*** -2.728 -0.098* -1.717 -0.026 -0.579 
GCONS(-1) -0.245* -1.809 -0.218 -1.573 -0.298* -1.712 0.049 0.390 -0.274* -1.691 -0.415*** -2.843 
OPEN(-1) 0.086*** 2.909 0.076*** 2.448 0.058* 1.736   0.084* 1.853 0.085*** 2.907 
HHD(-1) 0.030 0.931 0.060 1.633 0.012 0.309 0.008 0.194 0.030 0.859 0.041 1.420 
BDEBT(-1) -0.052 -0.822 -0.066 -1.056 -0.006 -0.082 0.019 0.263 -0.037 -0.483 -0.092 -1.524 
PS(-1) -0.020*** -3.267 -0.023*** -3.657   -0.020*** -2.560 -0.021*** -2.951 -0.019*** -2.844 
INT(-1)   -0.115 -1.582         
SCAP(-1)     -0.032** -2.085       
TRADE(-1)       -0.004 -0.173     
CTAX(-1)         0.136 0.301   
TFP(-1)           0.004 1.620 
C 0.142 2.074 0.119 1.717 0.137 1.749 0.080 0.717 0.169 2.220 0.099 1.341 
Short-run effects        
    
Δ(TOP1(-1)) 0.449*** 2.571 0.314 1.640 0.541*** 2.879 0.370* 1.686 0.463*** 2.550 0.296* 1.799 
Δ(GROWTH) 0.000* 1.741 0.000* 1.738 0.000 0.801 0.000 0.075 0.000* 1.759 0.000* 1.760 
Δ(WS) 0.174 1.612 0.205* 1.892 0.229* 1.863 0.152 1.118 0.144 1.208 0.067 0.601 
Δ(UD) -0.053 -0.762 -0.048 -0.689 -0.161** -2.082 -0.096 -1.034 -0.051 -0.688 0.039 0.550 
Δ(GCONS) -0.485** -2.218 -0.442* -1.842 -0.578* -1.934 -0.197 -0.781 -0.475* -1.700 -0.702*** -2.945 
Δ(OPEN) -0.038 -1.204 -0.033 -1.037 0.007 0.213   -0.037 -1.055 -0.005 -0.136 
Δ(HHD) -0.005 -0.058 -0.025 -0.291 -0.151 -1.531 -0.134 -1.606 0.015 0.152 0.007 0.089 
Δ(BDEBT) 0.074 1.090 0.080 1.193 0.061 0.847 0.122 1.434 0.080 1.117 0.024 0.388 
Δ(PS) 0.011* 1.731 0.008 1.212   0.006 0.733 0.011* 1.690 0.013** 2.295 
Δ(INT)   -0.074 -1.281         
Δ(SCAP)     0.022** 2.142       
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Δ(TRADE)       0.031 0.992     
Δ(CTAX)         -0.163 -0.410   
Δ(TFP)           -0.014** -2.079 
 
 
R2 0.79  0.82  0.80  0.67  0.80  0.85  
DW 2.25  2.48  2.98  2.46  2.12  2.12  
BG 0.29  0.11  0.64  0.00  0.15  0.39  
Notes: The dependent variable is the top one per cent income share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
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5.3 Sweden (1981-2012) 
In the baseline specification (1) the three financial variables are statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level, with 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝑃𝑆 having the expected long-run signs and 𝐻𝐻𝐷 having a 
perverse long-run sign. 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 and 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 also exhibit the anticipated signs, but they are 
statistically insignificant. The expected positive sign of 𝑃𝑆 also holds in the short-run where it 
is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level as well. In specification (2) incorporating 𝐼𝑁𝑇 
yields almost identical results as the long-run coefficients of the three baseline financial 
variables remain unchanged in terms of signs and statistical significance. In this case the long-
run coefficients of 𝑈𝐷 is borderline statistically significant at the 10 per cent level but has a 
perverse positive sign. Regarding the short-term, 𝑃𝑆 remains statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level and keeps the correct positive sign. Replacing 𝑃𝑆 with 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 in specification (3) 
the picture changes substantially, since now the only statistically significant coefficient is that 
of 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 which does have the expected positive sign, both in the short and the long-run. The 
results also change in terms of statistical significance in specification (4), where all long-run 
variables are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, except from 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆. 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 
𝑃𝑆 do have the expected signs as in (1) and (2), while 𝐻𝐻𝐷 keeps its perverse sign. Similar 
to the rest specifications the short run coefficient of PS has the anticipated sign and is 
statistically significant. As in (2), in (4) the sign of the long-run coefficient of 𝑈𝐷 remains 
perverse, i.e. increases the top one per cent. In specifications (5) and (6) incorporating 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 
and 𝑇𝐹𝑃, respectively, does not provide us with different results as all coefficients remain 
almost identical to those of specification (1) and (2). In both 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 and 𝑃𝑆 keep the expected 
positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The long-run coefficients 
of 𝐻𝐻𝐷 also remain statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, but also keep the perverse 
negative sign. As in most specifications 𝑃𝑆 keeps its correct sign in the short-run as well and 
is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  
In Sweden, household indebtedness, corporate indebtedness, and share prices are the 
most robust drivers of the top one per cent income share in Sweden over the period 1981-2012. 
The long-run effects of corporate indebtedness and share prices do have the expected positive 
signs, but household debt appears to affect the top one per cent perversely, i.e. negatively. 
Evidently, increased levels of corporate debt and shareholder value orientation have led 
Swedish firms to worse financial positions, which are attempted to become improved by 
squeezing the income of the working class, leading to higher income inequality. In contrast, 
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the results suggest that the arguments of Froud et al. (2002) and Langley (2007) that 
accumulation of household debt should deteriorate the bargaining power of labour, leading to 
higher inequality, does not hold empirically. Why this is the case in the statist-developmentalist 
Sweden? As argued in the next section that might due to protected homeowners who might 
take advantage of debt accumulation in order to obtain assets as residential investment and 
improve their bargaining position in the long-run. Beyond the statistical significance of the 
coefficients, the Durbin-Watson and the Breusch-Godfrey tests suggest that the residuals are 
not autocorrelated in the cases of specifications (1), (2), (4), and (6), whilst the issue of positive 
autocorrelation arises in the rest, hence the results of the former are considered as most reliable 
in terms of depicting cointegrating long-run relationships.
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Table 4: Sweden – Determinants of the top one per cent income share, 1981-2012   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Long-run effects        
    
TOP(-1) -1.996*** -5.905 -2.122*** -4.458 -0.778 -1.635 -2.219*** -7.547 -1.928*** -5.028 -2.036*** -5.501 
WS(-1) 0.268** 2.091 0.309 1.666 -0.272 -0.723 0.205*** 3.216 0.254* 1.779 0.271* 1.686 
UD(-1) 0.131 1.401 0.164* 1.694 -0.278 -1.574 0.141*** 2.529 0.151 1.125 0.142 1.265 
GCONS(-1) -0.142 -0.711 0.063 0.262 0.285 0.569 -0.230 -1.451 -0.141 -0.676 -0.066 -0.235 
OPEN(-1) 0.074 1.145 0.062 0.866 -0.227 -1.453   0.089 1.092 0.069 0.864 
HHD(-1) -0.114*** -2.987 -0.110*** -2.730 0.032 0.235 -0.142*** -4.631 -0.095** -2.079 -0.114*** -2.633 
BDEBT(-1) 0.051*** 3.284 0.047*** 2.702 0.009 0.209 0.062*** 4.454 0.042** 2.278 0.050*** 2.957 
PS(-1) 0.097*** 4.778 0.110*** 3.839   0.108*** 6.101 0.095*** 3.657 0.096*** 4.448 
INT(-1)   -0.082 -0.470         
SCAP(-1)     0.073*** 2.951       
TRADE(-1)       -0.127*** -2.731     
CTAX(-1)         -0.049 -0.057   
TFP(-1)           0.002 0.700 
C -0.197 -0.888 -0.289 -1.185 0.478 1.073 0.063 0.675 -0.219 -0.839 -0.241 -0.813 
Short-run effects        
    
Δ(TOP1(-1)) 0.397** 2.216 0.336* 1.707 -0.110 -0.321 0.516*** 3.231 0.417** 2.052 0.423** 2.125 
Δ(GROWTH) 0.000 -0.288 0.000 -0.231 0.000 0.408 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.192 0.000 -0.154 
Δ(WS) 0.098 0.888 0.110 0.910 0.045 0.173 0.121 1.498 0.123 1.042 0.124 0.872 
Δ(UD) 0.196 1.677 0.128 1.006 -0.164 -0.728 0.188*** 2.446 0.225* 1.770 0.198 1.538 
Δ(GCONS) 0.094 0.352 0.212 0.731 -0.177 -0.209 0.130 0.603 0.269 0.782 0.075 0.259 
Δ(OPEN) 0.044 0.923 0.047 0.945 -0.087 -0.816   0.056 1.008 0.032 0.599 
Δ(HHD) -0.018 -0.370 0.035 0.626 -0.026 -0.207 -0.009 -0.213 -0.042 -0.557 -0.026 -0.452 
Δ(BDEBT) 0.004 0.176 0.003 0.138 -0.082 -0.922 0.016 0.889 0.002 0.103 0.009 0.302 
Δ(PS) 0.067*** 6.925 0.071*** 5.950   0.067*** 8.176 0.058*** 3.129 0.064*** 5.758 
Δ(INT)   0.016 0.141         
Δ(SCAP)     0.029** 2.099       
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Δ(TRADE)       -0.051 -1.074     
Δ(CTAX)         0.378 0.551   
Δ(TFP)           0.002 0.153 
 
 
R2 0.90  0.92  0.94  0.93  0.90  0.90  
DW 2.43  2.36  2.56  2.60  2.71  2.42  
BG 0.20  0.14  0.01  0.16  0.03  0.11  
Notes: The dependent variable is the top one per cent income share in first differences. Statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
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6. The Comparative Political Economy of the Top 1% in the neoliberal era 
The main results above do provide us with important information on which are the main drivers 
of the top percentile in the short and the long-run in each case study. However, the magnitudes 
of the coefficients obtained are not comparable either within each country or cross country. To 
make the coefficients comparable it is necessary to derive the standardised coefficients by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviation of the explanatory 
variable over the standard deviation of the dependent variable. According to  Ziliak and 
McCloskey (2004), this step is essential in every econometric study that seeks to evaluate the 
socio-economic significance of the relative effects and go beyond statistical significance. Table 
6 below reports the standardised coefficients of the long-run, cointegration effects for the 
baseline specifications (1) for the United States, Germany, and Sweden.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting with the case study of the USA also yields interesting results. As in Sweden, 
both in the short and the long-run the impact of 𝑃𝑆 on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 is indeed positive and 
dominates the rest coefficients. This result provides further support to the argument of Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan (2000) that pursuing increases in share prices increases the top one per cent by 
raising the dividend and interest payments, along with the income of highly skilled employees. 
This result is also in line with the classical VoC classification of the USA as a liberal asset-
based market economy, which implies that in principle asset prices should affect more 
macroeconomic outcomes, including income inequality. Focusing on the long-run, the second 
dominant driver of the top one per cent in the USA during the neoliberal era is union 
membership, 𝑈𝐷. As in the case of Germany, its effect is indeed negative as expected. This 
finding underlines that the rise of the top one per cent in the USA since the mid-1970’s is also 
strongly induced by the declining unionisation rates, i.e. the disempowerment of labour’s 
                                                 
22 The standardized coefficients are calculated as follows. The estimated coefficient obtained is multiplied by the 
ratio of the standard deviation of the explanatory variable over the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Table 6: Standardised long-run coefficients 
  United States  Germany Sweden 
WS(-1) 0.326 0.019 0.832 
UD(-1) -1.216 -0.884 0.826 
GCONS(-1) -0.547 -0.774 -0.166 
OPEN(-1) -0.630 2.089 1.032 
HHD(-1) 1.135 0.569 -1.243 
BDEBT(-1) 0.755 -0.378 1.646 
PS(-1) 2.120 -1.355 3.999 
Notes: Calculations are based on the baseline specification (1).   
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representation which aims to reduce inequalities. In the short-run, the second strongest and 
statistically significant variables is the corporate debt ratio, 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇. This translates to higher 
income inequality in the short-run due to the rise of corporate financialisation, i.e. the 
redistribution of income towards the rentier class during neoliberalism.  
In the case of the export-driven German economy, as expected based on the country 
classification of Stockhammer et al. (2016), the long-run coefficient of 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 exhibits clearly 
the strongest effect on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 during the neoliberal era. This means that indeed the rise of 
the top percentile in Germany has to do mainly with the rise of a social class that benefited 
disproportionately from the export-oriented strategy of the country. The second strongest long-
run effect is that of 𝑃𝑆 which has a perverse negative effect on the top income share. One 
possible explanation for this perverse sign is that even members of the lower working class had 
access to buy shares providing them additional sources of income from capital, increasing 
indirectly their bargaining power, thus eventually leading to lower inequality. Consequently, 
future studies should look at the ownership of stocks, as it is of great significance for their 
potential effects on income distribution. Yet, this task is non-trivial, thus it is beyond the scope 
of this study. It should be noted though, that 𝑃𝑆 leads to higher income inequality in Germany, 
but the effects are limited only to the short-run. The other significant variables as expected for 
a coordinated economy are the long-run effects of 𝑈𝐷 and 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆, which show that the rise 
of the top percentile in Germany has also been induced by falling unionisation and welfare 
state retrenchment during neoliberalism. Interestingly, 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 also has a negative effect in the 
short-run which highlights the importance of welfare state retrenchment for top income shares 
in this case. In total, for Germany, it seems that it is primarily the power resources variables 
and trade globalisation that matter more for the growth of the top percentile rather than 
financialisation. This is to some extent expected for a coordinated economy, as in theory, 
financialisation should be more dominant in liberal regimes. 
Lastly, standardizing the coefficients for the case of Sweden, the standardised 
coefficients suggest that both in the short and the long-run the positive impact of 𝑃𝑆 on the 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1 is dominant. This results provides strong empirical support to the view that the Swedish 
top percentile income share rose mainly due to the rise of shareholder value orientation during 
neoliberalism. As proposed by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) this implies that Swedish 
firms’ attempts to boost share prices indeed assisted the rise of a social group of elite workers 
and capital owners whose income is linked to dividend payments. This could be to some extent 
surprising as coordinated economies are in principle credit-based, thus debt aggregates should 
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dominate. Beyond shareholder value orientation, the second dominant effect is indeed the 
positive long-run impact of 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 on the 𝑇𝑂𝑃1. This shows that the second main factor that 
induced the rise of the top one per cent in Sweden was the redistribution of income from the 
productive firms to the rentier class, through corporate debt payments. As rentiers are still a 
vital part of the top income shares this resulted in an increase in the top percentile. Regarding 
the third main financialisation variable 𝐻𝐻𝐷 the interpretation of its negative and statistically 
significant long-run sign is not straightforward. As suggested earlier, there are two possible 
explanation behind this negative effect. The first comes from the Neo-Weberian literature on 
welfare state and financialisation regimes. Schwarz and Seabrooke (2008) classify Sweden as 
a statist-developmentalist, coordinated economy, in which the state protects the right to home 
ownership with a focus on indebted homeowners who are more vulnerable financially. This 
means that indebtedness in this case does not have the disciplinary effects on labour’s 
bargaining power that are expected by Froud et al. (2002) and Langley (2007). In contrast, as 
indebtedness leads to the purchase of an asset for the indebted homeowner, i.e. the residency, 
this eventually empowers his/her bargaining position, hence the long-run negative effect. A 
second potential explanation is that the strong pro-labour market institutions in Sweden give 
workers the power to demand higher wages in order to cover their debt commitments, 
ultimately reducing income inequality, as proposed by Argitis and Dafermos (2013). Overall, 
it is quite interesting that, even in Sweden which is a nation coordinated economy, the power 
resources variables are insignificant, and the impact of financialisation is clearly dominant. 
That probably has to do with the fact that power resources variables play a relatively more 
important and straightforward role for functional income distribution, and not top income 
shares which are constituted of wage and capital income. 
Centring on the cross-country discrepancies, we observe the positive impact of 
shareholder value orientation on the top percentile is robust in two out of the three countries. 
This holds unanimously in the short and the long-run in Sweden and the USA, where rising 
share prices lead to increases in the top one per cent. The impact of the real share price index 
is less clear in the case of Germany since it induces higher income inequality only in the short-
run. The impact of other financialisation variables becomes evident mainly in Sweden where 
both private aggregates have significant long-run effects. For the USA corporate indebtedness 
also seems to play a role, but it is limited to the short-run only. With respect to the rest 
explanatory variables, the significance of the direct measures of power resources varies 
substantially. 𝑈𝐷 is the most prominent power resource variable, as the decline of union 
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membership is statistically significant and has a substantially large magnitude both for 
Germany and the USA. Contrariwise, the decline in government spending, i.e. welfare state 
retrenchment, is important to the top one per cent only in the case of Germany, both in the short 
and the long-run. Summarising, it can be argued that the rise of the top one per cent income 
share in the neoliberal era was mainly a phenomenon driven by financialisation, rather than by 
power resources indicators. Power resources variables which are more strictly linked to the 
bargaining process over the determination of factor income shares seem to be relatively more 
influential for the wage share decline in the neoliberal era (e.g. see Kristal, 2010; Hancke, 2012; 
Bengtsson, 2014). 
 
7. Conclusions 
Within the broad distribution literature several empirical studies explore the determinants of 
functional income distribution with a focus on the impact of financialisation provide evidence 
that rising household indebtedness (Guschanski and Onaran, 2018; Wood, 2017), shareholder 
value orientation (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Alvarez, 2015; Dünhaupt, 2017; Köhler 
et al., 2018), and financial globalisation (Stockhammer, 2017) have decreased the labour share. 
The goal of the present chapter has been to go beyond functional income distribution and 
explore the determinants of the top one per cent income share in the neoliberal era focusing on 
the individual country level through a comparative political economy approach. This study is 
the first attempt to provide such a comparative analysis focusing primarily on the impact of 
financialisation. Also, it is the first time that any individual country study within this part of 
the empirical literature explores other case studies except the liberal market economy of the 
USA. A substantially smaller proportion of the distribution literature has focused on the 
determinants of the top one per cent, including the effects of financialisation. The main findings 
of those studies show that higher income inequality is induced by the expansion of certain 
activities of the financial sector, either based on panel data context (Roine et al., 2009; 
Dünhaupt, 2014; Flaherty, 2015; Godechot, 2016; Huber et al. 2017) or focusing on the case 
of the USA (Volscho and Kelly, 2012). The common empirical result in most of these studies 
is that the main financial variables that affect the top one per cent income share are shareholder 
value orientation (measured by share prices, stock market capitalisation, or dividend payments) 
and the size of the financial sector. Both factors are found to lead to higher top income shares. 
With the exception of Godechot (2016), none of these studies estimates the effects of household 
and corporate financialisation in terms of private indebtedness, despite several studies have 
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explored those channels (e.g. Froud et al., 2002; Langley, 2007; Argitis and Dafermos, 2013; 
Kim et al., 2017; Wood, 2017). 
The main contribution of this present chapter is that it examined econometrically three 
coordinated market economies with diverse characteristics, besides the USA (1974-2011): 
Germany (1972-2010), an export-driven, sector coordinated economy whose growth during 
neoliberalism has been mainly dependent on exports (Stockhammer et al. 2016); Sweden 
(1981-2012), an example of a nation coordinated market economy with a statist-
developmentalist tradition to protect homeownership, including the indebted households 
(Schwarz and Seabrooke, 2008). The explanatory variables include a wide variety of factors 
including power resources indicators like union density, government spending, trade openness, 
terms of trade, and financialisation indicators such as the corporate and household debt ratios, 
and real share prices. Other control variables include stock market capitalisation as an 
alternative measure of shareholder value orientation, the corporate tax rate, and total factor 
productivity per hour worked as a rough technical progress indicator.  
The econometric results for the USA (1974-2011) suggest that the three main factors 
that led to the explosive growth of its top one per cent have been the fall in union membership, 
rising share prices, and to some extent corporate financialisation. Rising share prices, i.e. 
shareholder value orientation, dominate the other effects both in the short and the long-run and 
do increase the top income share as expected according to Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000). 
Declining unionisation is the second robust long-run effect which indeed suggests that the 
erosion of trade unions in the post-Fordist era favoured capital income and elite workers, 
resulting in rapidly rising top income shares. In the short-run, it seems that redistribution from 
productive units towards rentiers through corporate debt also induced higher income inequality 
to some extent. The estimations for the German economy (1972-2010) provide evidence which 
is in line with its classification as an export-driven economy (Stockhammer et al. 2016), as the 
long-run effect of trade openness indeed induces increases in the top one per cent, whereas 
government spending and unionisation have opposite effects. With respect to financialisation, 
similar to most existing studies, the only robust indicators are the proxies of shareholder value 
orientation, i.e. share prices and stock market capitalisation, both of which increase the top one 
per cent as they are associated with increases in capital income. This holds both in the short 
and the long-run, highlighting the robustness of the positive effects. Regarding the statist-
developmentalist, coordinated economy of Sweden (1981-2012), the econometric findings 
underline that financialisation has been the main driver of its top one per cent in the neoliberal 
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era. This becomes evident as the long-run coefficients of all three main financial variables are 
statistically significant in almost all six specifications. The corporate debt ratio, real share 
prices, and stock market capitalisation increase the top one per cent, pinpointing that corporate 
financialisation and shareholder value maximisation ideology induces redistribution of income 
towards rentiers and elite workers, i.e. top income shares. The negative effect of household 
debt is in contrast with the cultural political economy argument (Froud et al., 2002; Langley, 
2007) which links financialisation with the decreased bargaining power of labour but justifies 
the classification of Sweden as statist-developmentalist by Schwarz and Seabrooke (2008). As 
in such an economy, indebted homeowners are protected by the state household debt does not 
have disciplinary wage income effects, since the fear of defaulting on their debt is minimised. 
The mortgage leads to the purchase of an asset for the working class and eventually empowers 
it as a residency constitutes part of household wealth, thus the long-run negative effect on the 
top one per cent. 
Summarising the empirical findings for the four case studies in comparative 
perspective, the effect of financialisation is robust in all three countries, whilst the effects of 
power resources are not statistically significant in all cases. The positive effect of shareholder 
value orientation on the top percentile income share is most robust financialisation indicator, 
since this finding holds for Germany, Sweden, and the USA, either in the context of real share 
prices or in the context of stock market capitalisation. This result is in line with the existing 
empirical literature on the top one per cent (Roine et al., 2009; Dünhaupt, 2014; Flaherty, 2015; 
Godechot, 2016; Huber et al. 2017) which shows that its primary driver is indeed shareholder 
value orientation. The main new result here is that the present study provides such evidence for 
Germany and Sweden, and not only for the USA. Furthermore, the second important finding 
regarding financialisation is the statistically significant effects of the private debt ratios in 
Sweden and the USA, whose economic significance is discussed thoroughly earlier. These 
results are also consistent with the panel data study of Godechot (2016), who also shows that 
the rise in the private debt ratios has induced higher top income shares in the neoliberal period. 
Beyond financialisation, the effects of trade globalisation are quite limited in all cases except 
from Germany, which was expected based on the experience of the export-oriented strategy of 
its economy in the last few decades (Stockhammer et al. 2016). With respect to the power 
resources variables it seems that they play a more important role for the coordinated market 
economy of Germany, and to some extent for the liberal market economy of the USA. 
Interestingly, in Sweden, the effects are limited only to unionisation, despite its long tradition 
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of social democracy. These mixed results suggest that power resources variables are probably 
more closely related to the conflict over the functional distribution of income rather than to top 
income shares. Overall, the results show that the rise of the top one per cent during the 
neoliberal era has been a phenomenon driven by different factors, but financialisation seems to 
be the key factor in all three countries. The impacts of financialisation in the form of stock 
price inflation is consistent, the effects of private indebtedness, trade globalisation, welfare 
state retrenchment, and declining unionisation seem to depend on domestic characteristics of 
the economy. Such an example is the protectionist behaviour of the Swedish state in favour of 
indebted homeowners. 
Future research shall focus on providing more thorough comparative political economy 
studies on income distribution. As this study shows significant cross-country variation exists 
in its results, which unveils institutional and cultural differences among the case studies. So 
far, most studies utilise panel data analysis or focus exclusively on the USA, leaving 
unexplored a wide variety of countries who have experienced a rapid rise in their top one per 
cent income share. In addition, from a critical realist perspective future research should develop 
more thoroughly the channels through which financialisation affects income distribution. In 
this direction, it is of great significance to distinguish between measures of inequality that 
represent different social groups, i.e. functional income distribution versus top income shares. 
As shown in the previous chapter, private debt aggregates are found to be influential for 
functional income distribution, but this chapter shows that it is shareholder value orientation 
that matters more for the top one per cent. By the same token, power resources theory should 
update its benchmark framework by distinguishing between different channels that may affect 
different inequality indicators, since variables like government spending and union density are 
found to be dominant only in the context of the functional income distribution. 
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Appendix 
A1: Descriptive statistics, ADF results, and correlation matrices 
 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and ADF unit root tests   
  TOP1 WS GROWTH UD GCONS OPEN HHD BDEBT PS INT SCAP TFP TRADE CTAX 
Germany  
Mean 0.11 0.72 824.04 0.29 0.21 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.05 0.31 8.58 0.97 0.02 
Median 0.11 0.72 721.92 0.32 0.22 0.46 0.54 0.52 0.44 0.04 0.27 8.69 0.99 0.02 
Max 0.15 0.76 2193.89 0.36 0.24 0.87 0.71 0.61 1.58 0.12 0.65 11.34 1.04 0.03 
Min 0.09 0.65 -892.29 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.12 0.00 0.08 4.78 0.83 0.00 
Obs 50 43 47 57 58 48 48 48 57 57 43 53 48 52 
ADF levels 0.72 0.40 0.69 0.02 0.98 0.99 0.75 0.88 0.89 0.24 0.69 0.11 0.25 0.02 
ADF diff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden    
Mean 0.07 0.70 85.48 0.76 0.24 0.69 0.59 1.05 0.38 0.06 0.49 8.20 1.10 0.02 
Median 0.07 0.69 75.00 0.76 0.25 0.65 0.53 1.02 0.16 0.04 0.39 7.93 1.09 0.02 
Max 0.11 0.78 331.12 0.87 0.28 0.93 0.88 1.58 1.59 0.14 1.38 10.96 1.34 0.04 
Min 0.04 0.64 -172.30 0.65 0.16 0.43 0.44 0.54 0.01 -0.01 0.03 5.24 0.99 0.01 
Obs 54 43 57 53 58 48 38 38 57 35 29 53 48 52 
ADF levels 0.69 0.41 0.64 0.67 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.29 0.74 0.99 0.06 0.31 
ADF diff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USA    
Mean 0.14 0.67 3896.74 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.62 0.57 0.47 0.01 0.99 9.44 1.07 0.02 
Median 0.13 0.68 3556.90 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.59 0.56 0.24 0.01 1.03 9.30 1.04 0.02 
Max 0.23 0.70 8187.98 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.98 0.74 1.48 0.06 1.66 11.84 1.47 0.04 
Min 0.08 0.64 -2998.43 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.41 0.37 0.05 -0.02 0.39 6.68 0.95 0.01 
Obs 56 42 47 44 57 47 58 58 57 52 38 53 47 52 
ADF levels 0.91 0.12 0.28 0 0.48 0.92 0.82 0.97 0.99 0.02 0.85 0.99 0.04 0 
ADF diff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: ADF levels is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity in levels, while ADF diff is the same test in first differences. P-values are reported for this test. 
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Table Α2: Correlation matrices   
 𝑇𝑂𝑃1 𝑊𝑆 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 𝑈𝐷 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 𝐻𝐻𝐷 𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑃𝑆 𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 
Germany 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1 1              
𝑊𝑆 -0.78 1             
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 0.39 -0.47 1            
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 -0.77 0.83 -0.23 1           
𝑈𝐷 0.28 -0.61 -0.06 -0.64 1          
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 0.87 -0.86 0.39 -0.92 0.56 1         
𝐻𝐻𝐷 0.43 -0.68 0.13 -0.79 0.76 0.66 1        
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 0.52 -0.58 0.08 -0.83 0.62 0.78 0.81 1       
𝑃𝑆 0.70 -0.81 0.35 -0.88 0.57 0.82 0.83 0.73 1      
𝐼𝑁𝑇 -0.44 0.49 0.09 0.67 -0.40 -0.51 -0.52 -0.44 -0.52 1     
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 0.66 -0.71 0.29 -0.82 0.51 0.74 0.85 0.72 0.94 -0.58 1    
𝑇𝐹𝑃 0.62 -0.87 0.31 -0.89 0.74 0.82 0.86 0.79 0.89 -0.46 0.81 1   
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 0.37 -0.54 0.04 -0.66 0.42 0.40 0.61 0.45 0.64 -0.64 0.63 0.71 1  
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.31 -0.40 -0.09 -0.43 -0.48 -0.23 0.19 -0.21 -0.42 -0.51 1 
Sweden 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1 1              
𝑊𝑆 -0.48 1             
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 0.50 -0.56 1            
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 -0.22 -0.02 -0.13 1           
𝑈𝐷 -0.26 0.21 -0.48 0.12 1          
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 0.73 -0.73 0.56 -0.53 -0.31 1         
𝐻𝐻𝐷 -0.32 0.66 -0.21 -0.05 -0.34 -0.47 1        
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 0.76 -0.12 0.09 -0.05 -0.16 0.38 0.07 1       
𝑃𝑆 0.96 -0.54 0.55 -0.35 -0.38 0.84 -0.30 0.70 1      
𝐼𝑁𝑇 -0.83 0.70 -0.40 0.25 0.27 -0.83 0.35 -0.62 -0.85 1     
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 0.90 -0.69 0.56 -0.21 -0.41 0.81 -0.37 0.61 0.93 -0.89 1    
𝑇𝐹𝑃 0.84 -0.50 0.36 -0.45 -0.30 0.80 -0.17 0.77 0.87 -0.89 0.81 1   
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 -0.45 0.40 -0.24 0.67 -0.20 -0.77 0.37 -0.23 -0.52 0.55 -0.40 -0.61 1  
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.78 -0.71 0.66 0.00 -0.52 0.72 -0.34 0.43 0.82 -0.80 0.86 0.64 -0.25 1 
USA 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1 1              
𝑊𝑆 -0.77 1             
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 0.53 -0.34 1            
𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆 -0.90 0.78 -0.37 1           
𝑈𝐷 -0.35 -0.06 -0.52 0.24 1          
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𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 0.83 -0.85 0.38 -0.79 -0.10 1         
𝐻𝐻𝐷 0.87 -0.86 0.30 -0.88 0.01 0.87 1        
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 0.68 -0.65 0.00 -0.68 0.17 0.59 0.73 1       
𝑃𝑆 0.95 -0.83 0.46 -0.88 -0.28 0.92 0.92 0.66 1      
𝐼𝑁𝑇 -0.43 0.48 -0.15 0.56 -0.19 -0.66 -0.66 -0.34 -0.56 1     
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃 0.87 -0.60 0.55 -0.80 -0.60 0.69 0.70 0.38 0.86 -0.37 1    
𝑇𝐹𝑃 0.90 -0.86 0.37 -0.93 -0.16 0.90 0.96 0.69 0.96 -0.67 0.81 1   
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 0.10 0.06 0.16 -0.14 -0.46 -0.32 -0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.37 0.29 0.00 1  
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 0.22 -0.02 0.57 0.02 -0.47 0.15 0.04 -0.26 0.12 0.09 0.26 -0.01 -0.25 1 
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A2: Data sources and graphs 
Table A3: Data sources and definitions 
Indicator Measure Source Notes 
𝑇𝑂𝑃1 Top 1% income share (% GDP) wid.world  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 USD, Millions OECD   
𝑋 % GDP OECD   
𝑀 % GDP OECD   
𝑊𝑆 % GDP OECD   
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 
Exports price index over imports price 
index 
OECD 
  
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐶 % GDP WORLD BANK   
𝑈𝐷 % total number of employees OECD 
Administrative 
data for all 
countries except 
from the USA 
𝐻𝐻𝐷 % GDP BIS   
𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐷 % GDP BIS   
𝑃𝑆 Index, Real OECD   
𝐼𝑁𝑇 %, Nominal OECD   
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿 % OECD   
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋 % WORLD BANK   
𝑇𝐹𝑃 TFP per hour worked Bergeaud et al. (2016)   
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Figure A1: USA – Explanatory variables
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Figure A2: Germany – Explanatory variables 
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Figure A3: Sweden – Explanatory variables 
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Conclusions 
 
The goal of this doctoral research project has been to contribute to the growing empirical 
political economy literature on the macroeconomic effects of financialisation, understanding 
this phenomenon as integral to capitalism, and not only as part of the neoliberal era. Focusing 
on both broad research areas of the financialisation scholarship, i.e. its impact on economic 
fluctuations and its effects on income inequality, the first two chapters of this dissertation 
utilised historical macroeconomic data to explore whether finance has been influencing 
business cycles and functional income inequality since the mid-19th century, following a 
comparative political economy approach. Scrutinising further the impact of financialisation on 
income distribution, the third chapter centred on personal income inequality, and more 
precisely on the top one per cent incomes share. However, the econometric exploration of this 
chapter focuses on the neoliberal era. The choice to shift the focus of the third chapter on a 
specific period, rather than use historical macroeconomic data, is based on Piketty’s (2014) 
decomposition analysis of top income shares. Piketty’s findings show that the top percentile 
has changed dramatically compared to the pre-WWII period, since in neoliberalism it includes 
both top managers and rentiers (i.e. wage and profit incomes), rather than exclusively rentiers 
(i.e. only profit income). In this respect, examining the determinants of this particular inequality 
indicator over a long historical period can lead to misleading results. This is unlike the wage 
or the profit income share, which historically represent well-defined social groups. Regarding 
the case studies selected for this dissertation, the main aim has been to examine countries 
diverse characteristics. Hence, the dataset included the liberal market economies of the USA 
and the UK, the sector coordinated market economies of Germany and France, and the nation 
coordinated, statist developmentalist economy of Sweden. It must be noted that data 
availability has been an important limitation due to the use of historical data, but the final set 
of case studies is representative of the three main types of western capitalist economies.  
Therefore, this doctoral project examined three core research questions: (i) Have the 
business cycles of the USA and the UK been driven endogenously by private debt since the 
late 19th century, as suggested by Minsky’s theory of endogenous debt-driven economic 
fluctuations? (ii) Have mortgage indebtedness, corporate indebtedness, real share prices, and 
stock market capitalisation contributed to declines in the income share of labour in France, 
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Sweden, and the USA since the late 19th century? (iii) Have household indebtedness, corporate 
indebtedness, real share prices, and stock market capitalisation induced the rise of the top one 
per cent income share of the USA, Germany, and Sweden in the neoliberal era? 
As a first step of the analysis, the introductory chapter attempted to define what is 
financialisation. Despite some broad definitions of financialisation have appeared during the 
last few decades they do vary substantially. Implicitly or explicitly the vast majority of the 
financialisation literature discusses this phenomenon as a unique situation, i.e. as a new stage 
of capitalism or even as synonymous to neoliberalism. That becomes particularly evident in 
studies that build on the classical Marxist tradition (Lapavitsas, 2011) and describe 
financialisation as a distinct regime of accumulation of the post-Fordist era. This is somewhat 
inconsistent in the sense that early Marxist authors like Hilferding (1910) have discussed the 
financialisation of the economy in the context of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Moreover, recent seminal works in the field of Quantitative Macroeconomic History 
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordá et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al., 2013) provide 
annual historical macroeconomic data on several financial variables since the mid-19th century 
contradict the view of financialisation as a new stage of capitalism. The historical financial 
series show that finance has been historically integral to the capitalist system of production of 
most advanced economies, rather than part of a particular phase of it. In addition, those studies 
also provide econometric evidence that financial variables, either private debt aggregates 
and/or asset prices, have been increasing the probability of financial crises and deeper 
recessions at least since the mid-19th century. Building on these datasets and findings, this 
doctoral research project calls for a different understanding of financialisation as a dynamic 
integral process which changes forms across space and time. The introductory chapter 
distinguished between three distinct financialisation processes: (a) the financialisation of the 
corporate sector due to riskier investment decisions a la Minsky; (b) the financialisation of the 
corporate sector due to the growth of the influence of stock markets on corporate governance; 
and (c) the financialisation of households through accumulation of private debt. The degree of 
deepening of each financialisation process can vary substantially under different regimes of 
accumulation and across countries. So far, the financialisation literature builds on the neoliberal 
experience mainly in the Anglophone advanced capitalist countries, describing financialisation 
as a combination of rising household indebtedness and shareholder value orientation. This 
doctoral research project rejects this rather myopic view of financialisation as biased from the 
experience of the last few decades. Considering finance as integral to capitalism, this project 
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aimed to improve our understanding of its macroeconomic effects in the long run. First, by 
testing Minsky’s behavioural theory of endogenous debt-driven business cycles since the late 
19th century, rather than conducting exploratory estimations as the rest empirical literature that 
uses historical macroeconomic data does. Second, by examining how different dimensions of 
financialisation have been influencing the distributional conflict between capital and labour 
since the late 19th century. Third, focusing on a more era-specific research question, I examined 
to what extent the neoliberal form of financialisation has contributed to the rise of the income 
share of rentiers and top managers, i.e. the top percentile income share. Perceiving 
financialisation as a combination of different processes in different sectors which can vary 
across countries, this study is one of the few studies financialisation that utilises time series 
econometric analysis and examines case studies other than the USA. 
The first chapter aimed to explore if business cycles in the USA and the UK have been 
driven by corporate or mortgage debt since the late 19th century, testing Minsky’s behavioural 
theory of endogenous debt-driven economic fluctuations (see Nikolaidi and Stockhammer, 
2017). This theory suggests that firms increasing optimism during the boom makes them take 
riskier decisions, i.e. increase their debt ratios in order to invest more. As corporate debt 
accumulates, eventually debt service payments become unsustainable, thus firm have to 
decrease their investment expenditure, triggering a slowdown in accumulation. In this respect, 
there are two testable hypotheses that can be estimated to assess the existence of Minsky cycle: 
GDP or investment growth must exhibit a positive effect on corporate indebtedness, and 
corporate debt must have a negative effect on GDP or investment growth. Existing literature 
on debt-driven cycles examines them either in terms of standard deviation shocks of debt on 
growth, or the negative effects of private debt on growth (Palley, 1994; Kim, 2013, 2016), or 
test whether private indebtedness increases the probability of financial crises (Schularick and 
Taylor, 2012; Jordá et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; Aikman et al., 2013). Contrary to those 
approaches, this chapter focused explicitly on both aspects of Minsky’s theory, i.e. debt-
burdened growth and the procyclicality of the leverage ratio. The pair of estimating equations 
were strictly based on a simple predator-prey, difference equations system of private debt and 
growth which depicts a general Minsky debt model (see Nikolaidi and Stockhammer, 2017). 
Regarding the estimating methodology, I chose to allow the error terms to follow moving 
average error processes of order one (MA(1)), i.e. use the Autoregressive MA(1) model 
(ARMA(1, 1)). This choice has to do with the 2D predator-prey debt-growth system which is 
too minimalistic, thus technically misspecified from a statistics point of view, which would 
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have induced serial correlation in the residuals if ordinary least squares have been chosen 
instead of the ARMA(1,1) model. The full sample results provide strong evidence that the in 
the USA GDP and investment growth has been inducing higher business debt ratios since the 
late 19th century while rising debt ratios have been decreasing GDP and investment growth 
during the same period. The estimations which has been based both on an equation-by-equation 
basis and in a systems context (Vector Autoregressive MA(1) model) showed that the corporate 
leverage ratio has been procyclical, while simultaneously GDP growth and investment growth 
have been business debt-burdened, hence the USA has indeed experienced Minsky corporate 
debt-driven cycles at least during the last century. Regarding the UK, the corporate leverage 
ratio is found to be procyclical in the full period, but the effects of corporate indebtedness on 
growth are insignificant, hence Minsky’s business cycle theory is not confirmed in this case. 
Also, the mortgage debt-growth system estimations do not provide evidence for mortgage-
driven cycles either in the USA or the UK.  
The second chapter shifted the focus from the analysis of business cycles to the scrutiny 
of the distributional conflict between capital and labour in historical perspective, i.e. it focused 
on the determinants of the labour share. Utilising recently developed historical databases on 
distribution indicators (Piketty and Zucman, 2014) and financial variables (Jorda et al., 2017), 
this chapter estimated the effects of three different channels of financialisation on the wage 
shares of France, Sweden, and the USA since the late 19th century. Despite the development of 
new databases with historical macroeconomic data has demonstrated that finance has been 
historically integral to capitalism, existing literature on the impact of finance on the functional 
income inequality has focused exclusively on the post-WWII period (e.g. Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey 2013; Alvarez, 2015; Stockhammer, 2017; Wood, 2017; Guschanski and Onaran, 2018; 
Köhler et al., 2018), which is rather myopic. The econometric estimations are based on the 
unrestricted error-correction model which has become a quite common approach in the social 
sciences distribution literature (e.g. Kristal, 2010; Volscho and Kelly, 2012; Bengtsson, 2014a; 
Godechot, 2016), as it effectively corrects for serial correlation and distinguishes between the 
long and the short-run effects, which can be analytically important. The econometric results 
for France show that the mortgage debt ratio and real share prices have been reducing its labour 
share since the early 20th century. In addition, government spending has a positive effect on 
its labour share in historical context, which provides support to the argument of Dutton (2002) 
that a universal social security system has been established in France as early as the pre-War 
under the pressure of progressive social movements. The econometric results for Sweden 
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suggest that mortgage debt, real share prices, and stock market capitalisation have been 
contributing to decreases in its labour share since 1891. There is also strong evidence that 
strong labour power resources have benefited labour in Sweden historically, as union density 
exhibits a positive effect which is statistically significant in most specifications estimated. The 
results on the effects of financialisation on the US labour share are mixed, as the coefficient of 
mortgage debt has a negative sign, but business debt is found to increase the labour share since 
1929. Government spending exhibits a robust positive effect on the US labour share, showing 
that historically government intervention has benefited labour in the USA. Calculating the 
standardised coefficients for the baseline specification for the three countries, I find that: (a) 
the magnitude of traditional power resources variables, like government spending in France 
and the USA, and union density in Sweden, are stronger than the impact of finance indicators; 
and (b) in the USA the negative effect of mortgage debt is larger than the positive effect of 
business debt, therefore the total impact of financialisation is found to be negative. The 
econometric findings of this chapter provide support to the view that finance has been integral 
to capitalism at least since the late 19th century (see Jordá et al. 2017) by showing that financial 
variables do not only generate endogenous crises and deeper recessions (see Chapter 1; Jordá 
et al. 2013, 2015, 2016) but also disempower labour and induce higher income inequality. This 
finding is of particular importance, as recent studies on the nature of domestic demand regimes 
in historical context (Stockhammer et al. 2018) show that demand has been wage-led, i.e. 
reductions in the labour share have contractionary effects. 
The third chapter shifted the focus from the historical dimension of financialisation and 
examined a research question that is of particular interest in the neoliberal era: Has the rise of 
the top percentile income share been induced by the neoliberal form of financialisation? Piketty 
(2014, pp. 276-278) argues that during neoliberalism, a substantial qualitative structural change 
has occurred to the top one per cent income share which has become the income share of capital 
owners and the top managerial class, i.e. the working super-rich. This is unlike the pre-WWII 
period in which the top one per cent used to depict the income share of rentiers. This remark 
implies that the study of the top percentile requires a time-specific study, i.e. focus on its 
evolution under certain regimes of accumulation where its demographics have not changed 
substantially. The present chapter contributes to the literature by examining the effects of 
financialisation on the top percentile income share of four different varieties of capitalism: 
USA (1974-2011), Germany (1972-2010), and Sweden (1981-2012). Existing literature on the 
impact of financialisation on the top percentile has been based mainly on panel data analysis 
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or focused exclusively on the case of the USA. I estimated the effects of various channels of 
financialisation, including proxies such as household debt, business debt, real share prices, and 
stock market capitalisation and control variables like union density, government spending, 
trade globalisation, and corporate taxation. The estimations were based on the unrestricted 
error-correction model, similar to the labour share estimations of chapter two. For the USA, 
the econometric results suggest that real share prices have increased its top one per cent, while 
unionisation exhibits a negative sign, with the magnitude of the former being larger. In 
Germany, trade globalisation has a positive impact which prevails over the rest statistically 
significant effects, which is consistent with its classification as export-oriented (Stockhammer 
et al. 2016). The long-run coefficients of union density and government spending do have the 
expected negative signs, while real share prices decrease its top percentile share. In Sweden, 
corporate debt and real share prices are found to induce increases in the top percentile, whereas 
household debt has a negative effect on the top one per cent. The latter finding provides support 
to Argitis and Dafermos (2013) who argue higher household indebtedness in countries with 
strong labour power resources can lead to less inequality. The econometric results of this 
chapter show that the drivers of the rise of the top one per cent vary significantly in different 
varieties of capitalism. Overall, in contrast to functional income distribution, the magnitudes 
of the financialisation variables are found to be larger than those of labour power resources. 
Summarising, the present doctoral project contributed to the empirical literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of financialisation by providing strong evidence that: (1) corporate debt 
has been creating endogenous financial instability in the US economy during the last century; 
(2) private indebtedness and the growth of the influence of stock markets have been decreasing 
the labour shares of France, Sweden and the USA at least since the late-19th century; and (3) 
the rise of the top percentile income share in the neoliberal era is a phenomenon linked to the 
growth of financial activities in most countries. There are few possible straightforward 
extensions to this research agenda: First, to develop fully specified models that include the 
destabilising roles of private indebtedness and asset prices together, and examine them 
empirically. Second, further development of historical macroeconomic databases, which will 
include more countries (e.g. developing economies) and more sophisticated finance indicators 
(e.g. dividend payments and financial globalisation indices), will allow to expand the analysis 
on whether financialisation has been historically integral to capitalism across a wider variety 
of economies and use better proxies for specific theoretical arguments. Third, the phenomenon 
of endogenous business cycles, like income distribution, can depend on various factors beyond 
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the impact of finance, hence future studies should use the 2D predator-prey framework of 
chapter one to examine other types of endogenous cycles, e.g. growth-profit share Goodwin 
(1967) cycles or growth-government spending political business cycles (Kalecki, 1943). 
Focusing on specific aspects of the macroeconomic impact of financialisation, the first 
two chapters demonstrated that finance has been historically integral to capitalism, while 
chapter three argued that certain dimensions of the macroeconomy require an analysis that 
takes into account specific historical accumulation regimes and their characteristics. Thus, 
arises the question: How should the financialisation literature move forward? The short answer 
to this question is that a general theory of financialisation must be developed. This requires an 
empirical analysis that examines financialisation as integral to capitalism, but with a focus on 
how financialisation has changed under different epochs, i.e. under different regimes of 
accumulation. The French Regulation Theory (Boyer, 1990) and the Marxist Social Structures 
of Accumulation approach (Gordon et al., 1982) emerged during the late Fordist period as 
attempts to explain the 1970s stagflation crisis and examine how different institutional 
complementarities, i.e. modes of regulation, supported growth in different historical periods. 
However, both approaches largely overlook the role of finance. Hence, future research should 
build on those approaches and examine different financial variables as indicators of different 
dimensions of financialisation in order to answer to what extent finance has been dominant 
historically and how financial structures have changed under different modes of regulation. 
Such an analysis requires a long-term perspective, thus the use of historical macroeconomic 
data. Expanding the analysis of the introductory chapter of this thesis, future studies on 
financialisation should distinguish between two main types of financialisation: household-
driven and corporate-driven. Further, it would be beneficial to identify additional sub-varieties, 
such as bank-based household-driven, housing asset-driven, rentier-dominated, and corporatist 
financialisation periods. Initially, the study may focus on the two main categories by examining 
graphically if the GDP share of mortgage debt exceeds the GDP share of the corporate debt. If 
that is the case then this period will be characterised as a household-driven financialisation 
regime; if not, it will be described as corporate-driven financialisation. Focusing on the 
household-driven financialisation periods econometric causality tests can unveil whether there 
is bidirectional positive causality between mortgage debt and house prices, i.e. a housing 
bubble. If this relationship exists, then the regime shall be characterised as housing asset-driven 
financialisation. By the same token, if in a corporate financialisation period the increase in 
corporate debt induces higher share prices, then this period will be described as rentier-
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dominated financialisation regime since this will indicate that leverage was used to maximise 
shareholder value (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Needless to say, it is of great importance 
to examine this phenomenon on an individual country basis, since significant cross-country 
discrepancies do exist, therefore a domestic financialisation regime may vary significantly 
across time and space. 
More broadly, regarding the future research agenda of political economy, it is of great 
importance expanding the connections between global political economy and the heterodox 
economics traditions which can be mutually beneficial. International political economists 
should shift their focus from the narrow micro-level analysis and embrace the macroeconomic 
analysis of the Post-Keynesian tradition which offers a framework that links class struggle and 
macroeconomic stability building on the notions of wage- and profit-led demand (e.g. see 
Stockhammer et al., 2016). Such a framework allows to go beyond the concept of social 
equality per se, and discuss its relationship with economic stability, which eventually helps us 
assert whether social democratic policies can stabilise the system. Moreover, more extensive 
use of econometric methods -as this study did- would allow scrutinising various unexplored 
political economy arguments, as descriptive statistics (which are more commonly used in 
international political economy) cannot effectively unveil the causality among different 
variables. In turn, contemporary Post-Keynesians have a lot to learn from global political 
economy and politics, as their analysis has become more economistic in the narrow sense, 
moving away from its political economy roots. In recent decades, Post-Keynesians have 
focused to a large extent on building formal macroeconomic models and using formal statistical 
techniques to examine existing political economy arguments, rather than provide their own 
political economy explanation of current issues. At the same time, most of their criticism 
against mainstream economics is focused on the absence of political economy, which is 
somewhat contradictory. One of the most notable shortcomings of the contemporary Post-
Keynesian tradition is the absence of a coherent state theory and the absence of the role of 
politics. A possible path to overcome this shortcoming is to go back to its roots and more 
specifically to Kalecki (1943) who has stressed the twofold role of state intervention for 
macroeconomic stability and ruling class’ political uncertainty which can create endogenous 
instability. This will allow, for instance, not only to analyse the economic effects of 
financialisation and market deregulation but also to understand how the balance of power 
among different social classes affects the policy decisions of governments on (de)regulation 
(Gouzoulis and Constantine, 2019). In addition, few recent studies (Palley, 2015; Gouzoulis, 
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2019) argue for the importance of the political economy of the middle working class, as this 
social group may share interests simultaneously with the lower working class and the capital 
owners. This element introduces an opportunistic aspect into its behaviour, which could explain 
why empirical survey studies report that the middle class often acts as a political advocate of 
pro-capital reforms, such as financial liberalisation and trade globalisation (Loayza et al. 2012; 
Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). In this sense, a necessary development in order to produce policy-
relevant alternatives to neoliberalism is to go beyond the classical workers-capitalists class 
dichotomy and take into account the political and macroeconomic role of the middle working 
class. 
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